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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this doctoral dissertation, I provide a systematic analysis of the role of so-
cial norms in the thought of philosopher and feminist theorist, Judith Butler. 
More specifically, I investigate the way in which Butler theorizes the relation-
ship between norms and violence in light of her notions of critique and re-
sistance. The key argument of the study is that in order to understand the 
wide range of topics that Butler addresses in her work—such as gender nor-
malization, the critique of violence, ethical responsiveness, and the biopoliti-
cal regulation of life—we need to pay close attention to her account of norms. 
Although Butler’s theorization of norms has begun to attract increasing 
scholarly interest, a thorough analysis of the topic has not yet been written. 
In order to fill this gap in previous research, my dissertation offers the first 
monograph-length study that explicates the problematic of norms in Butler’s 
thought. 
 
My study seeks to answer the following questions: What is the role of norms 
in Butler’s work? How does Butler conceptualize the relationship between 
norms, violence, and nonviolence? How should we understand critique, 
transformation, and resistance in the midst of norms? What are the ethical 
and political implications of Butler’s notion of norms? I respond to these 
questions by examining Butler’s theorization of norms through what I call 
her twofold understanding of norms. I argue that on the one hand Butler 
theorizes norms as mechanisms of social power that violently regulate the 
field of recognizable subjects, bodies, and lives, but on the other hand she 
conceptualizes norms in terms of the possibility of critical change and re-
sistance. 
 
I illustrate Butler’s twofold notion of norms through four key topics, which I 
have organized into four main chapters. First, by examining Butler’s often-
neglected feminist theoretical background in the thought of Monique Wittig, 
I argue that her conception of the relationship between norms and violence 
critically builds on Wittig’s argument that normative heterosexuality can be 
understood as a form of discursive violence. Second, through explicating But-
ler’s conception of gender normalization vis-à-vis her generally overlooked 
discussions of transgender embodiment and livability, I challenge recent ar-
guments that feminists should get rid of the concept of gender. By introduc-
ing the concept of “trans livability” I highlight Butler’s work as a contribution 
to trans-affirmative feminist theory.  
 
Third, by challenging the general tendency to interpret Butler as a critical 
humanist, I demonstrate that she puts forward a critique of anthropocen-
trism that offers insights into problematizing the speciesist norms that up-
hold not only the human-animal binary but also differentiates between liva-
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ble and killable nonhuman animals. Finally, by foregrounding Butler’s psy-
choanalytic account of grief in terms of her critique of norms, I argue that her 
discussion of the normative separation between grievable and ungrievable 
lives does not represent a turn away from politics as many critics have ar-
gued. I contend that her account of grievability must instead be understood 
as a theorization of resistance. 
 
Taken together, all the four chapters of my dissertation highlight Butler’s 
theorization of norms as a practice of feminist critique. By elucidating the re-
lationship between norms, violence, and social change, my study emphasizes 
the close relationship between feminist and queer practices of political re-
sistance and the critique of norms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In recent decades, the terminology of norms has become a commonplace in 
feminist, queer, trans, intersectional, and anti-racist theoretical frameworks. 
While rich and diverse in their areas of focus, these frameworks all share the 
aim of disclosing and contesting social norms, such as binary gender norms, 
normative heterosexuality, and racializing norms. Broadly construed, norms 
refer in these analyses to current ideals that regulate what can be regarded as 
a normal body or a valuable life (see, for example, Sedgwick 1990; Halperin 
1995, Warner 1999; Duggan 2002; Eng, Halberstam & Muños 2005; Puar 
2007; Ahmed 2013; Spade ([2011]2015). However, given the multifaceted 
and divergent interpretations of how social norms operate in our societies, 
the arguments regarding the conditions of feminist critique, change, and re-
sistance vary. In fact, an introduction to a recent special issue of differences 
called “Antinormativity’s Queer Conventions” (Wiegman & Wilson 2015) 
sparked a polemic with scholars holding different and even opposing posi-
tions about how we should conceptualize norms, and more specifically, how 
we should theorize the relationship between norms and critical agency. As 
debates like these indicate, there is a need to further explicate what we mean 
when we talk about—and, indeed contest—norms.  
 
In this doctoral dissertation I provide a systematic analysis and a sustained 
discussion on how a leading theorist within feminist and queer studies, Ju-
dith Butler, approaches the problem of norms. I argue that the question of 
norms runs through Butler’s oeuvre, lending thematic continuity to her di-
verse body of work that encompasses a wide range of topics. These include, 
for example: gender performativity, transgender autonomy, the normative 
constitution of “the human,” questions regarding the social and political con-
ditions of life, the problem of grievability, criticism of war and violence, as 
well as the ethical problems of responsiveness and the good life. However, 
despite the distinctive role that the question of norms plays in Butler’s work, 
its overall significance remains, in my view, underestimated in the now al-
ready rich and extensive scholarship published on her thought. 
 
Ever since the publication of her groundbreaking book Gender Trouble 
([1990]1999), Butler’s work has attracted considerable scholarly interest not 
only in gender studies and queer and feminist theory (see Jagger 2008) but 
also in political philosophy (see Lloyd 2007; Chambers & Carver 2008a, 
2008b; Schippers 2014), moral philosophy and ethics (see Thiem 2008; 
Lloyd 2015), sociology (Kirby 2006), legal studies (see Loizidou 2007), liter-
ary studies (see Salih 2002), media studies (see Brady & Schirato 2010), and 
religious studies (see Armour and St. Ville 2006). Although several scholars 
have commented on the question of norms in Butler’s work, a systematic 
analysis of the topic still remains to be done. In order to fill this gap in the 
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previous literature, my dissertation provides the first book-length study that 
focuses particularly on investigating Butler’s theorization of norms. By 
providing a detailed discussion of the role of norms in Butler’s work, my 
study further develops and contributes to the growing body of literature in 
the emerging field of Butler studies.  
 
Acknowledging that the question of norms is a contested theoretical terrain, I 
insist that Butler’s work offers us important insights into understanding the 
relationships between norms, violence, critique, and change. To this aim, my 
study seeks to answer the following set of questions: What is the role of 
norms in Butler’s work? How does Butler conceptualize the relationship be-
tween norms, violence, and nonviolence? How should we understand cri-
tique, transformation, and resistance in the midst of norms? What are the 
ethical and political implications of Butler’s notion of norms? I will respond 
to these questions by explicating Butler’s theorization of norms as a critique 
of norms. By investigating her work as a critique of norms I want to highlight 
two interrelated aspects of her notion of norms. These are the questions of 
violence and resistance. 
 
The key argument of this study is that Butler’s theorization of norms must be 
understood in terms of what I call her twofold notion of norms. By this I 
mean that on the one hand, Butler conceives of norms as something that 
makes the social field intelligible and constitutes us as recognizable beings. 
In this sense, norms operate through normalization. As mechanisms of social 
power, norms not only produce us as subjects but they also act forcefully on 
our bodies. They assign us to social categories (such as gender and race) and 
produce standards and ideals that regulate—often through violence and ex-
clusion—what kinds of subjects and lives are currently regarded as possible. 
In this sense, norms operate in a regulatory manner that sometimes takes 
violent forms. This violence related to norms ranges from the systemic forms 
of oppression and physical violence faced by sexual and gender minorities to 
the politically induced condition of heightened mortality of certain popula-
tions, such as immigrants and other racialized people. 
 
And yet, norms have a second dimension as well. Given that the social opera-
tion of norms requires that we continuously repeat them in our daily life, 
their persistence through time is dependent on a constant enactment 
through a set of various social, cultural, and political practices. It is my con-
tention that it is precisely the function of enactment and repetition that 
opens the norms for reworking and transformation. In other words, for But-
ler, norms also provide the conditions for critique and change. In order to 
understand Butler’s account of norms, we have to look carefully at this two-
fold dimension of norms, that is, at both her conceptualization of the rela-
tionship between norms and violence and her theorization of norms as 
modes of transformation and resistance. Analyzing Butler’s work in terms of 
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the twofold approach to norms is an original contribution of my dissertation 
to the field of feminist theorizing. 
 
In contrast to my approach, a common approach in the secondary literature 
is to read Butler’s notion of norms in terms of what scholars have called 
“normative violence” (see Lloyd 2007; Chambers 2007; Chambers & Carver 
2008a; Mills 2007; Brady & Schirato 2010; Murphy 2011a; Feola 2013). Mo-
ya Lloyd, for instance, has used it in order to stress “the violence of particular 
norms (or normative frames) in determining what (or who) will or will not 
count as culturally intelligible” (Lloyd 2007, 136; see also Lloyd 2013). In 
other words, we are formed through a constitutive violence that produces on-
ly certain kinds of beings (identities, experiences, and lives) as socially rec-
ognizable. Yet, although the concept of norms figures in the title of Lloyd’s 
book Judith Butler: From Norms to Politics, her focus is not specifically on 
Butler’s notion of norms but more generally on the feminist theoretical and 
philosophical trajectories of her thought with a particular focus on the ques-
tions of the body, language, and politics.  
 
On the other hand, those scholars who have provided more detailed analyses 
of Butler’s notion of norms (Chambers 2007; Chambers & Carver 2008a; 
Mills 2007; Thiem 2008; Murphy 2011a; Kirby 2006) have systematically 
downplayed the feminist theoretical background of Butler’s conception of 
norms. Generally, these scholars have highlighted Butler’s philosophical 
commitments to Michel Foucault’s notion of normalizing power and Jacques 
Derrida’s theorization of deconstruction. By focusing only on the impact of 
these philosophers on Butler’s notion of norms, they have ignored the femi-
nist theoretical background of her theorization of the relationship between 
norms and violence (see also Hemmings 2011). More precisely, I argue that 
scholars have overlooked Butler’s critical deployment of Monique Wittig’s 
notion of compulsory heterosexuality as a form of discursive violence (see 
Karhu 2016). It is my contention that Butler starts to develop her twofold no-
tion of norms exactly in the context of her early reading of Wittig in Gender 
Trouble ([1990]1999). 
 
In my view, the selective readings that have neglected Butler’s debt to Wittig 
have contributed to a general misunderstanding that Butler theorizes norms 
as structurally and ontologically violent. This line of interpretation presumes 
that Butler’s conception of norms rests on a notion of the “inherent violence 
of norms” (Murphy 2011a; see also Chambers 2007; Chambers & Carver 
2008a), “fundamental violence of discourse” (Chambers 2007; Chambers & 
Carver 2008a), “foundational violence” (Brady & Schirato 2010), “transcen-
dental violence” (Murphy 2011a) or “ontological or constitutive violence” 
(Mills 2007). Some of these scholars have also identified a tension in Butler’s 
work between her previous work on normative violence in the context of her 
elaboration of gender and her more recent considerations on the ethics of 
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nonviolence. They have argued that because Butler conceptualizes norms as 
ontologically violent, her turn to a critique of violence and a notion of non-
violence in her more recent work is at odds with her prior work on norms 
(Mills 2007; Murphy 2011a).  
 
However, by offering a more nuanced reading of Butler’s early discussion of 
norms in the context of her interpretation of Wittig, I challenge this interpre-
tation. I argue that by conjoining Wittig’s notion of discursive violence to her 
own notion of the performative operation of norms Butler actually rejects the 
argument that norms are inherently violent and instead theorizes them in the 
twofold manner I describe above. To emphasize Butler’s critical reading of 
Wittig in the context of her notion of norms is the first central topic of my 
dissertation. 
 
While my work draws and further elaborates on the interpretations that have 
read Butler’s work through the lens of “normative violence,” and while I 
think the concept does capture something important about Butler’s discus-
sion of the ways in which norms constitute us as recognizable beings, I will 
not use it as a point of departure for developing my conceptual framework. In 
fact, Butler mentions the phrase “normative violence” only once in her whole 
work (see GT, xx). Therefore, and for the purposes of my study, I deploy an 
analytical strategy that refrains from merging the concepts of “norms” and 
“violence” together. This is not to argue that Butler theorizes norms and vio-
lence as mutually exclusive operations of power. Quite the contrary, I argue 
also that Butler does conceptualize norms often in terms of violence.  
 
The aim of my interpretational strategy is to take a critical step back from the 
accounts of ontological violence (i.e. the understandings that view norms as 
“inherently” violent) that in my view risk conceptualizing violence as an es-
sential dimension of norms. By doing this I want to problematize the idea 
that violence is a self-evident fact of social relations and thus put more em-
phasis on violence as a historically and socially contingent phenomenon, that 
is, as something that can be called into question. By this I mean that even 
though norms potentially operate through violence, it is not an essential or 
structural feature of their function. Instead I argue that a crucial aim of But-
ler’s account of norms is precisely to expose the conditions under which 
norms do operate through violence or with violent effects and then to 
demonstrate that it is possible to interrupt them.  
 
To emphasize this aspect of Butler’s work, I want to elucidate her theoriza-
tion of norms as a critique of norms. It is my contention that Butler actually 
rejects the idea of norms as something that by definition work through vio-
lence. By highlighting her twofold notion of norms I thus seek to stress her 
general aim of opening up the norms for critique and change, of articulating 
a different future of norms. This, however, does not mean that we can get rid 
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of norms. Considering that Butler’s conception of norms is informed by Fou-
cault’s notion of social power understood not as a repressive but as a produc-
tive force that permeates all social relations, arguing for the eradication of 
norms would for her be an impossible theoretical position. Instead, Butler’s 
goal is to make norms visible so that it is possible to critically scrutinize their 
truth and self-evidence. In this sense, the task of critique opens up the possi-
bility of politicization and change. Therefore, my reading strategy, which 
analytically disentangles the concepts of “norm” and “violence,” allows me to 
pay careful attention to Butler’s understanding of norms as both potential 
mechanisms of violence and modes of social transformation. 
 
I argue that Butler’s twofold approach to norms is most clearly discernible in 
her discussion of gender minorities, especially trans people. In order to shed 
more light on her understanding of the transformative aspect of norms (in 
this context: gender norms), I will put forward a close reading of her theori-
zation of transgender embodiment, livability, and gender self-determination. 
Although Butler has stressed the significance of trans issues for her—both 
personally and academically (see Butler in More 1999)—and although she 
dedicates much space to discussing the topic, it is conspicuous by its absence 
in the secondary literature. Usually trans lives are brought up (together with 
the intersex population) in the literature only as illustrations of non-
normative genders. Since much of Butler’s work focuses on problematizing 
the violent exclusions of gender and sexual minorities, to ignore those parts 
of her work that specifically deal with these issues is to render already mar-
ginalized people invisible. In this sense, the omission runs counter to the eth-
ical undertone of Butler’s critique of gender norms. This is, in her words, “to 
let the lives of gender and sexual minorities become more possible and more 
livable […]” (NPTA, 32). 
 
However, and in addition to the ethical implications described above, the 
failure to elaborate on Butler’s discussion of trans issues is also theoretically 
problematic: it has consequences for the way scholars have interpreted her 
notions of norms and normalization. As I have already noted, the general 
tendency is to interpret Butler’s account of norms in terms of ontological vio-
lence. I argue that it is specifically in the context of her writings about trans 
lives that she most clearly articulates the possibility of change inherent in the 
operation of norms. It is my contention that Butler’s discussion of trans lives 
throws into stark relief her notion of norms as modes of critical transfor-
mation. 
 
In my discussion on Butler’s theorization of norms, violence, and trans lives, 
I position myself in a critical dialogue with Foucauldian feminist scholars 
(Hausman 1995; Germon 2009; Repo 2016) who have posed the question 
whether feminists should reject the concept of gender altogether. The moti-
vation for this question in these Foucauldian feminist studies is informed by 
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the historical fact that the concept of “gender” was invented as part of the 
normalizing discourses of US psychiatric-sexology in the 1950s that targeted 
trans and intersex bodies in particular. However, by drawing on Butler’s 
elaboration of gender as a transformable norm in the context of her discus-
sion of trans lives, I will defend the concept of gender as a valuable and criti-
cal tool for feminist theory and politics. My interrogation will thus distin-
guish Butler’s Foucauldian-inspired notion of norms and normalization from 
those Foucauldian feminist scholars that have proposed the rejection of the 
concept of “gender.” I will develop my argument through my concept of 
“trans livability” that draws on Butler’s critical reflection on the differential 
ways in which life is normatively produced as “livable” only for those popula-
tions that fit the current norms regulating gender and sexuality. 
 
I will elaborate further my key argument concerning Butler’s twofold notion 
of norms by offering a critical development of Butler’s notion of “livability.” 
As many scholars have pointed out, the problem of “livability” characterizes 
especially Butler’s more recent work. In these writings, Butler attends to the 
ethical and political question regarding the unequal distribution of bodily 
vulnerability and exposure across different populations and how these pro-
cesses make certain groups more vulnerable to violence and suffering than 
others. Many scholars have also noted that this problem informs especially 
Butler’s so-called “post-9/11” texts, which offer a sustained critique of the 
US’s military politics and engages in the critical analysis of the conflict in Is-
rael-Palestine (see, for example, Schippers 2014, 2–3). A common strategy is 
to read this change in Butler’s thematic framing in light of the question of 
“the human.” Accordingly, scholars have analyzed this shift with such con-
cepts as “new corporeal humanism” (Murphy 2011b), “mortalist humanism” 
(Honig 2010; 2013), “the political philosophy of the human” (Schippers 
2014), and “the political problem of the human” (Lloyd 2015). Given that 
Butler too has proposed an analysis of the normative category of “the hu-
man” (PL, 20), the deployment of the framework of “the human” in the 
commentaries does not come as a surprise.  
 
My study challenges this commonly-held interpretative scheme by showing 
that what has remained largely unacknowledged in the secondary literature 
is that Butler moves from the question of the human to the critique of the 
normative regulation of lives more generally. I contend that by this concep-
tual move, Butler actually includes nonhuman animals in her analysis of “liv-
able lives.” On many occasions, Butler explicitly questions anthropocentric 
norms and emphasizes that her notions of “life” and “livability” also incorpo-
rate other beings and not just human beings. 
 
Despite Butler’s critique of anthropocentricism, she unfortunately leaves the 
question of the animal to the margins of her work. This is something that 
might well be considered Butler’s own normative exclusion. Yet I argue that 
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Butler’s critique of norms—especially the norm of anthropocentrism—
provides promising tools for theorizing what I call the normative production 
of “killable animals,” and therefore, for animal ethics as well. Furthermore, 
because Butler rejects the framework of anthropocentrism in her conceptual-
ization of norms, and because her aim is to expose and problematize normal-
ized forms of violence, I argue that this extension is not only possible but also 
necessary for the overall coherence of Butler’s critique of norms.  
 
I will thus engage in a critical reading of Butler’s concept of “life” and seek to 
tease out those elements of her work that provide in my view fruitful ideas 
for theorizing animal ethics in the context of a critique of norms. In short, 
these are her problematization of the norms that regulate “life” and her no-
tion of ethical responsiveness. By cross-breeding Butler’s account of norms 
with critical animal studies, my reading brings a novel analytical layer to pre-
vious scholarly analyses that have prioritized the anthropocentric framework 
of “the human” in their discussions of livability. 
 
I have thus far outlined the main arguments in this study in terms of what I 
have called the twofold function of norms: the ways in which they operate by 
differentiating between livable and unlivable lives; and the possibility of ex-
posing the norms for critical change. However, this latter aspect of norms 
raises the further question of how exactly Butler comes to view critique and 
change in relation to norms.  
 
For decades critics of Butler have expressed trenchant criticism of and skep-
ticism toward Butler’s notions of agency and political action. They have, for 
example, argued that Butler’s feminist theorizing, such as her notion of gen-
der performativity, is overly abstract and cannot bring about real political 
change (see, for example, Fraser 1995; Benhabib 1995; Weir 1996; Nussbaum 
1999; McNay 2000). Since many commentators have already provided dis-
cussions of these debates, I will not rehearse these debates in my study.1 
Most recently, however, the criticism of Butler’s notion of political action has 
re-emerged in the readings that have focused on her theorization of grief and 
mourning. The fourth main topic of my study addresses this more recent cri-
tique that revolves around Butler’s Freudian notion of melancholia and her 
ethical reflections on grievability, that is, the question of what kinds of lives 
are seen to be worth grieving after death. 
 
One of the most influential criticisms has been Bonnie Honig’s recent claim 
that Butler’s turn to the questions of grief and mourning in her later work is 
premised upon an overly thin notion of political action. She argues that dur-
ing this period of her thought Butler’s notion of political action shrinks into 
                                       
1 For an examination of these discussions, see, for example, Lloyd (2005, 147–148; 2007, 57–61) and 
Kirby (2006, 129–143). 
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“a sentimental politics of shared feeling” (Honing 2013, 64). Engaging in a 
critical conversation with Honig, I analyze Butler’s notion of grievability in 
the context of her twofold approach to norms and argue that only this type of 
analysis will provide a thorough understanding of Butler’s notion of political 
action. This reading tactic allows me to emphasize the dimensions of critique 
and resistance that Butler strongly attaches to the questions of mourning and 
grief. 
 
By offering a close reading of Butler’s account of grievability, I will demon-
strate that upon closer examination the topic not only permeates Butler’s 
work on norms—from her early reading of Freud’s notion of melancholia to 
her later critique of the hierarchies of grief related to war on terror—but that 
she repeatedly connects it to questions of critique and resistance. To develop 
my argument regarding the necessary link between Butler’s theorization of 
grievability and her critique of norms, I explicate Butler’s Foucauldian notion 
of critique (that I argue has to be conceived as a critique of norms) by fore-
grounding it through her critical deployment of Theodor Adorno’s concep-
tion of resistance and Hannah Arendt’s notion of concerted action. This ana-
lytical strategy establishes the setting for my argument that Butler’s theoriza-
tion of grievability must be read, contra Honig, as a theorization of re-
sistance. Before providing a chapter outline of my study, I will briefly expli-
cate Butler’s conception of norms. 
 
 
Butler’s conception of norms 
 
Although the problematic of norms guides Butler’s work, she does not give 
any systematic or single theory of norms. As she stresses, the aim of her the-
orization of norms is not “to try and establish an internally consistent philo-
sophical position” (Butler 2007b, 180). By this she refers to her style of doing 
philosophy that she describes as follows:  
 
I am always in the process of restaging and finding new experimental 
possibilities for prior positions. I suppose that this does make me into 
a ‘process philosopher’ of a certain stripe. I’m aware of resonances 
among my various writings, but I do not intend them to follow upon 
one another systematically or to amount to a single comprehensive 
‘position.’ (Butler 2006a, 281) 
 
Bearing this in mind, my aim in this dissertation is not to reconstruct Butler’s 
theorization of norms as a systematic theory. Although I do insist, as I al-
ready have argued, that the question of norms lends thematic continuity to 
her oeuvre, I do not take her work to be an emerging totality. Instead, I ex-
amine Butler’s account of norms as a mode of critical inquiry by which she 
seeks to respond to a particular set of questions inspired by concrete and 
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contemporary political and ethical problems. Hence, Butler’s mode of inquiry 
can be understood as an interventionist approach (Pulkkinen 2015; Thiem 
2008). Butler does not, for example, establish a single “theory” of gender but 
rather seeks to make critical interventions into the prevailing notions of gen-
der that try to disclose the “truth” about human gender or sexuality (Pulk-
kinen 2015, 200). Similarly, her work never attempts to disclose the ontolog-
ical preconditions of “humanity” or “life” as such but seeks to intervene into 
the ontological presuppositions by asking who is excluded from the category 
of “the human” and what kinds of lives are normatively produced as “lives.” 
 
In the context of my analysis of norms, this means that Butler’s aim is not to 
provide a single theory of norms as an answer to the question of “what is a 
norm?” Instead, I take her to be setting out to critically investigate how 
norms currently operate in our societies and with what effects. In other 
words, the objective of Butler’s critical inquiry—and my own as well—is to 
problematize norms in order to contest the ways in which they currently dif-
ferentiate between livable and unlivable lives. The term “critique” can thus be 
understood as an ethical and political practice of thinking against and be-
yond the normative limits of “possible” lives. 
 
Characteristic of her poststructuralist approach, Butler does not give a clear-
cut definition of what she means by a “norm,”2 neither is her aim to provide a 
set of alternative norms to replace the current ones. As she notes, “The point 
is not to apply social norms to lived social instances, to order and define 
them (as Foucault has criticized), nor is it to find justificatory mechanisms 
for the grounding of social norms that are extra-social […]” (UG, 36). Yet, she 
does define norms in negative terms, specifying what they are not: a norm is 
not the same as a rule or a law, but it functions “within social practices as the 
implicit standard of normalization” (UG, 41, emphasis in original). In line 
with Foucault, Butler conceives norms as mechanisms of social power that 
govern the cultural intelligibility and recognizability of different kinds of sub-
jects, lives, practices, and action. In this sense, norms produce and organize 
social life regulating “what will and will not appear within the domain of the 
social” (UG, 42). Although norms usually remain hidden and unquestioned 
as they operate implicitly in daily life, they are “discernible most clearly and 
dramatically in the effects that they produce” (UG, 41). To put it differently: 
norms act precisely by producing certain effects. 
 
Despite the fact that a norm can be analytically separated from the practices 
it governs, Butler emphasizes that this is only “an intellectual heuristic” (UG, 
48). As she reminds us, “The norm is not exterior to its field of application” 
                                       
2 According to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, the term “norm” comes etymologically from the Latin 
word norma, that is, “precept, rule, carpenter’s square.” 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/norm (accessed May 23, 2017). 
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(UG, 52). This is because a norm does not have a distinct ontological status 
isolated from the social practices that sustain its continuing operation. This 
is to say that, for instance, gender norms regulate what will be a possible sub-
ject or a body and what will be not. In this way, norms make certain kinds of 
subjects, bodies, and practices appear as if they were natural and self-
evident. However, the naturalized status (e.g. “woman,” “heterosexuality,” 
“race,” “ability”) that norms sometimes enjoy is only an effect of repeated so-
cial practices and power relations, such as the institutionalized practice of 
gender assignment at birth. 
 
Yet Butler also argues that norms cannot be completely reduced to their con-
crete instances either: the enactment of norms constitutes social reality by 
generating different kinds of sedimented practices that endure through time. 
With regard to gender, this means that those who do not fit the current 
norms of gender (e.g. the naturalized and binary division of bodies into male 
or female) risk being regarded as unintelligible and “unreal” with severe con-
sequences, such as social exclusion, oppression, harassment, criminalization, 
pathologization, and different forms of violence. In this sense, gender norms 
function by producing and regulating the field of recognizable subjects, bod-
ies, experiences, and identities. 
 
While Butler is clearly influenced by Foucauldian scholarship in theorizing 
the concept of norm in relation to what she calls, following Foucault, the 
“normalizing operation of bureaucratic and disciplinary powers” (UG, 49), 
she takes issue with what she sees as the tendency in some Foucauldian 
scholarship (she mentions the work of François Ewald, for example, see UG, 
51) to understand norms more or less in terms of abstract structures. Against 
this structuralist tendency, she argues that “norms are not independent and 
self-subsisting entities or abstractions but must be understood as forms of 
action” (UG, 51, my emphasis). Making the argument that norms exist only 
in and through action—indeed, through social practice—allows Butler to con-
ceptualize norms “as the site of social intervention” (UG, 52, my emphasis). 
This is to say that for Butler, norms are not “static entities” (CHU, 152) that 
are imposed on us, as if we were only passive objects of their operation, but 
they are actively lived, embodied, and interpreted dimensions of social life. 
In other words, even though norms regulate the recognizability of lives and 
condition our action, they can be called into question and re-enacted in new 
ways. 
 
Before providing a chapter outline I want to make a final note on the main 
textual material and sources of my study. The extensive breadth and scope of 
Butler’s work—combined with the fact that she is, as she puts it herself, “a 
living author” (Butler 2006, 281) who constantly publishes new texts—
ostensibly sets certain limits to any effort to study her work. Although Butler 
discusses norms throughout her oeuvre, I have restricted my focus on those 
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of her texts that directly address norms in regard to the four key questions of 
my analysis (the relationship between norms and violence, the question of 
trans lives, the problem of animals, and the topic of grievability). For this 
reason, I do not engage in any detailed analysis of her other major works, in-
cluding Parting Ways (2012) and Senses of the Subject (2015) for example—
though I do also reference these works when relevant for the arguments I 
wish to pursue.3 
 
 
Structure of the study 
 
In developing my main arguments throughout the dissertation, I have orga-
nized the study thematically into four chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 traces Butler’s conceptualization of norms to her early discussion 
of discursive violence. Although Butler’s account of the relationship between 
norms and violence has begun to receive growing scholarly attention, the 
feminist theoretical background of this aspect of her work remains unex-
plored. In order to fill this lacuna and to highlight Butler’s twofold under-
standing of norms, the chapter explicates the feminist genealogy of Butler’s 
notion of violence. I argue that Butler’s theorization of norms as a certain 
form of violence can be traced back to Gender Trouble, and more precisely, 
to her discussion of Monique Wittig’s argument that the binary categoriza-
tion of sex can be conceived in terms of discursive violence. I contend, first, 
that Butler starts to develop her notion of “gender violence” on the basis of 
her reading of Wittig. On the other hand, I also show that Butler departs 
from Wittig’s notion of violence by proposing an understanding of gender 
norms as both violent mechanisms of social power and a means of critical 
transformation. Second, I argue that Butler’s more recent writings on mili-
tary violence and the ethics of nonviolence build on her critical interpretation 
of Wittig. On the basis of my reading, I suggest, in contrast to recent criticism 
(e.g. Mills 2007; Murphy 2011a) that Butler’s later critique of norms is not at 
odds with her prior work, but rather expands upon it. 
 
Chapter 2 explicates and further develops Butler’s twofold approach to 
norms by analyzing her critique of the psychiatric pathologization and nor-
malization of transsexual and transgender populations. I argue that in the 
growing body of scholarly literature, Butler’s explicit turn to questions con-
cerning trans persons in Undoing Gender has been largely overlooked. Typi-
cally, commentators use trans and genderqueer experiences and identities 
only as illustrations of non-normative genders and do not analyze Butler’s 
theorization of trans lives with equal scholarly attention as other aspects of 
                                       
3 For an elaboration of Butler’s key arguments in Parting Ways, see, for example, the last two chapters 
(ch. 4 & ch. 5) in Schippers (2014). 
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her work. In contrast to this scholarly trend, I provide a detailed examination 
of Butler’s discussion of trans lives, focusing particularly on the relationship 
between gender norms and trans embodiment, her critique of the psychiatric 
pathologization of gender, as well as her account of gender self-
determination and trans autonomy. I will do this by contrasting Butler’s ap-
proach to Foucauldian feminist scholars and to critics of her work (Hausman 
1995; Repo 2016) who have also questioned the pathologization of trans bod-
ies but, unlike Butler, propose that feminists should reject the concept of 
gender altogether because of its history as a normalizing, sexological catego-
ry. Through my deployment of Butler’s twofold approach to norms, and my 
examination of Undoing Gender, I contend that the price of the urge to reject 
the concept of gender is the exclusion of trans lives from feminist theory and 
politics. Although Butler also draws on a Foucauldian notion of normaliza-
tion, I demonstrate that she theorizes it not only as a mechanism of regula-
tion but also, and more importantly, in terms of critical transformation.  
 
The chapter thus seeks to answer the question how the normalizing functions 
of gender can be revised and reworked in new ways. By way of a critical com-
parison, I thus seek to highlight Butler’s notion of gender norms as both con-
straining and enabling mechanisms of power. I further illustrate her distinc-
tive approach to norms through my concept of “trans livability,” which builds 
on her analysis of the ways in which gender norms differentiate between 
those gendered lives that are conceived as valuable and livable and those that 
are not. In sum, my overall argument in this chapter is that Butler’s critique 
of gender norms and normalization can be taken as a trans-affirmative con-
tribution to feminist theory. 
 
Chapter 3 continues to examine Butler’s concept of “livability” by turning to 
her more recent ideas of bodily vulnerability, precariousness, and interde-
pendency through which she offers a critical analysis of the normative pro-
duction of “the human.” Although in feminist and queer theory as well as po-
litical philosophy it is now a commonplace to characterize Butler’s more re-
cent work with such concepts as “new corporeal humanism,” “the political 
philosophy of the human,” and “the political problem of the human,” I show 
that during this period of her thought Butler extends her critique of norms 
from the “human” to “livable lives” more generally. It is my contention that 
with this conceptual shift Butler challenges anthropocentrism as well as ges-
tures toward the possibility of incorporating nonhuman animals into her 
concept of livability. Furthermore, through my detailed explication of But-
ler’s conception of livability and precariousness, I contend that this extension 
is not only possible, but also a necessary step forward in her critique of 
norms. 
 
Despite the fact that already in Undoing Gender Butler points toward the 
question of “the animal,” the problem of the animal is systematically neglect-
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ed within Butler scholarship. In critical animal studies, on the other hand, 
several scholars (such as Chloë Taylor, Cary Wolfe, and Richard Iveson) have 
maintained that Butler’s account of precarity and her writings on nonviolent 
ethics are based on the exclusion of animals. Although I agree that Butler 
leaves the question of “the animal” to the margins of her work, my key aim in 
the chapter is to demonstrate that her work offers promising tools for prob-
lematizing normalized forms of violence not only against humans but also 
against animals. By drawing on Butler’s critique of the differential ways in 
which the conditions of life are made livable only for certain populations, I 
will provide an examination of the normative production of what I call “killa-
ble animals.” I argue that a critical analysis of the norms that differentiate 
not only between human and animal lives but also between “lovable” and 
“killable” animals has important implications for theorizing a more inclusive 
notion of nonviolence. 
 
Chapter 4 offers a detailed examination of Butler’s theorization of grief and 
grievability by emphasizing its integral role for her work on norms. I address 
a recent criticism by Honig (2010; 2013), who claims that by turning to the 
topics of precariousness and mourning in Butler’s so called “post-9/11” texts 
her conception of politics becomes reduced to a universalist ethics of mortal-
ism and sentimentalism, representing what Honig sees as a turn away from 
questions of political action and resistance. Challenging Honig’s reading, I 
seek to show that while it is true that Butler is preoccupied with questions of 
grief, mourning, and melancholia in her recent work, Honig’s critique is 
based on a misconception of the role of grievability in this work. Against Ho-
nig, I suggest that when Butler’s discussion of grievability is brought to the 
broader framework of her critique of norms—contextualized through her 
readings of Foucault, Adorno, and Arendt—the crucial relationship between 
grief and political contestation becomes visible. In order to bring the political 
implications of Butler’s account of grievability into sharper relief, I also ad-
dress the current plight of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. 
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1 NORMS, VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE: BUTLER’S 
CRITICAL RELIANCE ON MONIQUE WITTIG4 
 
 
In Undoing Gender (2004) Butler considers her “theory of gender explicitly 
in terms of the questions of violence […]” (UG, 207). By “violence” Butler re-
fers here to the violence performed by gender norms, that is, the forceful and 
binary division of bodies as either male or female within the discourse of 
normative heterosexuality. Yet Butler’s discussion of violence is not limited 
to her work on gender alone but extends to the question of whose lives count 
as “livable” in relation to the normative notions of the “human” and “lives.” 
Butler addresses this latter topic particularly in Precarious Life (2004) and 
Frames of War (2009), where she develops an ethics of nonviolence as a crit-
ical response to the US’s war on terror. In this sense, violence is a topic that 
runs through Butler’s work. It does not come as a surprise then that these re-
flections have started to gain emerging attention in recent commentary liter-
ature (see Chambers 2007; Chambers & Carver 2008a; Mills 2007; Lloyd 
2007; Murphy 2011a; Schippers 2014). However, what has remained largely 
overlooked is the feminist theoretical background of Butler’s conception of 
violence.5 To fill this gap in the literature, my aim in this chapter is to show 
that Butler’s theorization of violence grows out of her discussion of Monique 
Wittig’s “materialist feminism.”6 
 
Although certain feminist scholars have taken up the fact that Butler’s under-
standing of gender binary as a violent norm is related to Wittig’s feminist 
thought, they usually mention this connection only in passing (Jagger 2008, 
29; Lloyd 2013, 825).7 It is my contention that in order to fully understand 
                                       
4 This chapter is based on my previous article, see (Karhu 2016). 
5 As Birgit Schippers (2014, 3) states, “it would be impossible to surgically remove Butler’s feminism 
from her wider political philosophy; such an attempt would also ignore how her recent work articulates 
the significance of feminism in new contexts.” Given this statement, it is surprising that her book’s oth-
erwise elaborate chapter on violence (“The Paradox of Violence”) overlooks the feminist theoretical 
background of Butler’s account of violence. 
6 Admittedly, Monique Wittig is not the only feminist thinker to which Butler’s early theorization of 
gender critically builds upon. In addition to Wittig, Butler draws on Simone de Beauvoir’s, Luce Iri-
garay’s, and Gayle Rubin’s work, for example. However, and as I demonstrate in this chapter, she starts 
to develop her conception of the violence of gender norms particularly through Wittig’s notion of dis-
cursive violence. For this reason, my focus in this chapter is on Butler’s reliance on Wittig. 
7 In her 2007 book on Butler, Lloyd provides an analysis of the ways in which Butler’s notions of nor-
mative heterosexuality and gender performativity are “deeply influenced by Wittig” (Lloyd 2007, 47). 
Although Lloyd brings up the question of “normative violence” in this context (see Lloyd 2007, 33), she 
does not pay closer attention to the ways in which Butler critically merges Wittig’s notion of discursive 
violence with her own conception of norms. 
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Butler’s conception of violence, we have to examine her discussion of Wittig 
in Gender Trouble ([1990]1999) more closely. Through explicating Butler’s 
commitments to Wittig my attempt is to show that Wittig’s notion of discur-
sive violence plays a crucial role in Butler’s theorization of normative hetero-
sexuality and gender norms. Furthermore, I contend that Wittig’s influence 
on Butler is more wide-ranging than this, since traces of Wittig’s notion of 
violence can also be found in Butler’s recent criticism of war and her account 
of nonviolence. However, in order to highlight Butler’s twofold notion of 
norms I also want to point out a crucial difference between these thinkers. 
That is, while Wittig considers the system of heterosexuality as inherently 
violent, Butler seeks to articulate a possibility of social change inhering in the 
very operation of heterosexualizing norms. 
 
The reason I wish to highlight Butler’s critical reliance on Wittig has to do 
with two interrelated aims. First, by illustrating the theoretical connection 
between these two thinkers my aim is to pay attention to the generally disre-
garded Wittigian background of Butler’s theorization of the relationship be-
tween norms and violence. The second aim has to do with Butler’s formula-
tion of nonviolence as a critique of violent norms. Through elucidating But-
ler’s ethics of nonviolence in light of her Wittig-inspired theorization of 
norms, I demonstrate that Butler’s later work on nonviolence does not stand 
in contrast to her prior work, as for example Catherine Mills (2007; see also 
Murphy 2011a) has argued, but rather expands upon it. 
 
I develop my argument in three phases. Firstly, I examine Wittig’s critique of 
the discourse of heterosexuality by discussing her notion of “material vio-
lence.” The second section shows that Butler begins to formulate her account 
of gender violence on the basis of her critical reading of Wittig. In the third 
part I analyze Wittig’s influence on Butler’s more recent work by focusing on 
the questions of military violence and the ethics of nonviolence. In the con-
cluding part I summarize the reasons why I find it important to acknowledge 
the Wittigian background of Butler’s work. 
 
 
1.1 Wittig’s Criticism of Discursive Violence 
 
Monique Wittig developed the notion of “materialist feminism” with Chris-
tine Delphy, Nicole-Claude Mathieu and Colette Guillaumin in France during 
the 1980’s.8 Drawing on the socialist tradition, these scholars problematized 
                                       
8 According to Wittig, it was Delphy who coined the phrase “materialist feminism” in order to highlight 
the importance of understanding women as a social class who are forced to “the kind of work that has 
no exchange value” (Wittig 1992, xiv). Following this insight, Wittig claims in her early manifesto “For 
a Women’s Liberation Movement” ([1970]2005) that women’s unpaid housework is equivalent to “ser-
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the assumption that the division of labor between women and men is a natu-
ral state of affairs. Instead, they conceived the difference between the sexes 
as socially constituted, as a product of economic, political, and ideological—
in their Marxist vocabulary, “material”—oppression of women. In her early 
manifesto, Wittig posits that women’s unpaid housework is equivalent to 
“servile labor” (Wittig [1970]2005, 28), which rests on “sexism” that is “so 
well implanted in ruling-class ideology that only a radical seizing of power 
can destroy it” (ibid., 22). It is exactly the “radical seizing of power” that is 
Wittig’s objective in her version of materialist feminism, illustrated both in 
her fiction and theory. As Lisa Disch emphasizes, “French materialist femi-
nists should be heralded for analyzing women’s oppression not in terms of 
sexual difference but against it” (Disch 2008, 50, emphasis in original). 
 
Because for Wittig, as Diane Griffin Crowder notes, the “symbolic order is as 
much a fundamental political category as economics or other concrete social 
relations” (Crowder 2005, 64), the mere transformation of economic rela-
tions cannot suffice to eradicate oppression. Rather, the goal must be an 
“epistemological revolution” (Wittig 1992, xvii): “the whole conceptual 
reevaluation of the social world, its whole reorganization with new concepts, 
from the point of view of oppression” (ibid., 18). Accordingly, Wittig’s key ar-
gument in her theoretical essays gathered together and published in The 
Straight Mind (1992) is that the exploitation of women is based on the dis-
cursive system of heterosexuality, which operates through the category of 
“sex.” Furthermore, one of Wittig’s main theses is that the discourse of het-
erosexuality can be understood as “material violence” against women and 
non-heterosexuals.  
 
The first essay, in which Wittig addresses “material violence,” is “The 
Straight Mind,” where she conceptualizes language in terms of power dis-
courses “that constantly act upon social reality” (Wittig 1992, 21). She states 
that “The discourses that particularly oppress all of us, lesbians, women, and 
homosexual men, are those which take for granted that what founds society, 
any society, is heterosexuality” (ibid., 24). Wittig’s critical eye is directed par-
ticularly toward Claude Lévi-Strauss’s and Jacques Lacan’s structuralist no-
tions of sex difference. The most troubling feature of these “discourses” is, for 
Wittig, that they not only build whole systems of thought on the heterosexu-
alized notion of the human, but in doing so they naturalize and thus legiti-
mize oppression. In order to stress the material consequences of these dis-
courses of “the straight mind” (ibid., 27), Wittig introduces the concept of 
                                                                                                            
vile labor” (ibid., 28), which rests on “sexism” that is “so well implanted in ruling-class ideology that 
only a radical seizing of power can destroy it” (ibid., 22). In comparing women’s unpaid housework to 
servile labor Wittig refers to Engels’s claim that the historical institution of monogamous marriage in 
the industrialized world is “founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife” (Engels 
[1884]2010, 105). 
	 26	
“material violence.” She does this by explaining why she prefers the term 
“material oppression” to “ideology” in her criticism of the discourse of heter-
osexuality:  
 
When we use the overgeneralizing term “ideology” to designate all the 
discourses of the dominating group, we relegate these discourses to 
the domain of Irreal Ideas; we forget the material (physical) violence 
that they directly do to the oppressed people, a violence produced by 
the abstract and “scientific” discourses. […] I would like to insist on 
the material oppression of individuals by discourses […]. (Wittig 
1992, 25, my emphasis) 
 
By “material violence” Wittig does not refer to physical violence in any con-
ventional sense, but to the direct effects of oppression. For Wittig, the dis-
course of heterosexuality is materially violent because it tries to freeze heter-
osexist and male-dominated power relations by forcing everybody, especially 
marginalized groups, to conform to them. 
 
Wittig’s criticism of heterosexual discourse boils down to the problematiza-
tion of all kinds of essentialist explanations concerning oppression. In her 
essays “One Is not Born a Woman” and “The Category of Sex” Wittig there-
fore argues against the “method of finding in women and men a biological 
explanation of their division” (Wittig 1992, 10). Wittig underlines that the 
categories of male/female and masculinity/femininity “serve to conceal the 
fact that social differences always belong to an economic, political, ideologi-
cal order” (ibid., 2). Thus, the category of sex can be understood as violent, 
for it creates a severe illusion that the reason for women’s subjugation can be 
found from their bodies. To underscore this, Wittig questions the reduction 
of “sex” to the physical characteristics of bodies:  
 
what we believe to be a physical and direct perception is only a sophis-
ticated and mythic construction, an “imaginary formation,” which re-
interprets physical features (in themselves as neutral as any others but 
marked by the social system) through the network of relationships in 
which they are perceived. (ibid., 11–12) 
 
This statement crystallizes the crucial move Wittig makes. By contending 
that bodily differences are socially constituted she thoroughly politicizes the 
categories of “men” and “women” and reconceptualizes them as the products 
of the heterosexual discourse.  
 
According to Wittig, the category of sex works through the sexualization of 
women: they are viewed as “the sex” (ibid., 8, emphasis in original) in order 
to differentiate them from—and mark them available to—the dominating 
class, men. Hence, the category of “women” is “the mark imposed by the op-
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pressor: the ‘myth of women,’ plus its material effects and manifestations in 
the appropriated consciousness and bodies of women” (ibid., 11, emphasis in 
original).9 While Wittig focuses mainly on the relational and class-related 
constitution of bodies (indeed, she interprets the socially produced sex dif-
ference in terms of class), she also defends the idea of individual subjectivity. 
In Wittig’s view, the question of subjectivity is neglected in Marxism, which 
puts a strong emphasis on economics and therefore, in her view, neglects the 
question of sexuality as a specific form of oppression that targets women’s 
individual subjectivities (ibid., 17). Taking issue in this sense with Marxism, 
Wittig’s “historical task” is to break the “myth of women” by opening up 
space for “a new personal and subjective definition for all humankind […] 
beyond the categories of sex” (ibid., 19). 
 
Yet, for Wittig’s materialist feminism, the subjective perspective makes sense 
only in the broader political and social framework. This holds true especially 
for sexuality:  
 
For women to answer the question of the individual subject in materi-
alist terms is first to show, as the lesbians and feminists did, that sup-
posedly “subjective,” “individual,” “private” problems are in fact social 
problems, class problems; sexuality is not for women an individual 
and subjective expression, but a social institution of violence. (ibid., 
19, my emphasis) 
 
With this statement Wittig reminds us that in order to fight oppression, we 
must first disrupt the operation of discursive violence that constructs “wom-
en” as (hetero)sexualized objects. 
 
How, then, can we resist this kind of discursive violence? One attempt to 
theorize resistance can be found in Wittig’s essay “On the Social Contract,” 
where she merges Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of “the social contract” 
with Adrienne Rich’s notion of “compulsory heterosexuality” in order to de-
velop an understanding of heterosexuality as a common but forceful contract. 
There are two reasons for this tactic. First, it allows Wittig to highlight heter-
osexuality as a tacit agreement that regulates people’s “whole life, the way 
they act, the way they move, the way they think” (Wittig 1992, 41). Thus, the 
contract “makes life possible” (ibid., 40) for those who conform to its conven-
tions—but excludes and pathologizes others. As she writes: “Outlaw and mad 
are the names for those who refuse to go by the rules and conventions” dic-
tated by the contract (ibid., 40, emphasis in original).  
 
The second reason is that to theorize heterosexuality as a social contract in-
dicates the possibility of breaking it off. After all, the contract is made with-
                                       
9 Wittig borrows the term “myth of women” from Simone de Beauvoir ([1949]2011). 
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out everybody’s consent, or as Wittig paraphrases Rousseau, “we are not en-
joying a reciprocal commitment that would be the necessary condition for 
our freedom” (ibid., 35). By “we” Wittig refers here not only to women but 
also, importantly, to lesbians, the political “runaways” of the class of women.  
Indeed, what lurks behind the veil of heterosexual contract is the figure of the 
lesbian, which represents for Wittig the possibility of political resistance and 
freedom. This is because “Lesbians are not women,” since the meaning of 
“women” is anchored exclusively in the economy of heterosexual meaning 
production, where “women” becomes intelligible only in relation to “men” 
(ibid., 32).  
 
In “The Point of View” Wittig thus strongly differentiates her “lesbian point 
of view” from attempts to theorize change through “feminine writing,” by 
which Wittig refers to écriture feminine, a theoretical approach associated 
with the work of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. From Wit-
tig’s perspective, “feminine writing” does not emancipate women but works 
as “the naturalizing metaphor of the brutal political fact of the domination of 
women” (Wittig 1992, 59). To theorize writing as “feminine” is thus nothing 
but accomplishing “the enforcement of sex in language” (ibid., 79).  
 
Similarly, in her essay “The Mark of Gender,” Wittig expresses her skepticism 
toward the concept of “gender,” which American feminists had started to use 
as a tool for analyzing oppression during the 1970s (see Chapter 2 for an 
analysis of the genealogy of gender). For Wittig, “gender,” too, operates vio-
lently by making it impossible for women to gain full access to linguistic sub-
jectivity. She asserts that the concept of “gender” particularizes women by 
preventing them from achieving the status of “universal” and “absolute” 
speaking subjects—a linguistic position reserved only for men. In this sense, 
gender operates as “a direct interpellation” through which “the locutor is 
called upon in person” (Wittig 1992, 79).10 For women, this means that their 
personal subjectivity is reduced to “femininity.” Moreover, Wittig claims that 
gender, the semantic marker of women’s “difference,” violates the ontological 
wholeness of being as it “tries to accomplish the division of Being,” although 
“Being as being is not divided” (ibid., 81). Therefore, feminists must reject 
the linguistic category of gender. As she explains: “Language casts sheaves of 
reality upon the social body, stamping it and violently shaping it. […] For 
there is a plasticity of the real to language: language has a plastic action upon 
the real” (ibid., 78). 
 
                                       
10 Although Wittig does not cite Louis Althusser, the concept of “interpellation” comes, I assume, from 
his theorization of subject constitution through “ideological state apparatuses.” See, Althusser 
([1995]2014). Interestingly, Butler also examines gender in terms of linguistic and discursive interpel-
lation by referring to Althusser’s work. See, for example, Butler (PLP, 106–131). 
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Yet, while language can work violently against those it classifies as women 
and non-heterosexuals, it also provides, due to its very “plasticity,” the means 
of resistance. Here the figure of the “lesbian” becomes important. As Linda 
Zerilli notes, Wittig’s aim with the figure of the “lesbian” is “to dramatize the 
space and practice of freedom” (Zerilli 2005, 71). Not only does the “lesbian” 
articulate a promise of an alternative social order, but it also functions as a 
literary practice, a sort of textual violence against heterosexualized concepts. 
Wittig’s fiction provides myriad examples of the lesbian overriding of hetero-
sexual discourse—a strategy she calls “a war machine” (Wittig 1992, 69). Wit-
tig notes that her aim in L’Opoponax (1964) was “to universalize the point of 
view of a group condemned to being particular, relegated in language to a 
subhuman category” (Wittig 1992, 82). Likewise, in Les querillérès (1969) 
Wittig experiments with personal pronouns and depicts a war led by “elles” 
against “ils,” so as “not to feminize the world but to make the categories of 
sex obsolete in language” (Wittig 1992, 85). Also Le corps lesbien (1973) at-
tempts to unravel the binary notion of sex; the text dismembers and re-
members certain female body parts in order to think bodily boundaries be-
yond the heterosexualized notion of erotic pleasure.  
 
In sum, the main purpose of Wittig’s lesbian feminism is to disrupt the vio-
lent discourses of sex and gender by providing critical tools for mobilizing 
“the destruction of heterosexuality as a social system” (Wittig 1992, 20). For 
Wittig, then, the possibility of feminist transformation lies in the political 
and textual practice of lesbian resistance. This is also her solution to “materi-
al violence.” Calling into question the heterosexualized notion of the human, 
Wittig’s lesbian feminist critique seeks to open up a new horizon to theorize 
bodies and radical change. 
 
1.2 Butler on Gender Violence 
 
Butler provides her most extensive interpretation of Wittig’s notion of vio-
lence in Gender Trouble under the title of “Monique Wittig: Bodily Disinte-
gration and Fictive Sex.” She starts the chapter with an epigraph, a citation 
from Wittig: “Language casts sheaves of reality upon the social body.” Later 
on in the text, she repeats the statement, adding also the remaining part: 
“[…] stamping it and violently shaping it” (GT, 147). Already this textual play 
gives a hint of the relevance Butler gives to Wittig’s discussion of violence, 
and judging by the tone of her analysis that varies between criticism and ap-
proval, the topic both puzzles and fascinates her.  
 
In the beginning of her analysis, Butler gives credit to Wittig’s argument that 
“there is no sex/gender distinction along conventional lines; gender is built 
into sex, and sex proves to have been gender from the start” (GT, 144). In ad-
dition to this insight that works as one of the building blocks in Butler’s no-
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tion of gender performativity, she states, following Wittig, that the binary 
categorization of sex is a “reality-effect of a violent process” because “such an 
object has been violently shaped into such a datum and that the history and 
mechanism of that violent shaping no longer appears with that object” (GT, 
145). Furthermore, Butler adds in a footnote that both physical violence and 
the violence of categorization can be understood as aspects of the gendering 
violence through which the discourse of heterosexuality operates: 
 
[Wittig’s] theory might account for the violence enacted against sexed 
subjects—women, lesbians, gay men, to name a few—as the violent en-
forcement of a category violently constructed. […] Because discourse 
is not restricted to writing or speaking, but is also social action, even 
violent social action, we ought also to understand rape, sexual vio-
lence, “queer-bashing” as the category of sex in action. (GT, 212 n26, 
my emphasis) 
 
Although Butler acknowledges the radical possibilities bubbling under the 
concept of “material violence,” she questions certain ontological underpin-
nings she finds behind Wittig’s understanding of language, reality, and 
change. According to her, Wittig postulates two different levels of ontology: 
the pre-discursive realm of freedom conceived as “a prior and primary unity 
of all persons in a prelinguistic being” and the discursive level of heterosexu-
al oppression understood as “a violence against the field of ontological pleni-
tude […]” (GT, 150). Butler’s criticism targets specifically Wittig’s conception 
of heterosexuality as “a total system that requires a thoroughgoing displace-
ment,” as a result of which the options are either “radical conformity” or 
“radical revolution” (GT, 154). From Butler’s perspective, this kind of sepa-
ratist notion of lesbianism as the only emergency exit from oppression is a 
political short-circuit; it strips lesbianism of “the capacity to resignify the 
very heterosexual constructs by which it is partially and inevitably constitut-
ed” (GT, 163). 
 
Nevertheless, and against the general criticism that misrepresents Butler 
solely as an unfair critic of Wittig (see, for example, Crowder 2005, 70; de 
Lauretis 2005, 57; Zerilli 2005, 72), she does not completely debunk Wittig’s 
strategy of lesbianism. On the contrary, Butler notes that the textual practice 
of lesbianism found particularly in Wittig’s fiction “makes use of redeploy-
ment and transvaluation time and again both to make use of originally op-
pressive terms and to deprive them of their legitimating functions” (GT, 159; 
see also Kirby 2006, 43).11 For Butler, Wittig’s tactic of “redeployment” seeks 
to contest heterosexual discourse from within, through “the deconstruction 
of constructs that are always already a kind of violence against the body’s 
                                       
11 Butler repeats this argument in her later article that discusses Wittig’s textual practices (see Butler 
2007a). 
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possibilities” (GT, 161). Remarkably, this brings to mind Butler’s own decon-
structive tactic of performativity that focuses on “the subversive and parodic 
redeployment of power rather than on the impossible fantasy of its full-scale 
transcendence” (GT, 158).  
 
In my view, it is partly for this reason that Butler starts, suddenly, to use the 
terminology of norms in the middle of her Wittig chapter, although the ter-
minology of “norms” does not belong to Wittig’s typical conceptual arsenal.12 
Butler, for example, writes that “The ideal of a coherent heterosexuality that 
Wittig describes as the norm and standard of the heterosexual contract is an 
impossible ideal, a ‘fetish,’ […]” (GT, 155, my emphasis). Curiously, and 
without explaining this conceptual choice, Butler keeps deploying the vocab-
ulary of norms in the rest of the text as well.13 
 
I argue that Butler’s tactic serves a crucial theoretical aim: conceptualizing 
the categories of sex and gender as well as the discourse of heterosexuality as 
norms allows her to highlight the possibility of transformation as an intrinsic 
dimension of norms and social power relations. By doing this, Butler reworks 
Wittig’s tactic of “redeployment” by reading it through Foucault’s account of 
productive power understood as diffuse relations that produce, normalize, 
and regulate subjectivities along the historical axes of normal and abnor-
mal.14 As Butler writes, “Clearly, the norm of compulsory heterosexuality 
                                       
12 Wittig mentions the concept of “norm” only once in her work, see Wittig (1979, 119). 
13 Butler examines gender as a norm in relation to Wittig in her early article “Variations on Sex and 
Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, and Foucault” (1986), but not in terms of violence. 
14 In Undoing Gender and elsewhere Butler explicitly associates her notion of norms to Foucault’s no-
tion of disciplinary power and biopower. Therefore, it is helpful to briefly explicate what is the role of 
norms in Foucault’s thought. According to Dianne Taylor, “Foucault posits the norm as playing a fun-
damental role in the emergence, proliferation, and circulation of modern power” (Taylor 2009, 52). In 
his early Collège de France lectures (Psychiatric Power 1974; Abnormal 1975), Foucault identifies the 
norm as a legitimating function of disciplinary power that “[…] targets individual bodies in order to 
train subjects that are simultaneously efficient and obedient” (Taylor 2009, 49). When the norm oper-
ates as a form of disciplinary power it “determines what is normal” as well as constitutes subjects 
“through techniques of power that presuppose the norm, construed as an ideal or ‘optimal model’” 
(ibid., 50). These techniques of power emerged within the expansion of certain institutional structures, 
such as the factory, the prison, the army, the school, and the hospital, producing certain kinds of sub-
jects as “docile bodies.” In his later lectures (Society Must Be Defended 1976; Security, Territory, Pop-
ulation 1978), Foucault comes to see the norm as a mechanism of biopower that, as Taylor explains, 
“[…] proliferates through the actions of the State in such a way as to regulate populations at the biolog-
ical level in the name of promoting the health and protecting the life of society as a whole” (Taylor 
2009, 50). In other words, whereas disciplinary power aims to produce “normal” individuals, bio-
power establishes several curves of normality—including “the most normal” and “the optimal”—by 
making use of statistical and demographic sciences. The aim of this kind of normalizing power is to 
produce a manageable “mass” in order to control and regulate its behavior. In other words, norms 
	 32	
does operate with the force and violence that Wittig describes, but my own 
position is that this is not the only way that it operates” (GT, 155, my em-
phasis). In order to find a way out of Wittig’s theoretical framework that rests 
on a rather static and monolithic notion of social power, Butler crossfeeds 
Wittig’s tactic of “redeployment” with her own theorization of norms. This 
permits her to analyze discursive violence done by normative heterosexuality 
and binary gender without compromising her account of change as a histori-
cal and temporal possibility of norms. 
 
In the next and final chapter of Gender Trouble (“Bodily Inscriptions, Per-
formative Subversions”) Butler continues her Wittigian task of criticizing the 
“false stabilization of gender” (GT, 172) by introducing her account of gender 
as a performative, bodily enactment of norms. For Butler, the categories 
women and men are outcomes of “a sedimentation of gender norms” (GT, 
178) in that they are “tenuously constituted in time, […] through a stylized 
repetition of acts” (GT, 179, emphasis in original). Although Butler notes, 
significantly, that “Wittig understands gender […] as a sustained and repeat-
ed corporeal project” (GT, 177, my emphasis), the shift to norms allows her to 
underscore, even more, the intrinsic instability of gender, a strategy that 
“moves the conception of gender off the ground of a substantial model of 
identity to one that requires a conception of gender as a constituted social 
temporality” (GT, 179, emphasis in original). 
 
In Bodies That Matter (1993), Butler brings the ideas of repetition and vio-
lence together by arguing that the binary categorizations of sex and gender 
through which bodies are “materialized” is a “repeated and violent circum-
scription of cultural intelligibility” (BTM, xii). For Butler, “cultural intelligi-
bility” refers to the way normative discourses constitute us as culturally rec-
ognizable subjects.15 As Butler writes in Undoing Gender (2004), the risks of 
“unintelligibility” can be severe: “When gender norms operate as violations, 
they function as an interpellation that one refuses only by agreeing to pay the 
consequences: losing one’s job, home, the prospects for desire, or for life” 
                                                                                                            
function by reproducing power relations “[…] to the point that they come to be seen not as produced at 
all but simply as natural and necessary” (ibid., 52). Simultaneously with the production of “normal” 
and “abnormal” individuals and populations, “the norm” also legitimizes “intervention into both in 
order to ensure conformity or bring into conformity, to keep or make normal, and also effectively elim-
inate the threat posed by resisting individuals and populations” (ibid., 53). 
15 Briefly put, Butler’s account of subject constitution is based on the idea that to become a socially 
recognizable subject is to become subjected to normalizing power discourses, which produce and regu-
late the field of intelligible subjects (or, “lives” as she terms it especially in her later work on vulnerabil-
ity and interdependency), but which, simultaneously, provide the subject with the capacity of “critical 
agency.” Butler develops this idea particularly in The Psychic Life of Power (1997) in the context of her 
reading of Althusser, Hegel, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Freud. I examine Butler’s notion of critical agen-
cy and her conception of critique in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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(UG, 214). Also Wittig describes this risk with her famous phrase: “you-will-
be-straight-or-you-will-not-be” (Wittig 1992, 28). Similarly, for Butler, devi-
ating from norms can put one’s very survival at risk; bring forth a “social 
death” (Butler UG, 8; see also FW, 42).16 Yet, importantly, although gender 
norms can threaten the survival of those who do not conform to them, the 
temporal operation of norms makes them vulnerable and open to contesta-
tion. 
 
In Excitable Speech (1997) Butler develops further her understanding of 
gender as a violent but temporal (i.e. historically and socially contingent) 
norm by drawing on Jacques Derrida’s reformulation of J.L. Austin’s account 
of performative speech acts, a reading that highlights repetition, that is “iter-
ability,” as the conditioning possibility of linguistic meaning production (ES, 
147–151).17 In Derrida’s (1991) critical reading of Austin, it is due to the itera-
ble character of language that every linguistic mark can be recognized and 
thus “cited” again and again. And this, on the other hand, is possible only be-
cause linguistic marks can be “detached” from their prior use and redeployed 
in new contexts, where they can acquire new meanings. In this sense, itera-
tion is always a process of variation and alteration. For Derrida, then, the 
possibility of resignification is a general character of language. Taken togeth-
er, both Wittig’s idea that gendered bodies are violently constituted through 
repetition and Derrida’s insight that “citationality” is a general condition of 
language, are of importance for Butler; they offer a way to theorize gender 
norms as signifying, discursive practices that can be repeated, “cited,” in new 
ways. As Butler formulates: 
 
Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal pro-
cess which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both pro-
duced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration. […] This in-
stability is the deconstituting possibility in the very process of repeti-
tion […]. (BTM, 10, emphasis in original) 
 
                                       
16 Here Butler uses Orlando Patterson’s (1982) concept of “social death.” For an analysis of the idea of 
heightened mortality, see my elaboration on Butler’s discussion of the biopolitical production of early 
mortality in Chapter 4 (section 4.4) of this dissertation. 
17 For an analysis of Butler’s adaptation of Austin and Derrida to her notion of gender performativity, 
see, for example Rossi (2011). Butler also discusses the performative function of gender norms through 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of bodily “habitus.” However, in Excitable Speech, for example, she argues 
that while Bourdieu theorizes the body as constituted through “the repetition and acculturation of 
norms,” he overshadows the possibility of change inhering in the repetitive operation of norms (ES, 
154–156). Here, again, Derrida’s notion of “iterability” becomes crucial for Butler’s theorization of 
norms as iterable mechanisms of power that are open—in their repetition—for rearticulation and 
change. For a fuller analysis of Butler’s discussion of Bourdieu, see, for example, Lloyd (2007, 124–
125). 
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Given the temporal character of gender norms, they are open to resignifica-
tion as the “various new forms of gendering” elucidate (GT, xi). Here, Butler 
refers to transsexual and transgender identities and experiences and to “les-
bian and gay parenting” as well as “new butch and femme identities” (GT, xi). 
 
Butler’s merging of Wittig’s notion of material violence to her own poststruc-
turalist theorization of gender norms is also evident in a couple of new con-
cepts she introduces: “normative violence” and “gender violence.” In the 10-
year anniversary preface to Gender Trouble, Butler writes that “The dogged 
effort to ‘denaturalize’ gender in this text emerges […] from a strong desire 
both to counter the normative violence implied by ideal morphologies of sex 
and to uproot the pervasive assumptions about natural or presumptive het-
erosexuality […]” (GT, xx). By “normative violence” 18—that can be under-
stood as a redeployment of Wittig’s “material violence”—Butler refers to “the 
mundane violence performed by certain kinds of gender ideals” and to “the 
norms that govern gender” (GT, xx). By gender norms Butler refers here to 
“ideal dimorphism, heterosexual complementary of bodies, ideals and rule of 
proper and improper masculinity and femininity, many of which are under-
written by racial codes of purity and taboos against miscegenation” (GT, 
xxiii).  
 
Similarly, in Undoing Gender, Butler uses the concept of “gender violence” 
(UG, 6; see also NPTA, 38) to problematize the psychiatric pathologization of 
non-conforming gender identities, as well as to criticize the coercive genital 
surgery of intersex children, an operation, which, in Butler’s terms, submits 
them “to the knife of the norm,” through which “the ideality of gendered 
morphology is quite literally incised in the flesh” (UG, 53). Furthermore, as I 
will demonstrate next, Butler’s theoretical tactic, the critical conjoining of 
Wittig’s “discursive violence” to her own theorization of norms, lays the 
groundwork for her later work as well. 
 
1.3 Butler’s Critique of Military Violence and the Ethics of 
Nonviolence 
 
Butler’s recent work, including her books Precarious Life (2004) and Frames 
of War (2009), are often characterized as her “post-9/11 writings” (see e.g. 
Schippers 2014, 6) as they bring forth a powerful critique of the US War on 
Terror. What usually goes unnoticed, however, is that Butler started to for-
mulate her critique of US militarist foreign policy already in “Contingent 
Foundations” (1992). Indeed, I argue that this early article published two 
years after Gender Trouble works as a hinge between Butler’s early, Wittig-
                                       
18 It should be noted that Butler mentions the phrase “normative violence” only once in her work, see 
Butler (GT, xx). 
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inspired theorization of gender violence and her more recent discussions of 
military violence and nonviolence. What I find particularly interesting is that 
in “Contingent Foundations” Butler analyzes the rhetorical justification of 
the Gulf War as an example of discursive violence. 
 
Contesting the rhetorical rationale that US military intervention in Iraq 
would generate the conditions for democracy, Butler notes that the rationale 
itself was grounded on a violent strategy: 
 
We have, I think, witnessed the conceptual and material violence of 
this practice in the United States’s war against Iraq, in which the Arab 
‘other’ is understood to be radically ‘outside’ the universal structures 
of reason and democracy and, hence, calls to be brought forcibly with-
in. (“CF,” my emphasis)  
 
Given that Butler refers to Wittig later in the article, in the context of her de-
fense of what she calls a “poststructuralist analysis” of violence (“CF,” 17–18), 
it seems clear that her critique in the aforementioned quotation draws on her 
prior discussion of “material violence” in Gender Trouble. Furthermore, it is 
my contention that although Butler only cites Wittig infrequently after “Con-
tingent Foundations” (see BTM, 259n17; UG, 207), traces of her conceptual 
work with Wittig’s “material violence” can also be found in her more recent 
critique of the US War on Terror. 
 
Providing her critical response to the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 
well as Israeli state violence in Precarious Life and Frames of War, Butler 
seeks to theorize the possibility of nonviolence against the backdrop of recur-
rent military violence. To carefully consider our ethical and political respons-
es in the midst of violence, Butler urges us to reflect on how certain norma-
tive understandings of “the human” work by dehumanizing particular popu-
lations so that waging war against them appears more legitimate. To illus-
trate this, Butler attends to the discursive regulation of public mourning, a 
theme that runs through her later work (see Chapter 4 in this dissertation), 
by analyzing how “certain forms of grief become nationally recognized and 
amplified, whereas other losses become unthinkable and ungrievable” (PL, 
xiv). The normative regulation of grief is connected to what Butler calls “the 
violence of derealization,” a concept that echoes Wittig’s analysis regarding 
the exclusive mechanisms of discursive violence.  
 
Indeed, Butler uses the concept of “the violence of derealization” to examine 
how “discourse itself effects violence” by rationalizing the eradication of 
those populations who do not figure as “real” lives within the normative 
frames we currently have for “the human,” those who are, even while living, 
already “in the state of deadness” (PL, 33–34; see also Butler FW, 31). As in 
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“Contingent Foundations,”19 Butler stresses that this kind of discursive vio-
lence is often based on racist norms that target Arabs in particular or “any-
one who looks vaguely Arab in the dominant racial imaginary” (“CF,” 39).20 
For Butler, the criticism of racist norms is a prerequisite to theorize nonvio-
lence in times of war: only by questioning the discursive operation of racism, 
can we expose the myriad dimensions of contemporary military violence. 
This kind of “social critique” of norms (FW, 35; see also GAO, 82), which in-
terestingly resonates with Wittig’s critique of discursive violence, is therefore 
a key aspect behind Butler’s conception of nonviolence.21 
 
Another aspect is her conceptualization of nonviolence as an ethical task of 
taking responsibility for one’s own revengeful feelings. One of Butler’s main 
claims in both Precarious Life and Frames of War is that “our responsibility 
is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others” (PL, 16; 
see also Butler FW, 172). By this she means that the situation in which one—a 
subject or a state22—has undergone violence raises a crucial ethical question, 
“how we will respond to violent injury”? (PL, 16). Problematizing the US’s 
military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks Butler reformulates this as a 
series of feminist questions: 
 
Feminism surely could provide all kinds of responses to the following 
questions: How does a collective deal, finally, with its vulnerability to 
violence? At what price, and at whose expense, does it gain a purchase 
on ‘security,’ and in what ways has a chain of violence formed in which 
the aggression the United States has wrought returns to it in different 
forms? […] What has happened to the value of critique as a democratic 
value? (PL, 42) 
 
Butler’s goal here is to find “a way out of the circle of violence” (PL, 42). Yet, 
underlying this task is her claim that “aggression is coextensive with being 
                                       
19 In addition to Butler’s account of violence, there are several other points of contact between “Contin-
gent Foundations” and her recent criticism of war. For example, the idea of common human interde-
pendency (see, for example, PL, xii-xiii; FW, 54) is already budding in this early article (see, “CF,” 12). 
20 Wittig (1992, 11) also criticizes racism by noting that just like the category of sex, which is a social 
product of oppression, “the concept of race did not exist” prior to “the socioeconomic reality of black 
slavery.” Butler criticizes racism in a similar manner. Although Butler problematizes the analogy be-
tween sex and race because of their different historical genealogies, she states that “Rather than accept 
a model which understands racism as discrimination on the basis of a pregiven race, I follow those 
recent theories which have made the argument that the ‘race’ is partially produced as an effect of the 
history of racism […]” (BTM, 18). 
21 Butler’s notion of “social critique” draws especially on Adorno and Foucault’s theorizations of cri-
tique. I will provide a detailed analysis of Butler’s notion of critique in Chapter 4. 
22 Butler comments on the relationship between subjects and states as follows: “Nations are not the 
same as individual psyches, but both can be described as ‘subjects,’ albeit of different orders” (PL, 41). 
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human” (FW, 176) and thus “part of politics as well” (FW, 48). Therefore, the 
practice of nonviolence must become, in addition to the critique of norms, a 
struggle against “aggression’s tendency to emerge as violence” (PL, 170). Alt-
hough one might understand aggression, or “rage” as she also terms it, as an 
intrinsic aspect of our psychic lives, Butler holds that it is, at least to a certain 
extent, an outcome of the social and bodily condition of our lives, a condition 
that makes us vulnerable to different modalities of violence:23 
 
The social conditions of my existence are never fully willed by me, and 
there is no agency apart from such conditions and their unwilled ef-
fects. […] And though not all unwilled effects are “violent,” some of 
them are impingements that are injurious, acting forcibly on the body 
in ways that provoke rage. This is what constitutes the dynamic bind 
or a “struggle” that is non-violence. […] It is precisely because one is 
mired in violence that the possibility of non-violence emerges. (FW, 
171) 
 
In this context, the idea of nonviolence as a “struggle” comes from Butler’s 
psychoanalytic reading of Levinas’s argument that the call for nonviolence 
emerges out of an ethical encounter with a defenseless “other,” whose “face” 
evokes murderous desires in us, but which, simultaneously, makes an ethical 
demand not to kill (FW, 172–173).24 By building on Levinas, Butler’s purpose 
is to show that nonviolence—articulated here as an imperative of “not to 
kill”—is always communicated to us from outside, for it is someone “other,” 
who is making the demand. 
 
Interestingly, in Precarious Life Butler notes that for Levinas the figure of 
“the face” is “a situation of discourse” (PL, 138). This is to say that the ethical 
call for nonviolence is always communicated to us through language, which 
Butler understands, as I have already pointed out, in terms of discursive 
power in the sense that “there is a certain violence already in being ad-
dressed, given a name, subject to a set of impositions” (PL, 130). Our ability 
to respond ethically to the call for nonviolence is thus dependent on the 
norms that produce only certain “faces” as valuable and grievable. To quote 
Butler, “These norms work to give face and to efface” (FW, 77, emphasis in 
original). In this regard, Butler’s description of nonviolence as a struggle 
against aggression expands upon her Wittigian critique of the violent work-
ings of norms. 
                                       
23 Butler (FW, 176–177) specifies the relationship between aggression and violence as follows: “Even if 
aggression is coextensive with being human […] the way that destructiveness is lived and directed var-
ies enormously. Indeed, it can become the basis of a ‘non-moralized’ sense of responsibility, one that 
seeks to protect the other against destruction.” 
24 In this context, Butler reads Levinas particularly through Jean Laplanche and Melanie Klein’s psy-
choanalytic accounts of the relational constitution of “the self” (see, for example, GAO, 96–103). 
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Samuel A. Chambers also argues that Butler’s criticism of the War on Terror 
in Precarious Life “relies upon and further elaborates her prior theoretical 
position” in Gender Trouble (Chambers 2007, 56).25 He posits that it is pre-
cisely the concept of “normative violence” that connects these two books; in 
both texts Butler’s criticism of normative violence is “centered on the prob-
lem of unreal and unrealizable lives” (ibid., 47; see also Lloyd 2007, 135–
137). Just like Gender Trouble, which aimed, according to Chambers, to 
“counter violence at the level of discourse […] by opening up a space within 
norms for more and other subjects to appear” (Chambers 2007, 54), so does 
Precarious Life strive to contest normative violence by analyzing the discur-
sive production of certain subject categories, such as “enemy combatant” or 
“terrorist,” that are used to legitimize military violence and the suspension of 
human rights, as the cases of torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo deten-
tion centers demonstrate (ibid., 59, see also PL, 4, 51). 
 
Chambers defines normative violence as a “fundamental violence” of norms, 
for it inheres, in his view, in “the formation of subjectivity” within “the con-
struction of discourse and the circulation of discursive practices” (Chambers 
2007, 48–49). To emphasize this, he compares it to Derrida’s notion of “the 
violence of the letter,” through which Derrida theorizes the relation between 
linguistic violence and “juridical, force-related” violence (ibid., 47).26 Similar 
to Derrida’s notion, Butler’s concept of normative violence allows us, Cham-
bers argue, to analyze the violent operations of discourses and linguistic clas-
sifications, an analysis without which we could not understand the scope and 
meaning of physical violence, ranging from violent military practices to hate 
violence against sexual and gender minorities. Therefore, Chambers suggests 
that Butler’s concept of “normative violence” offers a helpful tool for political 
theory to discuss those forms of violence that usually remain unexplored, 
that is, the normative practices that render some bodies and populations as 
“livable” and others “unlivable.”  
 
While I agree with Chambers that the theorization of norms connects Butler’s 
work on gender to her criticism of military violence, what his analysis over-
looks, however, is the Wittigian background of Butler’s criticism of norms. 
Although Derrida’s deconstructive thinking undoubtedly inspires Butler’s 
thought, my contention is that in order to fully understand Butler’s theoriza-
tion of norms we must take seriously her critical commitments to Wittig. Alt-
hough also Chambers seeks to point out possible locations of resistance 
against normative violence, his over-emphasis of the Derridean notion of 
                                       
25 Chambers’s article is also published as a chapter (Ch. 4 “Normative Violence”) in Judith Butler and 
Political Theory (2008a), which Chambers published jointly with Terrell Carver. My references in this 
chapter are to Chambers’s article. 
26 For Derrida, the violence of the letter refers to “arche-writing,” a sort of “originary violence” that 
conditions the difference between speech and writing. See Derrida (1976, 110–112). 
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fundamental violence obscures Butler’s twofold notion of norms. In other 
words, for Butler, norms are precisely not “fundamentally” violent (isn’t the 
idea of “fundamental” or “inherent” violence a residue of structuralist think-
ing?) but open to resignification. Indeed, far from being fundamental struc-
tures of social world, norms in Butler’s thought must be understood in terms 
of social action (UG, 51–52; see also Introduction of this dissertation). There-
fore, to highlight Butler’s critical reading of Wittig’s conception of discursive 
violence is important not only because it makes visible the radical lesbian 
feminist background of Butler’s theorization of violence, but also because it 
sheds more light on her theorization of the relationship between norms, vio-
lence, and social change.27 It is this aspect that generally goes unacknowl-
edged by several Butler commentators, including Chambers. Only by ignor-
ing Butler’s critical discussion of Wittig’s notion of discursive violence can 
one argue that Butler conceives norms as fundamentally or inherently vio-
lent. 
 
While Chambers’s interpretation of Butler is sympathetic, the understanding 
according to which Butler conceptualizes norms in terms of fundamental or 
inherent violence has also given rise to more critical readings. Particularly 
Butler’s theorization of the ethics of nonviolence has raised questions about 
whether her earlier account of violently operating norms is compatible with 
her more recent theorization of nonviolence (Mills 2007, 2015; Murphy 
2011a). According to Catherine Mills, for example, Butler’s “understanding of 
normative violence is at odds with her attempt to move toward a nonviolent 
ethics” and a theorization of ethical responsibility (see Chapter 3 in this dis-
sertation) due to the following paradox: 
 
[W]ithin Butler’s account of the normative constitution of the sub-
ject—or what she later calls “the human”—norms themselves are in-
herently violent, and it is that violence itself that generates the need 
for what she calls a “nonviolent ethics” or “ethics of nonviolence.” But 
if the appearance of the ethical subject is itself productively con-
strained by social norms and is thus dependent on violence, then it is 
unclear in what sense an ethics of responsibility could be nonviolent. 
(Mills 2007, 134–135) 
 
                                       
27 Clare Hemmings (2011, 179–180) provides an excellent analysis of the ways in which feminist schol-
ars tend to mention only Foucault and Derrida as Butler’s key predecessors, a citational practice that 
has resulted in the systematic erasure of Wittig from Butler’s thought. My analysis of Butler’s critical 
debt to Wittig builds on and further develops this important insight. But although Hemmings analyzes 
in a detailed manner the theoretical relationship between these two feminist thinkers, she overlooks 
the way Butler’s theorization of the historically contingent intertwinement of norms and violence ex-
pands upon Wittig’s notion of discursive violence. 
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Because “normative violence,” according to Mills, conditions our appearance 
within the social and political sphere, every ethical encounter between singu-
lar beings “will also be founded in normative violence” (Mills 2007, 148–
149). Therefore, if violence plays a formative role in constituting us as cultur-
ally intelligible beings, then it becomes difficult, according to Mills, to main-
tain a conception of the ethical subject that “responds to and opposes vio-
lence but does not partake of it” (ibid., 147). However, this raises the ques-
tion of the crucial distinction between aggression and violence that Butler 
makes. Indeed, does it follow from the argument according to which we are 
“mired” in violence—that is, that we are socially constituted through power 
relations, violent practices, and violently operating norms and normative 
categories—that we are incapable of resisting our violent impulses and ag-
gression toward others? 
 
Despite the fact that Mills sidesteps Butler’s crucial distinction between ag-
gression and violence, a conceptual distinction that in my view points to the 
possibility of developing nonviolent practices vis-à-vis the different types of 
violence, she nevertheless holds that one possibility to theorize nonviolence 
in Butler’s framework could be to claim that “the ethical encounter might 
break from the conditions of its production” (ibid., 151).28 However, she 
doubts whether such “a radical break” is possible, since Butler’s notion of 
norms is based, as she puts it, on “the logic of iteration,” which “entail[s] that 
this break is never complete” (ibid., 151). While I agree that Butler’s account 
of nonviolence is significantly informed by her theorization of the relation-
ship between norms and violence, isn’t it exactly the notion of “iteration” that 
allows Butler to formulate a critique of violence? Or, a critique as an ethical 
practice of nonviolence? 
 
In her response to Mills, Butler maintains that “a certain crucial breakage 
can take place between the violence by which we are formed and the violence 
with which, once formed, we conduct ourselves” (FW, 167; see also Jenkins 
2007).29 This is possible because “The normative production of the subject is 
                                       
28 Mills suggests that another way to solve the paradox would be to distinguish between different 
mechanisms of violence (Mills 2007, 151). For Butler, there are several modalities of violence that over-
lap each other, including the violence of norms (i.e. what scholars have called “normative violence”), 
physical violence, hate violence, state violence, and military violence. Birgit Schippers, for her part, has 
mapped out four different types of nonviolence: the resignification of norms; the refusal of returning 
violence; as well as the practices of critique and grievability (Schippers 2014, 76–77). See also Butler’s 
recent elaboration on her notion of nonviolence in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly 
(NTPA, 187–189). 
29 In her response, Butler notes that “[…] I would caution against a generalization of the thesis that all 
normativity is founded in violence” (FW, 169). Butler’s response has also been published as an article 
(see Butler 2007). For an analysis of the relationship between violence and nonviolence in the context 
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an iterable process—the norm is repeated, and in this sense is constantly 
‘breaking’ with the contexts delimited as the ‘conditions of production’” (FW, 
168). Moreover, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, Butler’s argument 
about what might be called the “socio-temporal” nature of norms originates 
in her discussion of Wittig’s conception of discursive violence. It is this early 
interpretation of Wittig that works, I argue, as a stepping-stone for Butler to 
theorize norms as both constitutive and deconstitutive forms of social power. 
As I noted in the introduction to this study, I argue that this can be regarded 
as Butler’s twofold conception of norms.30 Hence, making visible the feminist 
genealogy of Butler’s conception of violence enables us to see why she found 
it important to theorize social temporality as a crucial aspect of the operation 
of norms. That is, it allowed her to show that transforming and even breaking 
violent norms is possible—if not inevitable bearing in mind that the repro-
duction of norms requires that they are repeated time and again. It is this 
compulsory repetition of norms that makes them vulnerable to critical trans-
formation. 
 
As Mills rightly notes, though, the break from norms is “never complete.” 
However, this is precisely because “the break” is not a “radical” break as Mills 
implies, but a temporal—constant and re-emerging—possibility of our daily 
action that is bound up with the performative, and potentially violent, action 
of norms. Yet this does not mean that nonviolence is impossible. As Butler 
states, it is possible to “undergo a shift in the iteration of violence” if we as-
sume “responsibility for living a life that […] makes good use of the iterability 
of the productive norms and, hence, their fragility and transformability” 
(FW, 170–171). This is exactly the goal of “social critique,” a topic I will dis-
cuss in more detail in Chapter 4. But now it suffices to say that the idea of cri-
tique is an indispensable aspect of Butler’s theorization of the relationship 
between norms and violence. Highlighting critique as an ethical practice that 
enables us to take distance from norms and to problematize the normative 
production of unlivable lives, Butler envisions the possibility of “an interna-
tional coalition of feminist activists and thinkers” that would mobilize femi-
nist, queer, and anti-racist struggles against violence and militarism (PL, 32–
33, 48). In this respect, then, Butler’s notion of nonviolence must be under-
stood as a collective critique of norms that strives to arrest cycles of  
violence by turning aggression into radical democratic31 political contesta-
tion.  
 
                                                                                                            
of the critique of colonialism, see also Butler’s reading of Frantz Fanon in her 2006 article “Violence, 
Non-Violence: Sartre on Fanon” (2006b). 
30 In Undoing Gender Butler describes the constitutive and deconstitutive operations of norms as the 
“doubleness of the norm” (UG, 206).  
31 Throughout her work, Butler associates her project with Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s ac-
counts of radical democracy (see, for example, FW, 142; BTM, 21, 193; NPTA, 4). 
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1.4 Conclusion: Butler’s Feminist Critique of Violence 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that Butler’s theorization of norms stems 
from her critical discussion of Wittig’s conception of discursive violence. This 
is most evident in Gender Trouble, where Butler begins to develop her notion 
of the gender binary as a violently operating norm. Yet, as I also have argued, 
Butler’s criticism of US military violence and her more recent mediations on 
nonviolence build, albeit more implicitly, on her prior discussion of norms in 
the context of her interpretation of Wittig. While it is clear that Butler’s theo-
rization of norms draws to a great extent on Derrida’s and Foucault’s works 
among others, it is my contention that to ignore Wittig’s influence on Butler 
is to overshadow a number of crucial aspects with regard to Butler’s work on 
norms. 
 
First, as I have shown, it was Wittig who introduced the idea that the catego-
ries of sex and gender can be conceived in terms of discursive violence. 
Therefore, Butler’s notions of normative violence and gender violence are 
undoubtedly indebted to Wittig’s work. Second, Butler’s critical response to 
the US’s War on Terror in her more recent work develops further her previ-
ous discussion of the relationship between norms and violence. As I have 
presented, Butler began to formulate her critique of military violence in 
“Contingent Foundations” by redeploying Wittig’s concept of “material vio-
lence”—a critique that resembles Butler’s later analysis concerning “the vio-
lence of derealization.” In this sense, Butler’s critique of the different forms 
of violence continues Wittig’s feminist legacy. 
 
In my elaboration of Butler’s deployment of Wittig, I have also paid attention 
to the crucial differences between them. Whereas Wittig holds that feminists 
must completely overthrow the violent system of heterosexuality, Butler sees 
the possibility of change as an internal dimension of normative power rela-
tions. Although Butler builds on Wittig’s notion of discursive violence, she 
reformulates it in terms of her notion of norms as iterable aspects of power. 
By doing this, she conceptualizes critical transformation as the intrinsic di-
mension of the workings of norms. My central argument in this chapter has 
been that it is this twofold notion of norms that Butler begins to formulate in 
the context of her reading of Wittig.  
 
Like Wittig, who stresses the analysis of “material violence” as a necessary 
element of feminist struggles against oppression, Butler insists on the im-
portance of understanding the social critique of norms as indispensable to 
our critique of violence and our struggle toward nonviolence. In Butler’s 
words, “If the injunction to nonviolence is to avoid becoming meaningless, it 
must be allied with a critical intervention apropos the norms that differenti-
ate between those lives that count as livable and grievable and those that do 
not” (FW, 180, my emphasis). I argue that by acknowledging the Wittigian 
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background of Butler’s thought, her theorization of the relationship between 
norms and violence becomes visible, above all, as a practice of feminist cri-
tique. 
 
I began this chapter by citing Butler’s statement that she “would like to con-
sider [her] theory of gender explicitly in terms of the questions of violence 
[…]” (UG, 207). To conclude, then, I want to quote the remaining part as 
well: “[…], and the possible transformation of the scene of gender violence 
into a future of social survival” (UG, 207). My discussion in the next chapter 
develops further Butler’s notion of critical transformation by addressing the 
question of transgender livability. 
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2 CONTESTING GENDER NORMALIZATION: A 
DISCUSSION OF TRANSGENDER LIVABILITY 
 
 
In an interview with Kate More (1999), Butler states that: “I think 
transgender has always been there for me as an issue and that I feel great af-
filiation with transgender communities and feel that my work, although it 
hasn’t always been explicitly linked to those issues, strikes me as […] very 
sympathetic” (1999, 286). Although Butler’s early work, such as Gender 
Trouble ([1999]1990) and Bodies That Matter (1993), only touches upon 
trans issues as part of her broader theorizations of gender, I argue that in 
Undoing Gender (2004) she brings the question of trans issues to the fore of 
her analysis of gender norms.32 
 
Butler’s shift of focus has remained largely unacknowledged in the growing 
body of commentary literature. In commentaries, transsexual and 
transgender identities are mentioned usually only as examples of Butler’s 
discussion of nonconforming gender identities and bodily experiences (see 
e.g. Loizidou 2007, 154; Lloyd 2007, 135; Carver & Chambers 2008a, 155; 
Thiem 2008, 244; Brady & Schirato 2010, 33; Shippers 2014, 19).33 In order 
                                       
32 As Enke (2013, 19) points out, the term ‘transsexual’ is usually used as a “[m]edical and popular term 
describing persons with significant cross-gender identity.” As Enke specifies, “[d]ue to varying life cir-
cumstances, transsexuals may or may not live their gender identity some of or all the time; depending 
on medical access, legal options or restrictions, financial means, physical appropriateness, and desire, 
transsexuals may or may not change bodily characteristics and/or achieve legal sex reassignment 
through hormonal and surgical means” (Enke 2013, 19). On the other hand, ‘transgender’ refers usual-
ly to three discrete but overlapping meanings. First, it can refer to “a social movement that insists on 
the right of all people to determine for themselves their own personal and legal gender statuses (gender 
self-determination),” and second, to “an ever-expanding social category that incorporates the broad-
est possible range of gender nonconformity for the purposes of movement building, organizing, and 
social-service recognition,” and finally, to a “[t]ransgender identity [that] may include a gender identi-
ty that differs from the sex assigned at birth; a gender expression that differs from that conventionally 
expected of people according to their bodily sex; and/or a desire for alteration of body’s sex/gender 
characteristics” (Enke 2013, 18–19, emphasis in original). When deploying the adjective ‘trans’ (such as 
“trans issues,” or “trans people”) I use it in a general and inclusive sense. 
33 Gill Jagger (2008) is an exception in this respect, for she devotes a whole chapter to the question of 
trans issues in her book on Butler, focusing on her theorization of performativity and materialization. 
Yet, surprisingly, she does not include Undoing Gender in her analysis. Anita Brady and Tony Schirato 
(2010, 33, 89) also address transgender issues and politics but do not offer an extensive elaboration of 
the topic. Here, it is also worth noticing that Moya Lloyd’s recent article “Heteronormativity and/as 
Violence: The ‘Sexing’ of Gwen Araujo” (2013) deploys compellingly Butler’s notion of gender norms in 
order to critically analyze the violence related to both the killing of Gwen Araujo, a trans woman of 
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to fill this gap, I provide a detailed reading of Butler’s discussion of trans is-
sues, with a specific focus on her theorization of the relationship between 
gender norms and trans embodiment; her critique of the psychiatric patholo-
gization of trans persons related to the diagnosis of gender identity disorder 
(GID); and her account of gender self-determination. 
 
While Butler frames her theorization of gender norms in Undoing Gender 
through the question of “the continuum of gender violence,” and in this sense 
continues the Wittigian legacy to examine sex and gender in terms of discur-
sive violence (see Chapter 1), she utilizes in particular a Foucauldian frame-
work to interrogate the pathologization of transgender lives and to theorize 
gender as “the apparatus by which the production and normalization of mas-
culine and feminine take place” (UG, 42). Although Butler focuses a great 
deal on questioning the normalizing operations of gender pertaining to the 
GID diagnosis, she strongly emphasizes the possibility of transformation in-
hering in the very operation of these gender norms.  
 
To elucidate Butler’s notion of gender as both regulative (i.e. normalizing) 
and transformative, and her twofold account of norms more broadly, I sug-
gest that we have to examine her discussion of transgender lives not only in 
light of her critique of normalization but also in connection to her theoriza-
tions of gender self-determination and trans embodiment. In order to high-
light Butler’s twofold approach to norms, I bring her views in critical dia-
logue with other Foucauldian feminist scholars who have discussed 
transgender pathologization but draw quite different conclusions than But-
ler. 
 
Within Foucauldian feminist studies, a number of scholars have problema-
tized the pathologizing discourses of gender, seeking to bring to light the ge-
nealogy of the concept of “gender” and the GID diagnosis (Feder 2007; Ger-
mon 2009; Hausman 1995; Repo 2016).34 Jennifer Germon, for instance, has 
complicated the now commonplace feminist deployments of the concept of 
“gender” by reminding us that it was originally invented and institutionalized 
in 1950s psychiatric sexology as part of the diagnostic efforts to treat intersex 
conditions and what sexologists called “transsexualism” (see e.g. Germon 
2009, 85–86; 63–64). Although all these aforementioned scholars put for-
ward a Foucauldian-feminist critique of the sexological discourse of gender, 
Bernice L. Hausman and Jemima Repo take a step further by arguing that 
the pathologizing discourse of gender actually produced the transsexual sub-
ject position, which therefore became necessarily dependent on the medical-
                                                                                                            
color, in 2002, and the legal case that followed it. As her focus is on this specific case of violence her 
aim is not to elaborate on Butler’s discussion of trans lives. 
34 Although many Foucauldian feminists have analyzed the medical emergence of gender, it has to be 
noted that Foucault himself never dealt with the concept of ‘gender.’ 
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ized “gender discourse” (Hausman 1995, 9; Repo 2016, 72). On the basis of 
this argument, they further conclude that feminist scholars today should not 
only be aware of the psychiatric history of the concept of gender, but they 
should also reject it as a theoretical and political tool and return to the con-
cept of “sex” (Hausman 1995, 200; Repo 2016, 180). 
 
Another aspect that Hausman and Repo share in their problematization of 
gender is their criticism of Butler’s approach to gender. They claim that But-
ler’s notion of gender is ahistorical because it lacks a detailed genealogical 
description of the medical emergence of the concept of “gender.” The result 
of this, they contend, is that her view does not challenge gender as a biopolit-
ical strategy (Repo 2016, 7), but ends up—with her aim of “proliferating gen-
der”—reinforcing the normalization of gender (Hausman 1995, 179).35 
 
In this chapter, I argue that Hausman’s and Repo’s contention that we 
should let go of the concept of gender not only ignores the possibility of the 
critical rearticulation of gender but also runs the risk of excluding those per-
sons who identify themselves as transgender or genderqueer persons from 
feminist theory and politics. Although Butler also problematizes the patholo-
gization of trans identities, her critique does not lead to the conclusion that 
“gender” as a concept should be renounced. By juxtaposing Butler’s approach 
to that of Hausman’s and Repo’s, my aim is to explicate Butler’s position in 
relation to this particular strand of Foucauldian-feminist critique of gender. 
Against Hausman and Repo, I argue that Butler’s discussion of trans issues 
offers us a less deterministic and more sophisticated critique of gender nor-
malization because Butler takes seriously the questions of trans embodiment 
and gender self-determination, thus foregrounding the possibility of thinking 
gender otherwise. As I will demonstrate, Butler’s discussion of trans lives vis-
à-vis gender normalization is strongly informed by her twofold approach to 
norms. 
 
Since Butler’s broader aim with her critique of gender normalization is to 
make room for those who live or experience their gender non-normatively, 
she also acknowledges the GID diagnosis as something that can contribute to 
greater autonomy with regard to gender self-determination, a crucial aspect 
that affects the lives of trans and other gender nonconforming people. In this 
sense, and as I will show, Butler’s approach reflects her theorization of “liva-
bility,” namely, an analysis of the ways in which gender norms affect our un-
derstanding of what kinds of gendered lives can be conceived as worth living 
and flourishing. For this reason, and in opposition to Hausman’s and Repo’s 
critique of gender, I argue that Butler’s stance can be regarded as a trans-
affirmative position in feminist theory. 
                                       
35 Repo also claims that another failure of Butler’s is the omission of biopolitics from her analysis (Re-
po 2016, 6–7; see also Repo 2014). For a critical evaluation of Repo’s criticism, see Sawicki (2016). 
	 47 
 
I begin by giving a short overview of the emergence of gender in psychiatric 
sexology. Then I move to critically scrutinize Hausman’s and Repo’s argu-
ments. In the third section, I discuss Butler’s theorization of the possibility of 
resistance against gender normalization by examining her accounts of livabil-
ity and trans embodiment. The fourth section gives a reading of Butler’s cri-
tique of the GID diagnosis from the perspective of gender self-determination. 
I conclude by summarizing why Butler’s approach can be conceived as a con-
tribution to trans-inclusive feminist theory and politics. 
 
2.1 A brief genealogy of gender  
 
In 1955, American sexologist John Money coined the concept of “gender.” 
His initial concern was the psychosexual development of children born with 
“ambiguous” genitalia, namely, intersexed or “hermaphroditic” children as 
they were then called. Borrowing the term “gender” from linguistics (philolo-
gy), Money and his research team—sexologists Joan Hampson and John 
Hampson—aimed to provide a clear way of determining sex in cases where 
biological variables (i.e. chromosomes, external genitals, gonads, hormones, 
and internal accessory structures) were incongruent and thus could not pro-
vide an unequivocal determination of a person’s sex. Drawing from their clin-
ical research on intersexed children, the team argued that the biological vari-
ables of sex did not predict a person’s psychological sex, that is, “gender role” 
as they called it.36 On the basis of these findings, Money and the Hampsons 
reasoned that “gender role” was not an innate feature of a body but an out-
come of postnatal experiences and learning (Germon 2009, 32; Hausman 
1995, 79, 94–97; Repo 2016, 30–32). 
 
Working within a behaviorist framework, Money and the Hampsons under-
stood gender in terms of the theory of stimulus and response; they believed 
that gender role was psychologically learned as a response to a perceptual 
stimulus of one’s genitals during a “critical period” that in their view lasted 
18 months after birth. According to this model, gender was learned in the 
                                       
36 By “gender role,” Money and the Hampsons referred to “[a]ll those things that a person says or does 
to disclose himself or herself as having the status of boy or man, girl or woman, respectively. […] Gen-
der role is appraised in relation to the following: general mannerisms, deportment and demeanor; play 
preferences and recreational interests; spontaneous topics of talk in unprompted conversation and 
casual comment; content of dreams, daydreams and fantasies; replies to oblique inquiries and projec-
tive tests; evidence of erotic practices, and, finally, the person’s own replies to direct inquiry.” (Money, 
Hampson, and Hampson 1955, 302.) Their concept of “gender role” was inspired by Talcott Parsons’s 
role theory, according to which different sex roles within the nuclear family was necessary for the 
maintenance of social order. See, for example, Parsons & Bates (1956); for more on the relationship 
between Money and Parsons, see Germon (2009, 32, 46). 
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early years of childhood and once it was learned it became a relatively fixed 
feature of a person’s self (Germon 2009, 36–37, 55; Hausman 1995, 97, 101; 
Repo 2016, 33–34; see also Money, Hampson, and Hampson 1955, 310). 
 
According to Germon’s feminist historical account, it is for this reason that 
the team started to develop and promote medical protocols for the surgical 
“correction” of the bodies of intersexed children (Germon 2009, 44). They 
believed that if genitals were operated on after birth, the child would be more 
likely to develop a “normal” gender role as either male or female (ibid). In 
this way, the risk of getting “wrong” perceptual stimuli—and thus the devel-
opment of an abnormal “gender role”—was prevented. In addition to surgical 
procedures, the development of “normal” gender roles within this model re-
quired also, as Repo points out, “the disciplinarization and normalization of 
the family,” since the successful establishment of a proper gender role also 
needed socialization and parental supervision in order to preclude any gen-
der confusion in the child (Repo 2016, 37, 38–39; see also Germon 2009, 
43). Although many intersex and LGBTIQ as well as human rights organiza-
tions have criticized the coercive genital surgeries, the medical “case man-
agement of intersex children” developed by Money and his team is still being 
practiced in several countries.37 
 
The sexological discourse on gender also contributed to the medicalization of 
transsexuality and was, as Germon writes, “especially profitable to psychoan-
alysts and others who were […] theorizing transsexuality as a phenomenon” 
(Germon 2009, 63). Building on Freudian psychoanalysis 38  and object-
relations theory, psychiatrist Robert Stoller developed Money’s ideas further 
by introducing a new concept, “gender identity”, as a part of his clinical and 
theoretical work on transsexuality.39 While Stoller accepted Money’s idea 
that “gender role” refers to behavioral manifestations and social expectations 
(i.e. femininity and masculinity), he suggested that “gender identity” refers to 
one’s psychological sense of self as female or male (Stoller 1968, 10). For 
him, gender identity was an outcome of the psychosocial development of per-
sonhood in early childhood. Although Stoller believed that “gender identity” 
                                       
37 For example, the agenda of the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) is, as described on their 
website, to work toward “systemic change to end shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries for 
people born with an anatomy that someone decided is not standard for male or female.” 
http://www.isna.org (accessed 15 May 2017). 
38 As Germon notes, postwar American psychology was influenced by Talcott Parson’s structuralist 
functionalism, and Money, for example, had studied under Parson’s supervision in the doctroal pro-
gram in the Psychological Clinic and Department of Social Relations at Harvard University at the end 
of the 1940s (Germon 2009, 25, 32–33, 46). 
39 Drawing on Money’s idea of the “critical period” of gender acquisition, Stoller suggested that the 
result of this developmental phase is a “core gender identity,” which he understood as a permanent and 
unchangeable sense of oneself as male or female (Stoller 1968, 29–30). 
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became established in early childhood, he held that gender identity contin-
ued to develop through adolescence (Stoller 1968, 29–30). 
 
According to Repo, Stoller introduced “gender identity” in order to study 
 
how children developed “normal” gender identity through their emo-
tional relationships and unconscious identifications with their par-
ents. Such knowledge would reveal which factors in a person’s envi-
ronment and intimate relationships needed to be managed and how 
this should be done to prevent the development of deviant gender 
identity. (Repo 2016, 56–57) 
 
Indeed, Stoller’s project was to study and find a cure for “abnormal cases,” 
and he was particularly interested in feminine boys, whose gender identity 
seemed to be in opposition to their sex (Stoller 1968, 10). He held that 
whereas a “normal” boy developed his gender identity by identifying with the 
same-sex parent, that is, the father, an “abnormal” boy—the transsexual 
child—identified with his mother. 
 
For Stoller, “male childhood transsexualism” was a “potentially malignant 
personality disorder,” which resulted from the overly symbiotic relationship 
between the male child and the ambivalently gendered (e.g. “bisexual” moth-
er, see Stoller 1968, 94, 125) and/or psychologically “empty” mother, who at-
tempts to feminize her son either consciously or unconsciously (Stoller 1968, 
90, 96, 109, 113–117).40 According to him, the pathology of these children 
manifested itself in their “feminine” behavior: they wanted to dress in wom-
en’s clothes; mimic feminine gestures, such as styles of walking and speak-
ing; in games they preferred female roles; and while urinating, they wanted 
to sit (Stoller 1968, 90).  
 
When it came to the possible treatability of this “personality disorder,” Stol-
ler concluded that “[f]ortunately, adult transsexuality, which is a malignant 
condition irreversible by psychological methods, may be treatable and re-
versible in the small children” (Stoller 1968, 140). As a cure, Stoller proposed 
corrective psychotherapy, the aim of which “should be to make the child feel 
that he is a male and wants to be a masculine boy,” which meant uprooting 
all “gender perversions” (Stoller 1968, 251–252). But with regard to “adult-
hood transsexualism,” Stoller lamented that the only option seemed to be to 
                                       
40 For Stoller, female-to-male transsexualism was “very rare,” since the primary caregiver—and thus 
the source of normal and pathological gender identification—was usually the mother, not the father. 
See Stoller (1968, 197). Curiously, in comparison to mothers, whom Stoller saw as the main culprits in 
“ruining” the child's normal gender identity, Stoller did not pay much attention to fathers; he only not-
ed that their physical absence may contribute to the child’s abnormal gender development (see e.g. 
Stoller 1968, 96–97). 
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surrender to the requests of the transsexual “to have his body changed so 
that he becomes as completely female as medical techniques can contrive” 
(Stoller 2016, 246). 
 
In sum, and as Germon notes, “Stoller’s work followed a long tradition of 
medical and scientific studies that have sought to demarcate the boundaries 
of normality by turning to those whose bodies and/or subjectivities betray 
some level of anomaly” (Germon 2009, 72). Yet, these bodies are never de-
fined as “anomalous or even nonconformist” but “always ‘abnormal,’ ‘defec-
tive,’ or ‘unfinished’ and most recently, ‘disordered’” (ibid).41 Indeed, the 
Stollerian discourse of gender identity resulted in the establishment of new 
diagnostic categories. Although the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
removed homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (DSM) in 1973, the new diagnoses “Gender Identity Disorder” 
(GID) and “Gender Identity Disorder in Children” were added to the DSM-III 
in 1980.42 
 
Notwithstanding Money’s and Stoller’s pathologizing accounts of gender, 
Germon points out that certain second-wave Anglophone feminists adopted 
the concept of gender in the 1970’s in order to question biological essential-
ism, laying thus the groundwork for contemporary feminist theorizations of 
gender (Germon 2009, 86–87).43 These feminist thinkers were especially in-
terested in Stoller’s sex/gender split, arguing that if gender was learned 
through socialization, then the sexual division of labor along with the differ-
ent gender roles were not biological facts but socially learned and thus some-
thing that could be changed (ibid.). Therefore, the concept of gender offered 
a promising—though much-debated—concept for the problematization of 
women’s oppression. As Germon critically notes, however, “the origins of 
gender in sexology have, almost without exception, been elided” from femi-
nist theory (Germon 2009, 3). For her, this can be explained by the lack of 
critical analyses of Money’s work in feminist theorizations on gender. As a 
consequence of this, Germon argues that feminist thinkers have also ignored 
the precarious position of the intersex population at the heart of the incep-
tion of gender, thus contributing—though unwittingly—to its “ongoing status 
[…] as the impossible ‘Other’” (ibid.). 
 
According to Repo (2016), on the other hand, the psychiatric and sexological 
gender discourse established by Money and Stoller was specifically a biopo-
                                       
41 For more on the history of the demarcation between normal and abnormal in relation to pathology, 
see Canguilhem (1991). 
42 Several scholars have argued that GID builds on and thus continues, though implicitly, the patholo-
gization of homosexuality. See, for example, Sedgwick (1991); Feder (1996); and Bryant (2006). 
43 Germon discusses particularly the works of Kate Millet, Germaine Greer, Ann Oakley, Gayle Rubin, 
Nancy Chodorow, Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna (Germon 2009, 86–120). 
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litical strategy targeting not only intersex but also transsexual populations, 
and more generally, the roles of men and women within the sphere of the 
family. She contends that  
 
[t]he idea of gender identity emerged in conjunction with the trans-
sexual subject, which was entangled with other budding attempts to 
regulate the emotional economy of families to maintain a sexual order 
of things around the social, political, and economic ideal of the nucle-
ar family. (Repo, 2016, 50–51, my emphasis) 
 
According to Repo’s genealogy, the emergence of “the transsexual subject” 
thus served broader biopolitical aims of stabilizing the normative ideal of the 
nuclear family in postwar USA. Here, Repo sides with Hausman (1995), who 
claimed two decades before Repo that “the transsexual subject” was created 
by the medical establishment. Before turning to Butler’s critique of the 
pathologization of trans lives, I scrutinize Hausman’s and Repo’s lines of rea-
soning more closely, since they both conclude on the basis of their arguments 
that feminists should discard the concept of gender. 
 
2.2 Giving up the concept of gender? 
 
On the basis of her genealogical analysis, Repo posits that the emergence of 
the transsexual subject was substantially conditioned by medical discourse, 
which sought to normalize transsexual bodies by performing surgical opera-
tions on those whose gender identity did not match their sex: 
 
In addition to the psychological profiling, diagnosis, and treatment 
elicited by gender, the apparatus also created new possibilities for sur-
gically altering an individual’s genitals (“sex”) in order to align them 
with the person’s mind (“gender”). Where for Money, gender justified 
pre-emptive genital surgery on infants, for Stoller, gender also justi-
fied the normalizing surgical alteration of the genitals of adult trans-
sexuals. (Repo 2016, 73, emphasis in original) 
 
According to Repo, reassignment surgery was marketed for transsexual pa-
tients as a way to achieve personal self-fulfillment and freedom, a strategy of 
power that aligned with the individualistic and liberal capitalist discourses of 
self-discipline and self-realization circulating during postwar America (Repo 
2016, 70). While she is right in claiming that Stoller suggested surgeries for 
“male-to-female transsexuals,” he did it very hesitantly, noting that only the 
most feminine transsexuals should be operated and that the surgical tech-
niques should be used cautiously and only as “research techniques” (Stoller 
1968, 251). In fact, as Joanne Meyerowitz and Carol Riddell have pointed 
out, only a small number of surgeons performed reassignment surgeries in 
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the US, while the majority of the medical establishment opposed the proce-
dures and expressed hostile attitudes toward transsexuals (Meyerowitz 2002, 
98–129; Riddell 2006, 151; see also Beemyn 2014). Overlooking these histor-
ical facts, Repo intimates that “the medical establishment” justified the sur-
geries by invoking the principles of self-fulfillment and freedom (Repo 2016, 
70). 
 
Although Repo’s theoretical aim is to disclose the biopolitical rationalities 
behind the inception of the concept of gender and the emergence of “the 
transsexual subject,” her ultimate aim, however, is to formulate a critique 
against feminist deployments of the concept of “gender”. Repo argues that 
although the second-wave feminist adoption of gender  
 
produced powerful contestations of biological determinism, they came 
at the price of turning a blind eye to the corporeal and psychiatric dis-
cipline of sex it enabled, whether it was the outright violence done to 
intersexed infants and their genitals or the more strategically ambigu-
ous but nonetheless pathologized policing of adult male transsexuali-
ty. (Repo 2016, 165–166)  
 
Against the understanding that gender can be a useful concept for feminism, 
Repo asserts that “gender is an apparatus of power and that therefore it can-
not be taken for granted politically as its deployment always has limitations” 
(Repo 2016, 76). Furthermore, Western feminism was, according to her, “al-
ways already entangled in medical and psychological discourses of normali-
zation” (Repo 2016, 178). On these grounds and because “[t]he concepts that 
feminists use must open up possibilities for critical thought and transforma-
tive politics,” Repo reasons that they “must be ready to discard concepts 
when they lose their critical edge,” arguing that feminists should reject the 
concept of gender (Repo 2016, 171, 176–178). Finally, she concludes that 
“Feminists today must be vigilant about asking whether their engagement 
with the discourse of gender advances a critical agenda […] when often it 
might simply suffice to refer to sex, sexual difference, or women instead” 
(Repo 2016, 180, my emphasis).  
 
While I think Repo’s “biopolitics of gender” can function as a critical remind-
er for contemporary feminist and queer theorists to take seriously the regula-
tive and normalizing aspects of gender, I think her conclusion regarding the 
harmfulness of the concept of gender is problematic. On the one hand, Repo 
criticizes second-wave feminists for ignoring “the perfunctory instrumentali-
zation of Money’s and Stoller’s intersexed and transsexual patients” and for 
“thus depoliticizing the conditions of their plight,” but on the other hand she 
suggests that feminists should return to “sex,” “sexual difference,” or “wom-
en” in order to maintain the critical edge of feminist theory and politics (Re-
po 2016, 166, my emphasis). However, this raises the question on what 
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grounds should feminists use just these three categories? And why now, 
when for example the tenacious efforts of transwomen to radically update 
feminist theory and activism are finally starting to bear fruit? 44  Why 
shouldn’t for instance “transsexuals,” “transwomen,” “transmen,” and “gen-
derqueer” persons be included in feminism as well? And furthermore, why 
should we assume that the categories of “sex,” “sexual difference,” and 
“women” are not biopolitically produced?45 
 
Although Repo urges feminist theorists to pay critical attention to the nor-
malizing discourses of gender, her selective genealogy risks reinforcing the 
exclusion of trans issues and trans persons from feminist theory and politics. 
In this way, her reading not only overlooks the counter-discourses (“counter-
dispositifs”) that the psychiatric discourse and the “apparatus” of gender lat-
er enabled (such as the ideas of “transgender” and “genderqueer”), but also 
depoliticizes trans identities and experiences by downplaying their relevance 
for feminist theory and politics.46  
 
Upon closer scrutiny, Repo’s biopolitical account of the emergence of the 
“transsexual subject” repeats certain problematic arguments made earlier by 
Hausman in Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of 
Gender (1995), a study that also utilizes what Hausman’s calls the “Foucauld-
ian paradigm” (Hausman 1995, viii).47 Although Hausman does not discuss 
the biopolitical dimensions of gender, her argument regarding the emergence 
of “transsexualism” bears a clear resemblance to that of Repo’s. Indeed, 
Hausman’s main argument is that the possibility of transsexual identity and 
subjectivity depends on the historical emergence of the concept of “gender” 
as well as on the invention of sex-reassignment technologies (Hausman 1995, 
7, 9). Interestingly, Hausman also concludes that due to the medicalized 
roots of gender, feminist theorists should reject it by returning to the concept 
of “sex” (Hausman 1995, 200). 
 
                                       
44 In recent years, there has been a growing body of multidisciplinary feminist research published by 
trans scholars. See, for example, Bettcher (2014b; 2012); Koyama (2003); and Namaste (2000). 
45 I would like to thank Catherine Mills for pointing this out for me. 
46 Importantly, and as Stryker and Bettcher (2016, 8) have pointed out, transwomen participated ac-
tively in feminists struggles already in the 1970s, despite the fact that they were often excluded by sep-
aratist feminists. 
47 Hausman (1995, viii) explains her position as follows: “Foucault’s emphasis on the analysis of dis-
course as a method of ‘doing history’ has deeply influenced my approach to the cultural study of medi-
cine and of the phenomenon of transsexuality. In this book, I focus narrowly on the ’official discourses’ 
of transsexualism—those produced both by medical personnel and by transsexuals—in order to ascer-
tain the discursive conditions that made the emergence of the demand for sex change and its recogni-
tion within medicine possible in the twentieth century.” 
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A crucial element of Hausman’s argumentation is her critique of trans per-
sons themselves. She claims that their subjectivities cannot be taken serious-
ly because they are necessarily tied to medical techniques (Hausman 1995, 
3–4). She writes:  
 
[i]t is possible that the concept of gender identity gone awry (that is, 
the conviction of being the other sex) covers over some kind of subjec-
tivity that would more openly demonstrate the dependence of trans-
sexualism on a demand for technological intervention—a demand, in 
other words, to engineer oneself as a human subject. (Hausman 1995, 
137) 
 
Hausman goes as far as to argue that “transsexuals are the dupes of gender” 
because of their “compulsive relation to technology” through which “they 
produce themselves as the simulacra of sexual difference” (Hausman 1995, 
140; see also Hausman 2001, 477). 
 
Without addressing Hausman’s biased understanding of trans persons, Repo 
refers to Hausman to back her own arguments. For example, Repo argues 
that in order to gain access to sex reassignment surgery and hormonal thera-
py, “[p]eople who previously felt they were different but were able to live 
with this feeling now engaged in practices of self-identification, self-
diagnosing themselves as transsexuals” (Repo 2016, 71, my emphasis). Re-
ducing trans experiences and identities prior to the invention of surgical 
techniques to mere feelings, Repo further argues—citing Hausman—that the 
psychiatric and sexological discourse of gender and the surgical techniques 
related to it produced and normalized “the transsexual” as a subject category 
(Repo 2016, 72). Yet, she remains silent about the full scope of Hausman’s 
claim. On the same paragraph to which Repo refers, Hausman asserts that 
“[d]emanding sex change is therefore part of what constructs the subject as a 
transsexual,” adding that “[b]ecause of this, we can trace transsexual’s agen-
cy through their doctors’ discourses” (Hausman 1995, 110). For Hausman, 
trans resistance against gender normalization is not possible, since the agen-
cy of trans subjects is necessarily tied to the pathologizing discourse of gen-
der (Hausman 1995, 196–199). Whereas Hausman explicitly dismisses the 
possibility of resistance, in Repo’s analysis the question concerning trans re-
sistance is conspicuous by its absence. 48 
                                       
48 It has to be mentioned that in the concluding pages of her book, Repo brings up the question of trans 
activism by acknowledging “the gradual achievements of the trans movement to render ‘transgender’ 
an intelligible category of subjectivity” (Repo 2016, 180). Yet, she quickly reminds us that even in these 
struggles gender must be seen as “a highly contentious instrument” (ibid.) due to its functioning as a 
biopolitical discourse. Furthermore, and rather ironically, Repo dismisses the fact that the trans 
movement has also sought to render not just “transgender” but, indeed, “transsexual” an intelligible 
category of gendered experience and subjectivity. 
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Hausman’s assumptions bear a resemblance to radical feminist theorists 
Janice Raymond’s ([1994]1979) and Sheila Jeffreys’s (2014) arguments that 
the medicalization of gender is the reason behind the emergence of the phe-
nomenon of transsexuality and, further, that reassignment surgeries are vio-
lations and mutilations against bodily integrity because they reinforce patri-
archal gender stereotypes.49 In addition, they both argue for the eradication 
of gender from feminist theory and activism as well as for the abolition of 
“transsexualism” and “transgendersim.” Raymond, for example, asserts that 
“the problem of transsexualism would be best served by morally mandating it 
out of existence” (Raymond 1979, 178). Similarly, Jeffreys maintains that 
“[i]f the growing new wave of feminism has more success in challenging the 
edifice of gender than the previous stages in women’s movement have had, 
transgenderism will disappear” (Jeffreys 2014, 187). 
 
Given that Hausman’s position not only implicitly mirrors these trans exclu-
sionary statements but that she also explicitly cites Raymond (see Hausman 
1995, 197–108), Repo’s failure to critically engage with Hausman’s argu-
ments has significant consequences for her genealogy of gender. Especially 
so when Repo also ignores the criticism by several trans scholars who have 
exposed the overtly simplified logic behind the kind of reasoning that reduc-
es trans subjectivities to surgical technologies.  
 
For example, trans scholar Dean Spade writes that this kind of analysis ig-
nores “the fact that people (transsexuals and non-transsexuals) change their 
gender presentation to conform to norms with multiple other technologies as 
well, including clothing, make-up, cosmetic surgery […], training in gender-
specific manners, body building, dieting, and countless other practices” 
(Spade 2006a, 318). He also takes issue with the idea that trans people are 
mere victims and/or promoters of “false consciousness” perpetrated by the 
medical establishment, noting that “[a] review of literature written by trans 
people […] suggests a self-conscious strategy of deployment of the transsexu-
al narrative by people who […] seek to occupy ambiguous gender positions in 
resistance to norms of gender rigidity” (Spade 2006a, 326). Feminist trans 
scholar Viviane K. Namaste has summarized the untenable logic behind the 
reasoning of trans exclusive feminist scholarship as follows:  
 
Transsexuals in this type of scholarship can only exist in medical prac-
tice, so individuals who live and identify as transsexuals are best un-
derstood as victims of sexist or capitalist ideology. Taken to its logical 
                                       
49 In her concluding remarks, Hausman cites Raymond in order to stress that even the newer term 
“transgenderism,” which was invented in the 1990s to refer to those trans persons who did not neces-
sarily want to transition through surgery, does not provide any prospects of resistance because “one 
cannot ‘escape’ gender by switching roles or performances and thereby confuse the binary logic, be-
cause that logic defines the possibility of the switching in the first place” (Hausman 1995, 197–198). 
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conclusion, this position argues that transsexuality as a social phe-
nomenon, and therefore transsexuals as individuals, should not exist. 
(Namaste 2000, 34)50 
 
Moreover, both Hausman and Repo (as well as Raymond and Jeffreys) seem 
to understand the (medical) discourse of gender as a relatively stable and de-
terministic structure of power. By over-emphasizing the normalizing func-
tions of “the gender discourse,” they not only come to portray social power as 
a monolithic structure but they also end up overlooking the possibility of 
changing and resisting it. Even if we were to accept the problematic argu-
ments that “the gender discourse” merely serves the biopolitical regulation of 
populations (Repo’s argument) or consolidates normative heterosexuality 
(Hausman’s argument, see Hausman 1995, 194), wouldn’t it still be possible 
to reconceptualize the concept of “gender”? If the concepts of “sex,” “sexual 
difference,” and “women” are not fixed to their prior meanings but open to 
reinterpretations and redeployments and can thus be relevant tools for femi-
nist theory and politics, why does the same not hold true of “gender”? In-
deed, gender is already being redeployed in contexts where its normalizing 
functions are explicitly contested, such as in trans and queer communities. 
 
Furthermore, the understanding that the concept of gender is not fully de-
termined by its prior deployments is also more consistent with the key aim of 
Foucault’s own genealogical approach, which is to show that concepts are, as 
Foucauldian scholar Eduardo Mendieta puts it, “historically contingent, pro-
duced, mutable and thus open to transformation” (Mendieta 2011, 113). Ac-
cording to this understanding, Foucauldian genealogy can be conceived as “a 
science of freedom, a creative freedom that opens up horizons of being by 
challenging us to exceed, to transgress, to step over the limit established by 
existing modes of subjectivity and subjectivation” (ibid.; see also Oksala 
2011, and Pulkkinen 1996).51 Here, one only needs to consider the various 
critical analysis and reworkings of the concept of gender that transgender 
                                       
50 See also, for example, Bettcher & Stryker (2016, 5–7); Prosser (1998, 7–9); Riddell (2006, 149–155); 
and Stone ([1992]2006, 229–230). 
51 Foucault explains his understanding of the relationship between power and transformation as fol-
lows: “I seek to carry out the most precise and discriminative analyses I can in order to show in what 
ways things change, are transformed, are displaced. […] I set out to grasp the mechanisms of the ef-
fective exercise of power; and I do this because those who are enmeshed in these relations of power, 
who are implicated in them, may, through their actions, their resistance, and their rebellion, escape 
them, transform them—in short, no longer submit to them. […] From this perspective my entire re-
search rests on the postulate of an absolute optimism. I do not undertake my analyses to say: look how 
things are, you are all trapped. I do not say such things except insofar as I consider this to permit 
some transformation of things.” (Foucault 1976, 911–912, trans. SK, my emphasis.) 
	 57 
scholarship has provided in recent years (see e.g. Bettcher 2014a; Currah 
2006; Heyes 2007; Salamon 2010; Spade 2003; 2006a; 2006b).52 
 
Against this backdrop, Hausman’s and Repo’s suggestion that feminists 
should discard the concept of gender is hasty and one-sided at best, and at 
worst, falls prey to a position that tries to legitimize the exclusion of trans is-
sues and persons from feminist theory and politics. The suggestion that we 
should give up gender not only overlooks trans activism and the emerging 
field of transgender scholarship but it also misconstrues genealogical think-
ing. My position is that the pathologizing discourse of gender by no means 
exhausts or determines the multiple meanings we give to gender today—let 
alone the diverse ways in which transsexual, transgender, or genderqueer 
identities and experiences are lived today.  
 
In contrast to Repo and Hausman, Butler’s critique of gender normalization 
does not lead to the rejection of the concept of gender. Here, it is important 
to analytically disentangle gender norms that are lived and experienced from 
the pathologizing and medical discourses of gender. This is not to say that 
the lived experiences of trans persons, for example, are not conditioned by 
normalizing discourses of gender but only that the ways in which gender 
norms are lived cannot simply be reduced to these discourses. In order to 
highlight these crucial differentiations that point toward the possibility of 
transformation and resistance and, indeed, toward the idea of the twofold 
function of norms, I turn to Butler’s discussion of livability and embodiment. 
 
2.3 Disrupting gender normalization: embodiment and 
trans livability 
 
While Butler does not engage in the genealogical analysis of the psychiatric-
sexological inception of the concept of gender, it has to be noted that she 
does offer a critical analysis of the work of John Money through analyzing 
gender as a historical and regulative regime; a sexological norm; and an “ap-
paratus of knowledge” (UG, 67) that produce certain kinds of truth claims 
regarding bodies. But rather than focusing on the conditions that made 
“gender” possible as a sexological discourse, Butler is more interested in 
formulating a critique of these normalizing discourses, “a critique which,” 
she paraphrases Foucault, “is precisely the desubjugation of the subject with-
in the politics of truth” (UG, 74). In other words, Butler’s critique of gender is 
                                       
52 See also the inaugural issue of TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly (2014, volume 1, number 1–2) 
titled “Postposttranssexual: Key Concepts for a Twenty-First-Century Transgender Studies,” which 
provides short essays about the key concepts in transgender studies, including for instance ‘biopolitics,’ 
‘gender,’ ‘cisgender,’ ‘depathologization,’ ‘gender self-determination,’ ‘normal,’ and ‘transgender.’ 
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informed by her twofold approach to norms and centered on the question of 
critical transformation. 
 
Germon (2009), whose genealogical account of gender resembles that of Re-
po’s and Hausman’s, also points to the question of transformation when she 
comments on the possibility of resistance against gender normalization. Un-
like Repo and Hausman, she does not jump to the conclusion that feminists 
should give up the concept of gender. Quite the contrary, she asks, “[c]ould 
gender be used in the interests of those who have historically been most 
marginalized by it?” (Germon 2009, 188–189). It is my contention that But-
ler’s discussion of livability and embodiment provides a response to this cru-
cial question raised by Germon. 
 
In the introduction to Undoing Gender, Butler points out that her theorizing 
in the book is inspired by “the ‘New Gender Politics’ that has emerged in re-
cent years, a combination of movements concerned with transgender, trans-
sexuality, intersex, and their complex relations to feminist and queer theory” 
(UG, 4). In dialogue with these movements, Butler’s aim is to problematize 
those norms that idealize the dimorphic notion of human anatomy, norms 
that “produce a differential sense of who is human and who is not, which 
lives are livable, and which are not” (UG, 4). Butler seeks to expose what she 
calls “the continuum of gender violence,” which refers to different forms of 
violence related to gender norms, such as surgeries on intersex infants and 
children; the harassment and violence against trans people, especially trans 
people of color; as well as the medical pathologization of trans experiences 
and identities (UG, 6). 
 
Before delving deeper into Butler’s discussion of trans lives, it has to be not-
ed, though, that certain trans scholars have expressed hesitation concerning 
Butler’s turn to trans issues. Viviane K. Namaste, for example, has accused 
Butler of appropriating the “Trans Question” only for the service of her 
broader, queer feminist theoretical arguments concerning the social constitu-
tion of gender (Namaste 2009, 11–12; see also Prosser 1998, 30–32). While it 
is true that Butler’s early work (e.g. Gender Trouble, 1990; and Bodies That 
Matter, 1993) focused much on demonstrating how transsexuality—along 
with other alternative gendering practices such as drag and butch/femme 
identifications—can be regarded as an example illustrating the queer-
crossing of normative heterosexuality, her discussion of transgender in Un-
doing Gender takes a slightly different direction.53 Although she still strives 
                                       
53 For example, in Gender Trouble (1990) Butler discusses “transsexuality” and drag in the context of 
her theorization of the possibility of subverting conventional gender categories, and in Bodies That 
Matter (1993) she analyzes Paris Is Burning (1990), a documentary film about the ball culture within 
drag and transsexual communities in New York City, in order to locate possible occasions for resistance 
against heteronormativity. 
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toward theorizing sex, gender, and sexuality in ways that might disrupt the 
hegemonic understandings of bodies, her discussion of trans lives is actually, 
and crucially, informed by the question of gender self-determination—a 
question that has made Butler reconsider her views about the desirability of 
“stable” gender categories. 
 
In a recent interview with Sara Ahmed (2016), Butler addresses this particu-
lar issue by commenting on the tension between queer theory and trans and 
intersex movements with respect to the question of stable identity categories:  
 
But the strongest criticism of ‘queer’ lately has come from the trans 
community. […] I accept these criticisms as necessary, and have found 
myself revising my views in response to some of what has been said. 
[…] If ‘queer’ means that we are generally people whose gender and 
sexuality is ‘unfixed’ then what room is there in a queer movement for 
those who understand themselves as requiring – and wanting – a clear 
gender category within a binary frame? […] the message to the advo-
cates of ‘queer’ seems quite pertinent: some people very much require 
a clear name and gender, and struggle for recognition on the basis of 
that clear name and gender. It is a fundamental issue of how to estab-
lish and insist upon those forms of address that make life liveable. 
(Butler in Ahmed 2016, 9–10, my emphasis)54 
 
Already in Undoing Gender Butler acknowledges the role that a “stable” 
identity category plays for those whose experiences and identifications have 
previously been denied and excluded. As she reminds us, “the transsexual 
desire to become a man or a woman is not to be dismissed as a simple desire 
to conform to established identity categories,” and continues by stating that 
“[b]ut even if there are […] desires for stable identity at work, it seems crucial 
to realize that a livable life does require various degrees of stability” (UG, 8). 
Indeed, Butler’s discussion of trans issues is based on the ethical and political 
question of why certain gender nonconforming populations, such as trans 
and genderqueer people, are made more susceptible to harassment, violence, 
and pathologization than others. Accordingly, her theoretical task has to do 
with “distinguishing among the norms and conventions that permit people to 
                                       
54 In an interview with the TransAdvocat Butler comments on the common misconception regarding 
her theorization of gender performativity: ”Some trans people thought that in claiming that gender is 
performative that I was saying that it is all a fiction, and that a person’s felt sense of gender was there-
fore ‘unreal.’ That was never my intention. I sought to expand our sense of what gender realities could 
be. […] I did not mean to argue that gender is fluid and changeable (mine certainly is not). I only 
meant to say that we should all have greater freedoms to define and pursue our lives without patholo-
gization, de-realization, harassment, threats of violence, violence, and criminalization. I join in the 
struggle to realize such a world.” (Butler in Williams 2014) 
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breathe, to desire, and to live, and those norms and conventions that restrict 
or eviscerate the conditions of life itself” (UG, 8).  
 
Given that gender norms, for Butler, can operate both ways simultaneously 
depending on the context, it is crucial to  
 
cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for some, and similar-
ly, to refrain from proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some. 
The differences in position and desire set the limits to universalizabil-
ity as an ethical reflex. The critique of gender norms must be situated 
within the context of lives as they are lived and must be guided by the 
question of what maximizes the possibilities for a livable life, what 
minimizes the possibility of unbearable life or, indeed, social or lit-
eral death. (UG, 8, my emphasis) 
 
The question of “a livable life” brings me back to Hausman’s and Repo’s ar-
gument that feminists should discard the concept of gender. Contra Repo 
and Hausman, for Butler, the critique of gender must be grounded on an ac-
count that considers gender not only to be a normalizing discourse but also 
to be a lived bodily identity and experience. Therefore, the emphasis Butler 
puts on the notion of gendered lives “as they are lived” points to the crucial 
question of embodiment, that is, the ways in which gender is lived, embod-
ied, and contested by those who have been most marginalized by it—
including trans persons.  
 
In other words, Butler’s critique of gender norms must be understood in rela-
tion to her account of livability, or what I call trans livability, to emphasize 
that it is particularly the question of trans embodiment that fuels Butler’s cri-
tique of gender norms in this context. It is my contention that the idea of 
trans livability adds a necessary layer to the critique of gender, since it brings 
to light the ethical and political question concerning trans embodiment as a 
mode of resistance against unlivable gender norms.55 In this sense, the con-
cept of “trans livability” illustrates Butler’s twofold approach to norms: for 
her, gender is not only a violent norm or a mechanism of normalizing power 
but also a mode of social transformation and resistance. 
 
As Samuel A. Chambers and Terrell Carver have pointed out, “Undoing Gen-
der would have been appropriately subtitled ‘the livable life’” (Chambers & 
Carver 2008a, 69). In the context of gender norms, Chambers and Carver de-
fine a “livable life” as one that does not deviate from the normative expecta-
tions of sex, gender, and sexuality but conforms to them. Conversely, those 
who do not fit these normative understandings are conceived as less valuable 
and their lives as less “livable” (Chambers & Carver 2008a, 70). It is for this 
                                       
55 Spade (2003) also discusses trans embodiment as a form of resistance against gender normalization. 
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reason that Butler insists that trans lives “[h]ave a potential and actual im-
pact on political life at its most fundamental level, that is, who counts as a 
human, and what norms govern the appearance of ‘real’ humanness” (UG, 
28). Therefore, the question of trans livability must be thought of against the 
backdrop of gender normalization and the history of the violent discrimina-
tion and exclusion of LGBTIQ lives, and more specifically, in relation to the 
psychiatric pathologization and regulation of trans experiences and identi-
ties.  
 
For Butler, the question of livability is directly connected to her critique of 
gender normalization. By normalization, she refers to the ways in which gen-
der norms “hold sway over embodied life, provid[ing] coercive criteria for 
normal ‘men’ and ‘women’” (UG, 206). She notes that when these norms are 
defied, “it is unclear […] whether our lives are valuable, or can be made to be, 
whether our genders are real, or ever can be regarded as such” (UG, 206). 
Indeed, at the heart of Butler’s interrogation of “livable lives” is an attempt to 
disclose and tackle the normalizing operations of gender that have led to the 
pathologization of those who do not conform to the binary notion of bodies, 
which in turn has contributed to the legitimization of psychiatric regulation, 
political control, and social stigmatization of trans populations. Therefore, 
Butler’s turn to trans issues in Undoing Gender must be read in light of her 
critique of gender norms that serves the purpose of trying to make more 
room for trans and gender nonconforming people. 
 
Another aspect that often goes unnoticed in Butler’s account of “livable lives” 
vis-à-vis gender normalization is that, for her, livability is necessarily linked 
to the question of critical transformation and resistance. In the beginning of 
the book, Butler writes: 
 
Sometimes a normative conception of gender can undo one’s person-
hood, undermining the capacity to persevere in a livable life. Other 
times, the experience of a normative restriction becoming undone can 
undo a prior conception of who one is only to inaugurate a relatively 
newer one that has greater livability as its aim. If gender is a kind of 
doing, an incessant activity performed, […] it is not for that reason au-
tomatic or mechanical. On the contrary, it is a practice of improvisa-
tion within a scene of constraint. (UG, 1, my emphasis) 
 
To clarify the idea of “improvisation” with regard to gender regulation, I 
want to briefly come back to the idea of social temporality I discussed in 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation. As I showed there, Butler’s conception of gen-
der is based on her theorization of the temporal (i.e. “repetitive,” “performa-
tive” or “citational”) operation of norms. It is this temporal dimension of so-
cial norms that gives them their stabilizing and normalizing power, yet it is 
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also the aspect that opens up the horizon of critical intervention and inven-
tion. 
 
It is in this sense that trans embodiment can be understood as a critical re-
working of and resistance against gender normalization. Butler asks “[h]ow is 
it that […] transgender […] enters into the political field?” and answers that 
“[i]t does this […] by not only making us question what is real, and what has 
to be, but by showing us how contemporary notions of reality can be ques-
tioned, and new modes of reality instituted” (UG, 217).56 On the same page, 
Butler further elaborates her conception of the relationship between embod-
iment and norms, pointing implicitly to her theorization of gender performa-
tivity: 
 
As a consequence of being in the mode of becoming, and in always liv-
ing with the constitutive possibility of becoming otherwise, the body is 
that which can occupy the norm in myriad ways, exceed the norm, 
rework the norm, and expose realities to which we thought we were 
confined as open to transformation. These corporeal realities are ac-
tively inhabited, and this “activity” is not fully constrained by the 
norm. Sometimes the very conditions for conforming to the norm are 
the same as the conditions for resisting it. When the norm appears at 
once to guarantee and threaten social survival […] then conforming 
and resisting become a compounded and paradoxical relation to the 
norm, a form of suffering and a potential site for politicization. (UG, 
217; see also UG, 29, my emphasis) 
 
As Butler specifies in this passage, the embodied, or what also might be 
called creative, relation to the norm gives rise to a productive ambivalence: it 
both conditions the intelligibility of bodies and enables and opens up—
because of its citationality and temporality—the possibility of transformation 
and resistance. 
 
Whereas Hausman’s and Repo’s understanding of bodies seem to be based 
on an assumption that bodies—especially gender nonconforming bodies—are 
passive objects of normalization, Butler proposes a notion of embodiment 
that highlights gender normalization as an active process.57 Although the 
process of gender embodiment is conditioned, and indeed made possible, by 
the mechanisms of normalization, it is not fully determined by them. In con-
                                       
56 For a sustained analysis of trans embodiment, see, for example, Salamon (2010), who theorizes trans 
embodiment by drawing on Butler’s discussion of materialization, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily 
schema, and Freud’s account of bodily ego. 
57 In The Psychic Life of Power (1997) Butler theorizes this in terms of subjection (i.e. the “internaliza-
tion” of norms) by bringing together Foucault’s notion of subjectivation (assujettissement) and Freud’s 
writings on melancholic identifications. 
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trast to Repo and Hausman, Butler points out in Notes Toward a Performa-
tive Theory of Assembly (2015) that bodies are not just passive objects of 
normalization. This is to say that although “gender is received” to the extent 
that it produces us discursively and normatively through “the psychosocial 
imposition and slow inculcation of norms,” it is “not simply inscribed on our 
bodies as if we were merely a passive slate obligated to bear a mark” (NPTA, 
30). Rather, gender norms “inform the lived modes of embodiment we ac-
quire over time, and those very modes of embodiment can prove to be ways 
of contesting those norms, even breaking with them” (NPTA, 29, my empha-
sis). As Butler continues:  
 
Although there are authoritative discourses on gender—the law, medi-
cine, and psychiatry, to name a few—and they seek to launch and sus-
tain human life within discrete gendered terms, they do not always 
succeed in containing the effects of those discourses of gender they 
bring into play. Moreover, it turns out that there can be no reproduc-
tion of gendered norms without the bodily enactment of those norms, 
and when that field of norms breaks open, even provisionally, we see 
that the animating aims of a regulatory discourse, as it is enacted 
bodily, give rise to consequences that are not always foreseen, mak-
ing room for ways of living gender that challenge prevailing norms 
of recognition. Thus we can plainly see the emergence of transgender, 
genderqueer, butch, femme, and hyperbolic or dissent modes of mas-
culinity and femininity, and even zones of gendered life that are op-
posed to all categorical distinctions such as these. (NPTA, 31–32, my 
emphasis) 
 
For Butler, one clear example of how authoritative discourses on gender 
“break open” is when the initial gender assignment is rejected or revised 
(NPTA, 30). Here Butler points to the different practices of transgender af-
firmation and gender reassignment (including but not limited to surgical or 
hormonal modifications) that strive toward a greater livability for trans and 
genderqueer lives. In order to further illustrate Butler’s discussion of 
transgender in relation to her twofold approach to gender norms—that is, an 
approach that conceives gender as simultaneously a conditioning and an en-
abling norm—I examine next her critique of the “Gender Identity Disorder” 
diagnosis. As will become clear, Butler draws entirely different conclusions 
from the diagnostic tradition than Hausman and Repo. 
 
2.4 Pathologization versus gender self-determination: the 
question of transautonomy 
 
The main problem of Hausman’s and Repo’s account of gender is, I argue, 
that they dismiss the question of gender self-determination. That is, the 
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question “of trans people making conscious, informed choices about the best 
ways to live their own embodied lives” (Stryker & Bettcher 2016, 7). The right 
to decide one’s own gender and the idea of gender self-determination have 
been and continue to be key topics in transgender scholarship (see, for ex-
ample, Bettcher 2012; Spade 2006a & 2006b; Stanley 2014). In the following 
excerpt, Spade summarizes what is at stake with the idea of gender self-
determination with regard to medical discourses on gender: 
 
An approach that recognizes the possibility of a norm-resistant, politi-
cized, and feminist desire for gender-related body alteration need not 
reject the critique of medical practice regarding transsexuality nor 
embrace the normalizing regulations of the diagnostic and treatment 
processes. […] Such an analysis requires seeing the problem not as 
fundamentally lying in the project of gender change or body altera-
tion, but in how the medical regime permits only the production of 
gender-normative altered bodies, […]. An alternative starting point for 
a critique of the invention and regulation of transsexualism is a desire 
for a deregulation of gender expression and the promotion of self-
determination of gender […]. (Spade 2006a, 319) 
 
This is precisely the kind of approach Butler undertakes in her critical scruti-
ny of GID in Undoing Gender. To fully grasp what is at stake in Butler’s cri-
tique of the diagnosis, I suggest that it must be contextualized through the 
question of how should we understand gender self-determination in relation 
to the operation of gender norms and normalization? Contextualizing But-
ler’s critique of GID in this way also sheds more light on Butler’s twofold 
conception of gender as both a regulative and a transformative norm. 
 
Although Butler analyzes GID as it stands in DSM-IV, in my view her criti-
cism applies also to the latest 2013 diagnosis, “gender dysphoria.” In the 
fourth edition of the manual (DSM-IV) published in 1994, the term “trans-
sexualism” was replaced by the phrase “Gender Identity Disorder” as a diag-
nostic category. In 2013, when the APA introduced the DSM-5, GID was re-
moved from the grouping of “Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders” and giv-
en a new diagnostic name, “gender dysphoria.” While the aim of the revisions 
was to lessen the stigmatization of trans people as mentally ill, the diagnostic 
criteria remain quite similar compared to GID, only with a couple of chang-
es.58  
                                       
58 In the DSM-5 the aim of the new diagnosis (“Gender Dysphoria”) is described in the following way: 
“DSM-5 aims to avoid stigma and ensure clinical care for individuals who see and feel themselves to be 
a different gender than their assigned gender. […] Replacing ‘disorder’ with ‘dysphoria’ in the diagnos-
tic label is not only more appropriate and consistent with familiar clinical sexology terminology, it also 
removes the connotation that the patient is ‘disordered.’” See also p. 14 in Highlights of Changes from 
DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5 (2013). 
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Furthermore, given that “gender dysphoria” is still a diagnostic category in 
the manual that classifies mental disorders, the stigmatization of trans peo-
ple as mentally ill is hard to avoid.59 By saying this I do not mean to implicitly 
accept the possible social stigmatization regarding those DSM categories that 
are not related to gender or sexuality. Nor do I want to endorse an ableist po-
sition that excludes the experiences of suffering by trans persons and disa-
bled persons. My point is only to stress that as long as trans experience is 
categorized as a severe mental disorder and as long as disabled persons are 
discriminated against on all levels of society, it remains easier for states and 
institutions to legitimize certain normalizing interventions, such as compul-
sory therapy, institutionalization, and sterilization practices against trans 
persons.60 For this reason, I find Butler’s discussion of GID still relevant to-
day. 
 
Despite the fact that “gender dysphoria” continues the normalization of trans 
identities and experiences in terms of psychiatric diagnoses, “[t]he diagno-
sis,” as Butler points out, “is crucial for many individuals who seek insurance 
support for sex reassignment surgery or treatment, or who seek a legal 
change in status” (UG, 5). Getting the diagnosis is still in several countries 
the only way to have one’s juridical gender changed to correspond to one’s 
gender identity and/or have access to particular gender affirmation practices, 
such as health services, treatments (e.g. surgery and hormone therapy), and 
legal recognition. Hence, the diagnosis can provide the necessary means for 
gender self-determination and thus a more livable life. 
 
In this sense, the diagnosis can be understood as both restrictive and ena-
bling. On the one hand, the diagnosis “facilitates access to a variety of medi-
cal and technological means of transitioning” (UG, 75), which, in turn, not 
only contributes to the general well-being and flourishing of those persons 
who wish to undergo medical transitioning but can also be necessary for 
one’s very survival. In addition, many insurance companies in the US, for ex-
ample, require that a person who wishes to transition by undergoing surgery 
has been diagnosed with “gender dysphoria” by mental health profession-
als.61 As Butler stresses, this point has to do especially with socio-economic 
justice as poor and working class trans people as well as trans people of color 
                                       
59 Also, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), published by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), still maintains the diagnostic category of “Gender Identity Disorders,” which 
includes “Transsexualism,” “Dual-Role Transvestism,” and “Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood.” 
60 For more on the history of trans sterilization, see Honkasalo (2016b), who traces the pathologization 
of gender nonconformity to the eugenic movement in the US through a Foucauldian genealogy. For 
theorizations of solidarity politics in trans and disabled communities, see Kafer (2013). 
61 Paradoxically, despite the diagnosis, trans people are not covered and protected under the American 
Disability Act (see Spade 2003). 
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may not have the necessary funds to cover the expenses of the procedures 
provided by private clinics (UG, 76, 90). 
 
However, the problem is that the diagnosis is based on the normative as-
sumption that those who do not conform to the binary model of gender are 
mentally ill and thus in need of psychiatric intervention. In this way, the di-
agnosis can strengthen the stigma already attached to those who transgress 
gender norms. On the other hand, the motivation for subjecting oneself to 
pathologizing categories in order to get something one needs may itself be 
understood as practices that realize one’s autonomy. “After all,” Butler 
writes, “one might argue […] that the way that the diagnosis facilitates cer-
tain entitlements and insurance benefits, to medical treatment, and to legal 
status, actually works in the service of what we might call transautonomy” 
(UG, 76, my emphasis). 
 
Yet, given the pathologizing and normalizing functions of the diagnosis, it is 
difficult to see it only as a neutral instrument for achieving autonomy. This 
raises the question how should we understand the idea of gender self-
determination in relation to the pathologizing aims of the diagnosis? Here we 
have to bear in mind that if gender norms, as Butler argues throughout her 
work, constitute us as socially intelligible subjects, there is no position “out-
side” of these norms. As Butler explains: 
 
What precisely autonomy means, however, is complicated […], since it 
turns out that choosing one’s own body invariably means navigating 
among norms that are laid out in advance and prior to one’s choice 
[…]. Indeed, individuals rely on institutions of social support in order 
to exercise self-determination with respect to what body and what 
gender to have and maintain, so that self-determination becomes a 
plausible concept only in the context of a social world that supports 
and enables that exercise of agency. Conversely (and as a conse-
quence), it turns out that changing the institutions by which humanly 
viable choice is established and maintained is a prerequisite for the 
exercise of self-determination. In this sense, individual agency is 
bound up with social critique and social transformation. (UG, 7, my 
emphasis) 
 
In other words, and as this passage illustrates, we have to think of transau-
tonomy and agency in relation to the critique of gender norms. When consid-
ered from the perspective of “gender dysphoria,” we should thus ask: How 
does the diagnosis maintain and further consolidate the medicalized under-
standing of gender and, more generally, the norm of binary gender? 62 What 
                                       
62 In an attempt to make more room for those trans experiences and identities that fall outside the bi-
nary framework of man/woman or masculinity/femininity, Austin Johnson (2016) has suggested that 
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are the normative consequences of the diagnosis? And, furthermore, if we see 
the diagnosis as a strategy to achieve autonomy (if we understand autonomy 
here as the freedom to determine one’s gender), is it possible, at the same 
time, to resist and contest the normalizing functions of the diagnosis? How 
can the tension between gender self-determination and normalization be 
reconciled? 
 
When understood as a strategy, and especially from the standpoint of an in-
dividual, the diagnosis can be understood as an “instrument by which to fur-
ther one’s self-expression and self-determination” as well as to secure one’s 
status and funding for transition (UG, 88). On the other hand, the diagnosis 
“may well be used by the medical and psychiatric establishments to extend its 
pathologizing influence on populations of transsexuals, trans youth, and les-
bian, bi-, and gay youth as well” (UG, 88).  
 
When considered as a means of normalization, it is important to see how the 
medical and psychiatric discourses that maintain and regulate the criteria for 
the diagnosis produce certain assumptions of trans subjects by entrenching 
particular norms of masculinity and femininity. In order to get the diagnosis, 
one has to submit oneself to what Butler calls, referring to Foucault, a “regu-
latory apparatus” (UG, 90) that produces and maintains a set of standards 
and norms that regulate who can meet the criteria set by the psychiatric es-
tablishment. In the DSM-5, the main requirement is “a marked incongruence 
between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender of at least 
6 months duration.” The individual must also show emotional and psycho-
logical distress due to the incongruence.63 
 
The diagnostic features also include relatively long descriptions about how 
gender dysphoria manifests itself in different age groups. For example, pre-
pubertal “natal girls”64 with “gender dysphoria” are characterized as “pre-
fer[ring] boys’ clothing and hairstyles” and “[c]ontact sports, rough-and-
tumble play, traditional boyhood games, and boys as playmates” (DSM-5, 
453). On the other hand, boys with the diagnosis “have a preference for 
dressing in girl’s or women’s clothes” and “are intensely interested in female 
fantasy figures” and “female-type dolls (e.g., Barbie)” as well as “feminine ac-
tivities, stereotypical games, and pastimes (e.g., “playing house”; drawing 
                                                                                                            
the medical understandings of transgender can be analyzed as “transnormative” discourses. According 
to Johnson, these discourses seek to make trans experience, identification, and narratives intelligible 
only by medical standards. 
63 For the complete list of the requirements, see DSM-5 (2013), “Gender Dysphoria,” pp. 451–459. 
64 By using the phrase “natal girl” in relation to a transman implies a problematic bias at the heart of 
the diagnostic language: it is based on the normative presumption that, before transitioning, transmen 
are “girls.” 
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feminine pictures; watching television or videos of favorite female charac-
ters)” (DSM-5, 453).65 
 
As is clear from these excerpts, the diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” not only 
presumes that gender is a relatively fixed and stable phenomenon, but it also 
promotes a conventional, binary notion of “girlhood” and “boyhood.” Within 
this diagnostic model, which reflects the history of GID, culturally typical 
“traits” of masculinity and femininity is understood as normal aspects of per-
sonhood and behavior, while transgressive behavior becomes conceived of as 
abnormal—as if “non-transsexual people grow up with minimal to no gender 
trouble or exploration,” as Spade points out (Spade 2006a, 321).   
 
For this reason, Butler worries what the diagnosis might do to those who are 
most vulnerable. Even if certain populations could use the diagnosis strategi-
cally as an instrument, Butler asks, “[b]ut are children and teens always ca-
pable of effecting the distance necessary to sustain a purely instrumental ap-
proach to being subjected to a diagnosis?” (UG, 82). The worry is thus that 
although certain adults might have critical resources to resist the normalizing 
operations of the diagnosis, this is by no means self-evident with more vul-
nerable groups, such as children.66 Butler summarizes the counterarguments 
for maintaining the diagnosis as follows: 
 
So even if the diagnosis is approached as an instrument or vehicle for 
accomplishing the end goal of transitioning, the diagnosis can still a) 
install a sense of mental disorder on those whom it diagnoses, b) en-
trench the power of the diagnosis to conceptualize transsexuality as a 
pathology, and c) be used as a rationale by those who are in well-
funded research institutes whose aim is to keep transsexuality within 
the sphere of mental pathology. (UG, 83) 
 
In light of Butler’s critique of gender norms, then, the GID/gender dysphoria 
diagnosis can be seen as a mechanism of normalization that contributes to 
the intensification of the binary notion of gender. In this way, the diagnosis 
works as a regulatory tactic that aims to produce subjects that conform to 
prevailing gender norms. 
 
                                       
65 In problematizing these descriptions about the development of cross-gender identifications, Butler 
notes that “The DSM assumes that the doll you play with is the one you want to be […].” But, as Butler 
adds, this is not self-evident, as “[p]erhaps the norm itself is being played, explored, even busted” (UG, 
97).  
66 Especially so when there are still psychologists (e.g. Emeritus Professor of Neuropsychiatry and Be-
havioral Science, George Rekers at the University of South Carolina and his followers) who consider 
nonconforming gender identities in children to be pathological diseases. 
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In my view, a related problem here is that retaining the “gender diagnosis” 
can depoliticize transgressions of gender and thus contribute to the psychol-
ogization and individualization of political phenomena. For example, one of 
the requirements of the diagnostic tests is that the person who wishes to 
transition must show remarkable emotional “distress.”67 The diagnosis im-
plies that the origin of this distress and related “emotional and behavioral 
problems”68 and even the risk of suicide are psychological in origin.69 How-
ever, and as Butler rightly notes, “[t]he diagnosis does not ask whether there 
is a problem with the gender norms that it takes as fixed and intransigent, 
whether these norms produce distress and discomfort, whether they impede 
one’s ability to function, or whether they generate sources of suffering for 
some people or for many people” (UG, 95, my emphasis). 
 
In other words, the diagnosis neglects the social and often violent operation 
of gender norms against trans persons. It says nothing, for example, about 
the alarming numbers of homicides of transwomen worldwide, a normaliza-
tion of violence that affect disproportionally the trans communities of col-
or.70 Yet, to get rid of the diagnosis altogether is not an unproblematic op-
tion, since most of the states (most EU member states and the US, for exam-
ple) and insurance companies (specifically in the US context) still require it 
as proof of the “seriousness” of the medical and psychiatric reasons for un-
dergoing the procedures. 
 
One possibility to resist the normalizing operations of the diagnosis would be 
to turn its psychologizing and individualizing logic upside down. According 
to a Foucauldian feminist scholar, Ellen K. Feder, some mental health pro-
fessionals “understand the problem to lie instead in the hostile conditions 
that gender variant” persons may face and thus conceive a gender noncon-
firming people as not suffering from a mental disorder but from social preju-
dice that should be “the focus of intervention” (Feder 2011, 65). Feder con-
tinues that rather than doing away with the diagnosis, “another possibility 
could be to rename and reformulate the diagnosis” in accordance with this 
understanding as well as to “direct treatment toward the most appropriate 
means of alleviating distress and promoting flourishing” (ibid.). 
 
In sum, as long as medical, psychiatric, and legal discourses keep grounding 
their conceptions of transsexuality as well as transgender experiences and 
identities on the assumptions that the reason for “gender dysphoria” can be 
                                       
67 The DSM-5 explains this as follows: “Gender dysphoria refers to the distress that may accompany 
the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender” (DSM-5, 
451, emphasis in original). 
68 See DSM-5, 459. 
69 See DSM-5, 454. 
70 See, for example, http://tgeu.org/tmm-idahot-update-2015/ 
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found from a person’s mind or behavior, problematization of gender norms 
that inform these pathologizing and individualizing discourses proves indis-
pensable to the struggles for greater claims of gender self-determination and 
transautonomy. In this sense, for Butler, a critique of gender norms is a cru-
cial aspect of resistance against the normalizing functions of the diagnosis. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion: toward a trans-affirmative  
feminist theory 
 
When asked in a recent interview “Do you think that living in a world without 
‘gender’ is possible?” Butler answered: 
 
gender can be very important to us, and some people really love the 
gender that they have claimed for themselves. If gender is eradicated, 
so too is an important domain of pleasure for many people. And oth-
ers have a strong sense of self bound up with their genders, so to get 
rid of gender would be to shatter their self-hood. I think we have to 
accept a wide variety of positions on gender. (Butler in Williams 2014) 
 
By juxtaposing Hausman’s and Repo’s arguments with Butler’s discussion of 
trans lives I have aimed to interrupt the revitalization of the particular strand 
of feminist scholarship that keeps recycling narrow and biased views not only 
about trans persons and trans communities but also the choices trans people 
make about their bodies and their lives. Through my analysis of Butler’s dis-
cussion of trans embodiment and livability I have sought to illustrate that 
while it is crucial to expose and question the normalizing power of gender, it 
is equally necessary to acknowledge that gender also means a lived identity 
that potentially reworks and disrupts the normalizing discourses of gender. 
As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, this is the case especially 
with marginalized gender identities, such as transsexual, transgender, and 
genderqueer identities. 
 
The argument that gender is a redundant or harmful concept for feminist 
theory and politics is based on a one-sided understanding of the relationship 
between norms, normalization, and social and political transformation. In 
order to avoid simplified accounts of gender normalization, we need to make 
more adequate distinctions between the medical and normalizing discourses 
of gender and the different deployments and redeployments of the concept of 
“gender,” as well as between normative notions of gender (i.e. masculinity 
and femininity) and the nonconforming and norm-resistant ways in which 
genders are lived today. By spelling out these distinctions as part of my read-
ing of Butler’s discussion of trans lives, I have illustrated how gender can ex-
ceed and break away from its prior deployments. For this reason, I believe 
that the concept of gender is not only a valuable critical tool for feminist the-
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ory and politics but that it is an important concept for trans and gender-
queer inclusive feminism. 
 
In addition, by providing a reading of Butler’s discussion of trans lives, and 
through emphasizing it as a question of trans livability, I have attempted to 
highlight crucial but previously overlooked aspects of her problematization of 
gender norms. By underlining the possibility of critical transformation, and 
indeed, the different future of gender, the concept of trans livability brings to 
light the ethical and political aim of Butler’s critique of gender norms. In her 
words, “[t]he conception of politics at work here is centrally concerned with 
the question of survival, of how to create a world in which those who under-
stand their gender […] to be nonnormative can live and thrive” (UG, 219). 
Concretely, this raises the “question of developing, within law, within psychi-
atry, within social and literary theory, a new legitimating lexicon for the gen-
der complexity that we have always been living” (UG, 219). Only by taking 
into account trans and other gender nonconforming lives “as they are lived” 
can we start to formulate a radical account of feminist politics, one that takes 
seriously the medical and pathologizing discourses of gender but recognizes 
and supports the diverse and complex ways gender is currently being lived—
and contested. 
 
In sum, in this chapter I have sought to show that in order for feminist ac-
counts of gender normalization to maintain their critical, and indeed ethical, 
aspiration they must always be accompanied by questions of gender embod-
iment, trans livability, and gender self-determination. In the following chap-
ter, I expand upon my discussion of livability by exploring in more detail 
Butler’s critical analysis of the normative production of “life” in the context of 
her theorization of precarity. 
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3 THE NORMATIVE PRODUCTION OF KILLABLE 
LIVES: BUTLER’S NOTION OF “LIFE” AND THE CALL 
FOR ANIMAL ETHICS 
   
  
Butler’s recent work (e.g. Precarious Life 2004; Frames of War 2009; Part-
ing Ways 2012, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly 2015) 
provides a powerful critique of violence in the context of contemporary glob-
al conflicts and wars by asking whose lives count as valuable enough for pro-
tection against violence and suffering. Underlying Butler’s analysis lies her 
ethical notion of vulnerability, which is based on the idea that although all 
bodily life can be understood as precarious and thus physically vulnerable to 
violence, our ability to respond ethically and politically to the suffering of 
certain populations is conditioned by the social norms that differentiate be-
tween livable and unlivable lives. As I have argued in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, Butler’s critique of violence has thus focused on exposing and 
disrupting the norms that produce only certain lives as valuable. Emphasiz-
ing the political and ethical dimensions of Butler’s conceptualization of bodi-
ly vulnerability and livability, commentators have characterized her recent 
work using such concepts as “new corporeal humanism” (Murphy 2011b), 
“the political philosophy of the human” (Schippers 2014), and “the political 
problem of the human” (Lloyd 2015). 
 
However, I argue that during this period of her thought, Butler performs a 
significant shift that moves her critical focus from “the human” to the con-
sideration of the normative construction of “livable lives” more generally. It 
is my contention that by this move Butler also incorporates nonhuman ani-
mals into her concept of “livable lives” and thus into her theorization of eth-
ics as well. Indeed, Butler explicitly, and throughout her recent work, com-
ments on the necessity to include nonhuman animals into the concept of pre-
carious lives (see e.g. UG, 12; FW, 13, 17, 19, 75–76; NPTA, 35, 131–132).  
 
Despite the fact that Butler starts hinting at “the animal” already in Undoing 
Gender (2004) and also takes up the question in interviews (e.g. Kirby 2006; 
Antonello and Farneti 2009), the emerging body of literature in Butler schol-
arship (e.g. Chambers & Carver 2008a; Jagger 2008; Loizidou 2008; Lloyd 
2007; 2015, Thiem 2008; Brady & Schirato 2010; Schippers 2014) complete-
ly overlooks the problem of “the animal” in her work. On the other hand, sev-
eral scholars working in the emerging field of critical animal studies, most 
prominently Cary Wolfe (2013), Richard Iveson (2012), and Chloë Taylor 
(2008), have argued that although Butler’s recent work would allow her to 
address the systematic forms of violence faced by nonhuman animals as well, 
her notion of livability falls prey to the anthropocentric divide of hu-
man/animal and thus excludes animals from ethical theorizing. 
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Despite the fact that Butler stresses the importance of including nonhuman 
animals into the concept of livability, it is true, as these critiques state, that 
she leaves “the animal” to the margins of her work. However, I contend that 
her critique of the norms that regulate livability offers us promising tools for 
theorizing violence against animals. Since one of Butler’s key aims in her 
theorization of norms is to question normalized forms of violence against 
those lives regarded as unlivable, and since she has actually started to prob-
lematize anthropomorphism in her later work, I argue that this extension is 
not only a possible but also a necessary step forward in Butler’s critique of 
norms. Hence, this chapter engages in a critical development of what I have 
called Butler’s twofold account of norms. By building on Butler’s embryonic 
problematization of anthropocentrism I seek to expose the norms that up-
hold the distinction between “the human” and “the animal” and call them in-
to question. The aim of this chapter is thus to push Butler’s critique of norms 
toward a theorizing that takes not only humans but also nonhuman animals 
into ethical consideration. 
 
James Stanescu has pointed out that Butler’s work offers “occasional brilliant 
ruptures” of anthropocentrism and can thus be put in the service of animal 
ethics (Stanescu 2012, 576). But whereas Stanescu has sought to establish 
“queer and feminist animal studies” by utilizing Butler’s account of grief and 
mourning (Stanescu 2012, 568), my interest lies more specifically in the 
question of how Butler’s critique of norms might be employed to examine the 
normative hierarchy between livable and unlivable nonhuman animals. 
 
However, to fully understand the normative production of unlivable animal 
lives—or, what I call “killable lives”—I will pay specific attention not only to 
the question of how the norms that govern livability separate the human 
from nonhuman animals, but also how they distinguish between different 
kinds of animals. Most strikingly, this normative hierarchy appears in the 
differential way we treat our pets and those we call “food animals”: whereas 
pets are valued, loved and cared for, farmed animals are raised only to be 
killed for their meat. For this reason, I will pay particular attention to the 
ways in which norms produce “livable” and “protectable” animals on the one 
hand, and “killable” and “consumable” animals on the other. It is my conten-
tion that a critique of the distinction between “livable” and “killable” nonhu-
man animals has important implications for Butler’s notion of ethical re-
sponsibility and nonviolence. 
 
I begin the first section (section 3.1) by briefly outlining the key ideas behind 
Butler’s notions of vulnerability and precarity, before I explore the critical 
readings offered by Taylor, Wolfe, and Iveson (divided into subsections 3.1.1, 
3.1.2, and 3.1.3). In the next section (3.2), I extend and challenge these inter-
pretations through offering an alternative reading that highlights Butler’s 
conceptualization of precarious lives in terms of her critique of anthropocen-
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trism. Developing further these ideas, I then move on to discuss and prob-
lematize the normative production of “lovable” and “killable” animals by fo-
cusing first (section 3.3) on the normalization of killing and then (section 
3.4) on the question of our ethical responsibility toward animals. 
 
3.1 Precarious lives and Butler’s ambivalent animals 
 
In the midst of her sustained critique of the US’s military response to 9/11 in 
Precarious Lives and Frames of War, Butler begins to develop an account of 
the fundamental vulnerability of our bodies and the political and ethical im-
plications that in her view vulnerability entails. By “vulnerability” Butler re-
fers to the fact that “[…] the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others 
but also to touch and to violence” (UG, 21). Due to the vulnerable condition 
of our bodies, a dimension that characterizes our life from birth and through 
adulthood, our lives are dependent on what is outside of us and, therefore, 
we can never be fully self-sufficient beings. According to Butler, to deny this 
“common human vulnerability” is to deny the physical condition of corporeal 
life (PL, 30). 
 
That our bodies are vulnerable is not for Butler a physical fact alone but also 
a social and political condition of our lives. From very early on (e.g. in Gen-
der Trouble, Bodies That Matter, Excitable Speech, and The Psychic Life of 
Power), Butler has theorized how historical power relations and social norms 
organize the cultural intelligibility of our bodies: how gendering and racializ-
ing norms, for example, shape the morphology of bodies by violently exclud-
ing those who do not fit the current conceptions of what can be conceived of 
as a “real” body or a “normal” human. Given that our very “humanity” is in 
this sense dependent on the normative frameworks that uphold idealized 
versions of “the human,” it is thus a failure in Butler’s view to theorize bodies 
as bounded entities or in terms of bodily autonomy (UG, 21; see also FW, 52).  
 
Challenging thus the basic presuppositions that undergird liberal-
individualist frameworks, Butler seeks to theorize bodies in terms of “rela-
tionality,” “interdependency,” and “social ontology” (PL, 24, xii; FW, 3). Yet, 
these concepts are not synonymous with “intersubjectivity” but, instead, she 
refers by them to the more fundamental way in which our very survivability 
is conditioned by and dependent on known and unknown others and on the 
norms that regulate what kind of lives can be recognized as “livable lives.” 
 
Although questions of gendering and racializing norms also run through But-
ler’s more recent work, she now theorizes the question of vulnerability 
through her discussion of precariousness and precarity. By “precarious-
ness”—a twin concept to vulnerability—she refers to “our radical substituta-
bility and anonymity in relation both to certain socially facilitated modes of 
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dying and death and to other socially conditioned modes of persisting and 
flourishing” (FW, 14). Although the concept of “precariousness” stands for 
the “existential” understanding of bodily vulnerability, it is for Butler primar-
ily a political concept. This is because the conditions of precariousness are 
always socially, politically, and normatively organized; we only recognize and 
attend to the precariousness of those populations we conceive of, a priori, as 
valuable, or as Butler terms it, “livable.”  
 
As Butler notes, precariousness cannot be understood merely as the “existen-
tial” fact of our bodies, since it is differentially distributed globally through 
particular political regimes and policies (NPTA, 119).71 Or, as Butler explains:  
 
To say that a life is injurable, for instance, or that it can be lost, de-
stroyed, or systematically neglected to the point of death, is to under-
score not only the finitude of a life (that death is certain) but also its 
precariousness (that life requires various social and economic condi-
tions to be met in order to be sustained as a life). (FW, 13–14) 
 
Butler uses the term “precarity” to capture the specific ways through which 
precariousness is regulated and exploited by normative power relations (FW, 
3). As Moya Lloyd puts it, precarity “signals a politically generated condition 
of heightened risk, jeopardy and threat for specific populations. It has thus 
been used by [Butler] to distinguish between primary vulnerability […] and 
concrete particular, historical conditions of insecurity and liability faced by 
some” (Lloyd 2015, 175–176). In this sense, Butler deploys the concept of 
precarity to designate the social and political conditions “under which lives 
become unlivable” (NPTA, 201), such as the forms of state violence; police 
violence; war; failing networks of social and economic support; dispensable 
workforces; conditions of poverty; starvation; occupation, imprisonment, 
and forced emigration; and differential exposure to illness, mortality, and 
premature death (see, for example, FW, 25–26; DPP, 43; NPTA, 33, 48, 201). 
 
For Butler, the problematic of precarity is crucially connected to her account 
of recognition and recognizability. Reading the Hegelian notion of recogni-
tion (i.e. the dialectics of recognition) through her theorization of norms, 
Butler argues that our ability to recognize a living being in its precariousness 
“is dependent on norms that facilitate that recognition” and, as a result, 
“there are ‘subjects’ that are not quite recognizable as subjects, and there are 
‘lives’ that are not quite—or, indeed, are never—recognized as lives” (FW, 
                                       
71 Butler elaborates on this point in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly: “So as soon as 
the existential claim is articulated in its specificity,” that is, as a mode of precarity, “it ceases to be exis-
tential” and because, as Butler argues, “it must be articulated in its specificity, it was never existential” 
(NPTA, 119). 
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4).72 From this insight follows, for Butler, that “the differential distribution of 
norms of recognition directly implies the differential allocation of precarity” 
(DPP, 89). By “recognizability” Butler means the “historically articulated and 
enforced” terms, conventions, and norms, or “frames” as she terms them in 
Frames of War, that differentiate between “livable” and “unlivable” lives 
(FW, 3–5, 7). Since the frames that regulate our capacity to recognize certain 
lives as “real” lives operate historically and socially (through temporal “itera-
bility” as Butler has it) they are open to social transformation (FW, 4). As 
Butler explains, “When those frames that govern the relative and differential 
recognizability of lives come apart—as part of the very mechanism of their 
circulation—it becomes possible to apprehend something about what or who 
is living but has not been generally ‘recognized’ as a life” (FW, 12). Thus, the 
ethical and political task is to expose and interrupt the norms of recognizabil-
ity that seek to uphold exclusive hierarchies between “livable” and “unliva-
ble” populations. 
 
As Lloyd observes, although Butler sometimes addresses the economic con-
notations of the concept of “precarity,” she usually deploys it in a more philo-
sophical sense, to describe the normative production of unlivable lives 
(Lloyd, 2015, 174).73 For Lloyd, Butler’s theorization of precarity and livabil-
ity boils down to the question of how “the human” is normatively produced 
through differential power relations. Therefore, Lloyd argues that precarity 
can be portrayed “in terms of […] the political problem of the human” (Lloyd 
2015, 174, emphasis in original; see also Lloyd 2007, 134). Ann V. Murphy 
also argues that Butler’s “explicit attempt to distance herself from […] liberal 
individualism is accomplished via reference to the human as the most mean-
ingful designation through which to engage the figure of the precarious and 
vulnerable body” (Murphy 2011b, 587–588). Thus, Murphy suggests that 
Butler’s theorization of precarity can be understood as an attempt to theorize 
a “humanistic ethics” and a “new corporeal humanism” (ibid., 587, 589). In a 
similar manner as Lloyd and Murphy, Birgit Schippers has also analyzed But-
ler’s approach to livability and precarity in terms of “the political philosophy 
of the human” (Schippers 2014, 38–39). 
 
                                       
72 While Hegelian themes of desire and recognition run throughout Butler’s work, her first major pub-
lished book Subject of Desire ([1987]1999) provides the most detailed discussion of Hegel’s philoso-
phy. For an analysis of Butler’s critical deployment of Hegel, see, for example, Pulkkinen (2010) and 
Roman-Lagerspetz (2009). 
73 It should be noted, however, that in her more recent work Butler has also started to formulate “pre-
carity” in economic terms. For example, in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly she ad-
dresses the problems of “the institutionalization of neoliberal rationalities” as well as the issues of “re-
sponsibilization” and “precarization” in relation to what she calls the emergence of “post-Fordist forms 
of flexible labor” and the individualizing values of “market rationalities” (see, for example, NPTA, 11–
12, 15, 23, 201). 
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While Lloyd, Murphy, and Schippers have all provided generally sympathetic 
readings of Butler’s account of precarity, it is precisely the question of “the 
human” that certain other scholars have found problematic. For example, 
Taylor (2008), Wolfe (2013), and Iveson (2012) have argued that although 
Butler’s conceptualization of precarious lives seeks to challenge basic human-
ist tenets regarding the notion of bodies, it itself rests on certain unchal-
lenged humanist presuppositions, namely, the anthropocentric exclusion of 
nonhuman animals. However, they argue that there is in fact nothing in But-
ler’s account of precarity and livability that would justify such a theoretical 
framing. To gain a picture of these readings and to critically expand upon 
them later in this chapter (in section 3.2), I discuss each of them below. 
 
3.1.1 The precarious lives of animals 
 
In “The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee, and Animal Ethics” 
Taylor states that although “Butler’s account of an ethics of interdependency, 
embodiment, vulnerability, and mourning is a compelling incentive for 
thinking about the lives not only of humans, but of animals more generally 
[…],” Butler completely sidesteps the question of animals (Taylor 2008, 61). 
Since Taylor’s critique is focused on Butler’s Levinasian ethics of nonvio-
lence, it is helpful first to reiterate the key ideas behind Butler’s deployment 
of Levinas (see also Chapter 2).  
 
Although Butler’s analysis of Levinas’s ethics of nonviolence forms a part of 
her critical response to the US’s War on Terror and therefore constitutes an 
attempt to explore the possibilities of nonviolent global relations, or, indeed, 
a “Jewish ethic of nonviolence” (PL, 131), her employment of Levinas mirrors 
also her more general argument regarding the question of “moral authority.” 
According to Butler, moral authority, or ethics more generally, cannot be re-
duced to the reflexivity or deliberation of individual subjects but must be un-
derstood as something that stems from our social interaction, or, as Butler 
puts it, through “the situation of being addressed” by others (PL, 130): 
 
Indeed, this conception of what is morally binding is not one that I 
give myself; it does not proceed from my autonomy or my reflexivity. 
It comes to me from elsewhere, unbidden, unexpected and unplanned. 
In fact, it tends to ruin my plans, and if my plans are ruined, that may 
well be the sign that something is morally binding upon me. (PL, 130) 
 
In Precarious Lives, Butler’s attempt is thus to theorize the question of what 
binds us morally through Levinas’s ethics, which focuses on the precarious-
ness of “the other.” Here, Levinas’s figure of “the face” is especially important 
for Butler. Following Levinas, she notes that the “face” represents the precar-
ious life of “the other,” one that communicates to us an ethical demand of 
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“thou shalt not kill” (PL, 134). Since Butler seems to, at least partly, accept 
Levinas’s claim that this encounter with an “other” can evoke a defensive and 
aggressive impulse of self-preservation in us—indeed, “the desire to kill”— 
she comes to conceptualize the ethics of nonviolence as a “struggle” to hear 
the call for nonviolence over and against our own “murderous” desires (PL, 
135–136).74  
 
Although for Levinas the moral authority regarding the demand of the 
preservation of “the other” seems to come ultimately from a “divine source” 
(PL, xviii), for Butler at stake here is the argument that the preservation of 
“the other” (and social relations more generally) also seems to be a prerequi-
site for the preservation of oneself. For Butler, this argument rests ultimately 
on her notion of interdependency, which I already discussed above. On the 
basis of her discussion of Levinas, Butler seeks to theorize the conditions of 
possibility to a nonviolent response in the states of injury. As I read Butler, 
her key thesis is that if the precariousness of our bodies is not denied but 
recognized as a shared and thus general condition of interdependency, we 
might start to understand the political urgency to arrest cycles of self-
defensive violence. Indeed, Butler holds that our shared experiences of cor-
poreal vulnerability can be thought of as a new ground for nonviolent ethics 
and politics (PL, xii–xiii). 
 
However, the recognition of our shared vulnerability is not enough when 
formulating an ethics of nonviolence. Given that norms (regarding gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, and race, for example) differentiate between recogniza-
ble and unrecognizable “faces,” it might be difficult or even impossible for us 
to recognize the precariousness and suffering of certain “others,” let alone 
ethically respond to their call for nonviolence (PL, 146–147). For Butler, the 
normative demarcation between “faces” can itself be understood as “the vio-
lence of derealization,” a form of violence that she also calls “radical efface-
ment” and “dehumanization” (PL, 33, 140, 147). As she notes, “sometimes 
these normative schemes work precisely through providing no image, no 
name, no narrative, so that there never was a life, and there never was a 
death” (PL, 146). According to Butler, “the violence of derealization” operates 
through producing not only “unlivable lives” but also “ungrievable deaths” 
(PL, 34–35). Since the lives of these populations are not valued, their deaths, 
too, remain unrecognized as “real” deaths. 
 
Interestingly, Taylor argues that for Butler “the face” as a figure of precari-
ousness and suffering should not in fact be exclusively interpreted as a hu-
man face and neither should we understand “the call” for nonviolence only in 
terms of human language (Taylor 2008, 60; see also PL, xviii, 135). Indeed, 
                                       
74 For more on Butler’s account of the relationship between aggression and self-preservation, see her 
discussion on Levinas and Melanie Klein in Giving an Account of Oneself and in Frames of War. 
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Butler writes that the demand not to kill is “an utterance, that is not strictly 
speaking linguistic” but “a scene of agonized vocalization,” or a “wordless vo-
calization of suffering” (PL, 133–134). As Taylor remarks, the call “may also 
be silent, evoked simply by the site of a suffering body, by a back or shoulder 
blades, or a bent neck, as in an example of Levinas’s” (Taylor 2008, 60). On 
the basis of these observations, Taylor states that: 
 
Butler seems to be setting the stage to be able to claim—or allow oth-
ers to claim—that the cries of animals in slaughterhouses, the sight of 
their struggling bodies as they are dragged to their deaths, of their si-
lent corporeally-expressed grief as they live out their brief lives in fac-
tory farms, fur farms, and laboratory cages, address us with the ethical 
command: “thou shalt not kill,” and that we must respond to this 
command even if it “ruins all our plans”—our plans for dinner, for 
profit, for research, for fashion, for entertainment, for sport. (Taylor 
2008, 60) 
 
Despite this possibility of also addressing the suffering of animals, Taylor ar-
gues that Butler’s ethical theorizing is centered on the question of the “hu-
man” (Taylor 2008, 61). While she notes that this is understandable to the 
extent that Butler’s aim in Precarious Life is to “dislocate” the hegemonic 
(e.g. heterosexist and racialized) frame of “the human” by including those 
who are currently dehumanized, she asserts that Butler fails to dislocate her 
own frame “beyond the sphere of the human” (ibid.). Although Butler uses 
such concepts as “corporeal vulnerability,” “our exposure to violence”, “liva-
ble life,” and “grievable death” that do not refer exclusively to human lives, 
she repeatedly attaches them, Taylor argues, to the concept of “the human” 
(ibid.).75 As she notes, Butler even declares “I propose to start, and to end, 
with the question of the human (as if there were any other way for us to start 
or end!)” (Butler cited in Taylor 2008, 62; see also PL, 20). But as Taylor in-
sists: 
 
That we must start and end with the human when considering an eth-
ics of corporeal vulnerability is by no means obvious, since corporeal 
vulnerability does not start and end with the human, but with all those 
beings with bodies, which are consequently exposed to harm from 
other bodies. Given the vulnerable and embodied state of non-human 
and human animals alike, it would in fact seem more obvious to start 
and end with animals in general, and not with one specific species of 
animal, the human. (Taylor 2008, 62) 
                                       
75 In the context of her discussion of the figure of “the face,” Butler writes for example: “[N]ormative 
schemes of intelligibility establish what will and will not be human, what will be a livable life, what will 
be a grievable death. These normative schemes operate […] by producing ideals of the human that dif-
ferentiate among those who are more and less human” (PL, 146). 
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As Taylor critically paraphrases Butler, “If to be a real life is to be a human 
life, whereas to be inhuman—to be another species of animal, for instance—is 
to be ‘already dead’ and something which ‘cannot, therefore, be killed,’ then 
animal lives never were real, and their deaths are not real either” (Taylor 
2008, 63). She even goes as far as to argue that Butler’s inability to take ani-
mals into consideration resembles Descartes’ infamous notion of animals as 
“mere automata,” whose apparent ability to feel pain and despair is nothing 
but “simulations on the part of creatures that in fact do not feel, and are thus 
not vulnerable” (Taylor 2008, 63). 
 
As Taylor argues, by overlooking the suffering of animals, Butler—like the 
vast majority of us—shuts her eyes to the plight of animals: “There is a si-
lence about animals because we want to continue defining real lives, grieva-
ble lives, as ‘human,’ as does Butler, so that we can use animals without being 
concerned for them […]” (Taylor 2008, 64). Taylor thus concludes that our, 
and Butler’s, inability to take animal deaths into consideration results from 
an unwillingness to face their suffering. Or, as she formulates it by borrowing 
the vocabulary of Butler’s ethics, “we wish to avoid having a face-to-face rela-
tionship with animals because we want to avoid our ethical responsibility” 
and, thus, we tend to think that we can “kill them with impunity—as we do” 
(Taylor 2008, 63). 
 
3.1.2 Species trouble 
 
It seems that as long as Butler does not question the norm of the human it-
self, her critique of the normative processes of humanization and dehumani-
zation falls prey to anthropocentrism. In other words, Butler’s discussion of 
the normative production of the human seems to be compromised by “spe-
cies trouble” as Richard Iveson (2012; see also Stanescu 2012) has formulat-
ed the problem. Iveson argues that although Butler’s whole project is dedi-
cated to criticizing certain liberal-humanist paradigms (e.g. individualism 
and universalism) by interrogating the social and historical processes 
through which “the human” is normatively constituted, she leaves some of 
her own humanist presuppositions unchallenged (Iveson 2012, 26). Accord-
ing to Iveson, Butler fails to take into account that “the human” is not just a 
normative effect of power relations but that “humanness” is itself  “a regula-
tory norm which, through the inculcation of viable ways of being, reproduces 
itself by way of the constitutive outside of ‘the animal’ […]” (Iveson 2012, 23, 
27). As he notes, “the human” is a normative and repetitive practice of “hu-
man-ing” through which the species line is socially constituted (Iveson 2012, 
4). 
 
For Iveson, theorizing the normative exclusion of animals plays a crucial role 
in understanding the operation of other regulative norms, such as gender, 
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sex, sexuality, race, and class, for instance. In his words, “species difference 
serves to ‘ground’ all the other norms at the same time as it is reciprocally 
‘grounded’ by them” (Iveson 2012, 25). Therefore, Butler’s exclusion of ani-
mals is not only problematic from the perspective of animal ethics but also in 
terms of her theorization of norms. Iveson points out that due to “the natu-
ralization of speciesism in Butler’s texts,” she fails to analyze for instance 
“the animalization of racialized gender” and “the normative sexualization of 
animality” (ibid.). 
 
It should be noted, however, that Butler does actually hint at the mechanisms 
of animalization. In Precarious Lives she notes for example that the norma-
tive production (i.e. dehumanization) of the “enemy” as “less-than-human” 
in Guantánamo Bay detention camp was based on a “reduction of these hu-
man beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in 
need of total restraint” (PL, 78). Indeed, the prisoners “were rendered face-
less and abject, likened to caged and restrained animals” (PL, 73). Yet, she 
goes on to insist that “It is important to remember that the bestialization of 
the human in this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since 
it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined” (ibid., my 
emphasis).  
 
Butler’s rhetorical employment of the “figure” of the animal seems to support 
Iveson’s argument. As he points out, “insofar as Butler refuses to think with 
nonhuman animals, she is thus compelled to invoke the empty yet foreclosed 
domain of ‘the inhuman’ as the constitutive outside of the human, an invoca-
tion that remains more or less constant throughout her work” (Iveson 2012, 
26). Complicating Butler’s differentiation between “the-less-than-human” 
and “the animal,” Iveson argues that Butler’s “inhuman” can actually be un-
derstood as “the indecipherable nonhuman animal” that “haunts the bounda-
ries of the properly human” (ibid., emphasis in original). As he continues: 
 
The animal, in other words, is essential to the hierarchical functioning 
of the more and the less, in that “the animal” is always the least of the 
less, the negative pole to be transcended – more and less – along a 
humanist teleology which reaches its apotheosis in the phantasmatic 
ideal of the white human male. Only once this is recognized does it 
then become possible to understand how the machinations of power 
legitimize the slaughter of human animals by way of the prior “ani-
malization” of a specifically targetted [sic] human or human grouping, 
a reconfiguration that strips its target of a fully human status and, in 
so doing, constitutes a non-subject that can thereafter be killed with 
impunity. (Iveson 2012, 28) 
 
To put it differently, as long as we automatically exclude animals from ethical 
theorizing we are unable to theorize and problematize the interconnected re-
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lations of exposure to violence of both humans and nonhuman animals alike. 
Iveson’s challenge to Butler is thus this: rather than with the human, “the 
question of ethics must begin with nonhuman animals” (Iveson 2012, 32).  
 
3.1.3 A biopolitical critique of anthropocentricism  
 
In Before the Law: Humans and Animals in Biopolitical Context (2013), 
Cary Wolfe provides an account of the factory farming and mass slaughter of 
domesticated animals by drawing especially on Foucault, Agamben and Es-
posito’s discussions of biopolitics.76 He notes that Butler’s Precarious Life 
(2004a) and Frames of War (2009) can be regarded as her turn to biopoliti-
cal thinking, for her primary aim is not to theorize humanism but to ask how 
certain power mechanisms and legal discourses, such as the “state of excep-
tion” declared after 9/11, operate by dehumanizing certain populations and 
making them susceptible to different types of violence.77 Wolfe notes that 
during this period of her thought, “Butler hints at how her approach to the 
biopolitical might bear on fundamentally rethinking the human/animal di-
vide” (Wolfe 2013, 19). 
 
If not yet in Precarious Life, then in Frames of War, Butler indeed takes is-
sue with anthropocentrism by pointing out, for example, that “there is no 
firm way to distinguish in absolute terms the bios of the animal from the bios 
of the human animal,” because “the human animal is itself an animal” (FW, 
19, emphasis in original).78 Yet these statements seem to allow Butler only to 
arrive at the conclusion that “animality is a precondition of the human, and 
there is no human who is not a human animal” (FW 19, my emphasis). By 
stating this, Butler thus appears in this context to normatively differentiate 
between animals and humans, implying that “the human” somehow trans-
                                       
76 According to Wolfe, as long as theorizations of biopolitics do not take animals into consideration, 
they end up construing very restricted conceptions of current power relations. He writes, “[C]urrent 
practices of factory farming […] constitute not just some embarrassing sideline of modern life that has 
nothing to do with the politics proper […]. Rather, such practices must be seen not just as political but 
as in fact constitutively political for biopolitics in its modern form. Indeed, the maximizing control 
over life and death, of ‘making live,’ in Foucault’s words, through eugenics, artificial insemination and 
selective breeding, pharmaceutical enhancement, inoculation, and the like are on display in the mod-
ern factory farm as perhaps nowhere else in biopolitical history. It can hardly be debated, I think, that 
‘the animal’ is, today—and on a scale unprecedented in human history—the site of the very ur-form of 
that dispositif and the face of its most unchecked, nightmarish effects” (2013, 46, emphasis in origi-
nal). 
77 For more on Butler’s position on biopolitics, see Sawicki (2016). 
78 As James Stanescu points out, by highlighting the intertwinement of the bios of the animal and the 
bios of the human, Butler takes issue with Agamben’s concept of “bare life” (Stanescu 2012, 572). 
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gresses “the animal,” which comes to be viewed only as a precondition to its 
transgression, to its “humanity.” 
 
Wolfe pays critical attention to this tension, arguing that one of the main dif-
ficulties in Butler’s budding critique of anthropocentrism is her Hegelian and 
Levinasian notion of ethics, understood as a reciprocal practice. In Wolfe’s 
words, Butler’s “concept of ethics and of community remains tied to a recip-
rocal model based on a ‘mutual striving for recognition’” (Wolfe 2013, 19). 
Building on Hegel’s dialectics of recognition, Butler does intimate in Precar-
ious Lives that the process through which we become culturally viable per-
sons is a “reciprocal exchange, an exchange that dislocates us from our posi-
tions, our subject-positions, and allows us to see that community itself re-
quires the recognition that we are all, in different ways, striving for recogni-
tion” (PL, 44, my emphasis).79  
 
The problem here, as Wolfe sees it, is that if ethics is understood as a mutual 
and reciprocal practice, those populations that might not be capable of mu-
tual recognition and ethical reciprocity, including animals (not to mention 
children and humans with certain disabilities), are excluded at the very out-
set of ethical theorizing (Wolfe 2013, 19–20).80 
 
Interestingly enough, in elucidating our fundamental dependency on others 
and social norms Butler usually takes up children as her example, for they 
are par excellence dependent on others and on care, even if “for some this 
primary scene is a scene of abandonment or violence or starvation, that 
theirs are bodies given over to nothing, or to brutality, or to no sustenance” 
(PL, 31; see also PL, 45).81 Ethically considered, this condition of “primary 
                                       
79 However, it should be noted that one of the key reasons why Butler deploys Levinas’s ethics is that, 
unlike Wolfe claims, he actually rejects the idea of reciprocity. In Notes Toward a Performative Theo-
ry of Assembly, Butler writes: “For Levinas, reciprocity cannot be the basis of ethics, since ethics is not 
a bargain: it cannot be the case that my ethical relation to another is contingent on his or her ethical 
relation to me, since that would make that relation less than absolute and binding, and it would estab-
lish my self-preservation as a distinct and bounded sort of being as more primary than any relation I 
have to another. For Levinas, no ethics can be derived from egoism; indeed, egoism is the defeat of 
ethics itself” (NPTA, 108). On the other hand, Butler’s reading of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition also 
puts more emphasis on the mutual (but potentially hierarchical and exploitative) interdependency that 
the struggle for recognition implies than on “reciprocity” as Wolfe implies. 
80 More on the critique of ableism in regard to animal ethics, see Taylor (2017). 
81 It needs stressing that although with the notion of “primary vulnerability” Butler refers to the condi-
tion of infant dependency, the condition of vulnerability continues to “haunt” our adult life as well, 
since we are—as bodily vulnerable beings—always potentially susceptible to others, to social norms, to 
power relations, and to violence. It is also the case that certain populations in particular are more sus-
ceptible than others due to the differential logic by which vulnerability is politically and socially dis-
tributed (PL, 26–27). 
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vulnerability” (PL, 31) is far from a reciprocal relation but is necessarily an 
unreciprocal one.  
 
To use Wolfe’s terminology, which he borrows from analytic moral philoso-
phy, infants are not “moral agents” but “moral patients,” that is, we do not 
evaluate their moral behavior but the ways in which they are treated (Wolfe 
2013, 20). Despite the fact that Butler illuminates primary vulnerability by 
invoking the example of children, and although this—because it moves be-
yond the purview of reciprocal ethics—could also raise the question of how 
we treat other “moral patients,” such as animals, she does not, Wolfe la-
ments, make this theoretical move.  
 
For Wolfe, Butler’s negligence of animals implies that her turn to biopolitical 
thinking does not, after all, fully overcome the anthropocentric assumption 
according to which genuine ethical relations require mutual reciprocity. In 
order to formulate a more comprehensive critique of violence against human 
and nonhuman populations alike, it would be necessary, in Wolfe’s view, to 
completely dismantle the human/animal divide (Wolfe 2013, 105). 82 
 
3.2 Butler’s notion of “life” and the inclusion of nonhu-
man animals 
 
In Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), Butler returns 
to the question of recognition vis-à-vis precarious lives, reminding us of the 
mechanisms through which only certain kinds of subjects become recogniza-
ble as humans while others remain unrecognizable as such due, for example, 
to the differential operation of racializing and gendering norms. In this con-
text, Butler adds, surprisingly, that: 
 
This is surely one question posed by the animal rights movements, 
since why is it that only human subjects are recognized and not non-
human living beings? Does the act by which humans achieve recogni-
tion implicitly pick out only those features of the human that could ar-
guably be separated off from the rest of animal life? The conceit of this 
form of recognition founders on itself, for would such a distinctly hu-
man creature actually be recognizable if it were somehow separated 
                                       
82 Concerning Butler’s focus on the relationship between ethics and the processes of dehumanization, 
Wolfe writes that “Butler is certainly right […] that ‘dehumanization’ is a fundamental mechanism for 
producing a ‘Western’ idea of the ‘man’ over and against populations considered ‘dubiously human.’ 
But […] as long as the automatic exclusion of animals from [ethical] standing remains intact simply 
because of their species, such a dehumanization by means of the discursive mechanism of ‘animaliza-
tion’ will be readily available for deployment against whatever body happens to fall outside the ethno-
centric ‘we.’” (Wolfe 2013, 21). 
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from its creaturely existence? What would it look like? (NPTA, 35–36, 
my emphasis) 
 
Although this passage might look like Butler’s attempt to revise her previous 
position due to the critique discussed above, it should be noted that the ques-
tion of “the animal” is not completely a new idea in her most recent work, but 
that she has actually problematized the human/animal divide already in her 
previous texts. 
 
In Undoing Gender, for example, Butler underscores that “it is imperative to 
separate the question of a livable life from the status of a human life, since 
livability pertains to living beings that exceed the human” (UG, 12, my em-
phasis). Similarly, in Frames of War she states that “there ought to be recog-
nition of precariousness as a shared condition of human life (indeed, as a 
condition that links human and nonhuman animals) […]” (FW, 13). In an in-
terview with Vicky Kirby from 2006, Butler points out that “One problem 
with using the framework of humanization and dehumanization is that it 
leaves the question of the animal to the side” (Butler in Kirby 2006, 153). Al-
so in Dispossessions (2013), a published conversation with Athena Athana-
siou, Butler brings up the intertwinement of the human and the animal by 
stating the following:  
 
If we are moving toward a relational view [of the human], then it 
would follow that the human not only has a relation to animals (con-
ceived as the other), but is itself implicated in its own animality. The 
point is not to find the right typology, but to understand where typo-
logical thinking falls apart. The human animal might be one way of 
naming that collapse of typological distinction. (DPP, 35)83 
 
Despite the fact that Butler does not herself develop further the question of 
“the animal” in her work, I argue that we must take these aforementioned 
statements seriously, for they function in my view as an encouragement to 
theorize “livable lives” beyond the anthropocentric framework of “the hu-
man,” hinting thus at the possible extension of Butler’s notions of livability 
and precarity. Therefore, I argue that to fully grasp Butler’s notions of “pre-
carious” and “livable lives” we must detach these notions from anthropocen-
tric presuppositions and understand them not only in relation to the question 
                                       
83 Intriguingly, Butler also implies in the same conversation that “there is also a street politics of the 
animal,” but does not develop this idea any further. Although Butler’s key focus is on “street politics” in 
Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), she does not come back to this idea—
though she does mention “the animal rights movements” as an example of street politics (see NPTA, 
35). 
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of the human but also, and importantly, in terms of the political problem of 
life more generally.84 
 
However, although Butler refers to “animal rights” movements when prob-
lematizing the separation of human and nonhuman animals in Notes To-
ward a Performative Theory of Assembly, her account of the normative 
production of livable and unlivable lives does not put forward a theorization 
of animal rights but, rather, it offers insights into the theorization of the 
normative production of “livable” and “unlivable” animal lives as well as into 
the theorization of ethical responsibility and nonviolence. I will deal with 
these questions in more detail in the next section (3.3). In order to bring But-
ler’s discussion of norms to bear on the question of “the animal,” we need 
first to explicate what is the role of nonhuman animals in Butler’s theoriza-
tion of precarious lives.  
 
Unlike in Precarious Life where Butler theorizes precarious lives mainly in 
terms of “the human,” in Frames of War she starts to use such concepts as 
“living being,” “human animal,” “animal,” and “non-human animal” (FW, 5, 
13, 62). This change of vocabulary indicates, in my view, a more explicit in-
clusion of nonhuman animals into her notion of precarious lives. Butler be-
gins the book with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological “fram-
ing” of life. Her key argument is that since historical and normative power 
relations (i.e. norms, conventions, and categories) regulate our capacity to 
recognize something as a “life,” our understandings and conceptions of what 
we currently call “life” are never politically neutral (FW, 3–5).  
 
In this sense, for Butler, “life” is always a political concept and a question of 
power. The normative regulation of life raises the further question of vio-
lence: if certain lives are not recognized as real lives, then we might not rec-
ognize their destruction as real violence. As Butler notes, the epistemological 
and ontological questions regarding our capacity to recognize a life are thus 
crucially tied to ethical questions, such as the following: whose lives come to 
be viewed as valuable enough for sustenance and protection? Indeed, Butler 
often theorizes the normative regulation of life in light of the question of 
nonviolence.  
 
Yet, her position regarding nonviolence vis-à-vis precarious lives is not sys-
tematic. For example, in Precarious Life Butler states (in the context of her 
critique of Israeli state violence against Palestinians) that our common con-
dition of bodily vulnerability and suffering might give rise to an (Jewish) eth-
ic of nonviolence that “seeks to recognize the sanctity of life, of all lives” (PL, 
                                       
84 Here I am indebted to Moya Lloyd’s (2015, 174) characterization of Butler’s theorization of precarity 
as “the political problem of the human,” a concept I want to develop further by analyzing the question 
of “precarious lives” in terms of the political problem of life more generally. 
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104). However, in Frames of War Butler argues that from the fact that some-
thing is living does not automatically follow that we must protect it. Rather 
than emphasizing the sanctity of all lives, she now holds that “(…) it can be 
argued that processes of life themselves require destruction and degenera-
tion, but this does not in any way tell us which sorts of destruction are ethi-
cally salient and which are not” (FW, 16).  
 
In the same context, she also writes that “After all, plants are living things, 
but vegetarians do not usually object to eating them” (ibid.). Here, Butler 
seeks to expose what she calls “a certain anthropocentrism” that cherishes an 
“omnipotent fantasy” according to which humans could have a complete con-
trol over life processes (FW, 18). Although it is worth noting—as a critique 
against Butler—that human-induced climate change is exactly an evidence of 
the enormous power humans in fact exercise over the whole planet, Butler’s 
point here is simply that destruction and degeneration are essential aspects 
of life without which there would be no life in the first place.85 
 
Although Butler clearly argues that she does not regard all living beings as 
something that could be understood as “precarious lives” (i.e. those lives that 
are ethically salient) she does not explicate exactly where we should draw the 
line between “living beings” and “precarious lives.” To classify beings or lives 
in this way is not Butler’s aim, however. Rather, her aim is to critically inter-
rogate the social, political, and normative conditions under which we come to 
view only certain lives as worthy of protection. 
 
Hasana Sharp and Chloë Taylor (2016) argue that Butler’s remarks about 
vegetarians as well as her comments on the omnipotent fantasy of anthropo-
centrism seek to exclude animal activists as potential interlocutors from her 
discussion of life. They interpret that Butler’s critique rules out a “radically 
species-egalitarian position” that would recognize the ethical value of not just 
human animals but also nonhuman animals. 
 
Although Butler’s point – that many lives come into being and die on 
this planet that are beyond human control – is undeniable, human de-
cisions impact billions of nonhuman animal lives every day, and so we 
cannot simply dismiss it as anthropocentric to wish to intervene in 
those lives and deaths. (Sharp & Taylor 2016, 14) 
 
They conclude that although Butler’s discussion of life offers insights into 
theorizing the normative framing of life and corporeal vulnerability, it does 
                                       
85 Butler’s critique of anthropocentrism in this context is also related to her critique of the so-called 
“pro-life” movement in the US that campaigns against women’s reproductive freedom. More on this 
aspect of Butler’s discussion, see Taylor & Sharp (2016). 
	 88	
not provide critical enough tools for thinking about interspecies relations 
(Sharp & Taylor 2016, 16).  
 
I agree that Butler does not elaborate on the question of interspecies rela-
tions in the context of her theorizing of life. However, I think Butler’s discus-
sion of the normative regulation of life is more complicated than Sharp’s and 
Taylor’s interpretation allow. Butler does not reject the possibility to theorize 
interspecies relations as ethically relevant, for example. Rather, for her, it is 
precisely the interdependent relations between humans and nonhuman ani-
mals that generate the need to rethink the concept of life. As Butler writes in 
Frames of War: 
 
The point [is] to reconceive life itself as a set of largely unwilled inter-
dependencies, even systemic relations, which imply that the “ontolo-
gy” of the human is not separable from the “ontology” of the animal. It 
is not just a question of two categories that overlap, but of a co-
constitution that implies the need for a reconceptualization of the on-
tology of life itself. (FW, 75–76, my emphasis)86 
 
In Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler elaborates fur-
ther the idea of the shared interdependency that characterizes humans and 
nonhuman animals: 
 
The human creature is, after all, already in relation to the animal, and 
not in the sense that the animal is the “Other” to the human, but be-
cause the human is already an animal […]. Moreover, a large set of life 
processes cross the human and the animal and maintain a rather 
steadfast indifference to the distinction between the two. […] the 
forms of dependency between human and animal suggest that in part 
they are constituted by and through one another. If we take that de-
pendency to be central, then the difference between animal and hu-
man becomes secondary (they are both dependent, and they are de-
pendent on each other, depending on each other to be the kinds of be-
ings they are). (NPTA, 132, my emphasis.) 
 
As this passage intimates, the interdependency that characterizes all animals 
is, for Butler, fundamental in articulating the idea of precarious lives. There-
fore, I contend that although Butler does not include every living being into 
the category of precarious lives, she does include nonhuman animals. Since 
Butler’s notion of precarious lives includes not only humans but also non-
humans, her theoretical framework of interdependency lets us theorize our 
relations to animals as ethically significant ties. Here, we could also come 
                                       
86 In this context, Butler refers (in a footnote) to Donna Haraway’s books Simians, Cyborgs, and 
Women (1991) and The Companion Species Manifesto (2003). 
	 89 
back to Butler’s remark regarding the dietary choices of vegetarians and note 
that, upon a closer look, what Butler actually implies is that even though veg-
etarians usually do not object to eating plants, what they do object to eating 
is—indeed, animals.  
 
Here it is important to recall that, in Butler’s view, the fact that we are inter-
dependent beings gives rise to ethical questions concerning exploitation and 
violence: to recognize that we all are dependent on others and social norms is 
to recognize that we all are vulnerable to suffering and violence. From this 
follows, for Butler, that we should attend to the differential ways in which 
certain populations are made more susceptible to forms of violence than oth-
ers. However, this raises the question of how we should understand the dif-
ferential distribution of livability in relation to nonhuman animals.  
 
Not only do we share the bodily condition of precariousness and interde-
pendency with other animals, we have also made certain domesticated ani-
mals (e.g. cows, pigs, lambs, chicken) very concretely dependent on us due to 
our agricultural practices and eating habits, and therefore—if we follow But-
ler’s idea of interdependency—our relations to these animals are ethically 
significant, even if we do not wish to recognize them as such (see also Taylor 
2008, 62). 
 
On these grounds, and in contrast to Wolfe’s criticism according to which 
Butler’s theorization of precarious lives excludes animals due to her com-
mitment to reciprocal ethics, I argue that Butler’s conceptualization of pre-
carious lives in terms of interdependencies actually moves beyond the an-
thropocentric framework of ethical reciprocity. This is a theoretical move, I 
propose, that allows us to extend Butler’s ethical framework of livability to 
nonhuman animals as well. 
 
Here, Butler’s theorization of precarious lives in relations to the conditions of 
life becomes relevant. Emphasizing that there is no such thing as “life itself” 
that could somehow be separated from the different—and differential—
conditions of life that either make life livable or unlivable, she notes that “life 
requires support and enabling conditions in order to be livable life” (FW, 21). 
Quite obviously, this means that precarious lives are dependent on the 
broader environment and basic support such as food, shelter, care, and pro-
tection against injury and violence (FW, 22–23). 
 
Having said that, it is worth noting that for Butler “the conditions of life” do 
not refer to basic support alone but also, and importantly, to the social, polit-
ical, and normative conditions of life. There are two points to be made here. 
First, Butler argues that these basic supports of life are differentially and un-
equally distributed among populations due to social policies that govern ac-
cess to “shelter, work, food, medical care, and legal status,” for example (FW, 
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13). Second, the unequal distribution of the conditions of life is regulated by 
the norms that decide what can be recognized as a precarious life; these 
norms of recognizability affect our understanding of what kinds of lives can 
be considered as valuable enough for sustenance and protection (FW, 6). 
What, then, are the ethical implications of Butler’s conceptualization of the 
conditions of life? 
 
While Butler refrains from claiming that all life processes impose us an ethi-
cal obligation to preserve life, she argues that it is precisely the conditions for 
sustaining a livable life that do obligate us ethically:87 
 
To sustain life as sustainable requires putting those conditions in 
place and militating for their renewal and strengthening. Where a life 
stands no chance of flourishing, there one must attend to ameliorating 
the negative conditions of life. Precarious life implies life as a condi-
tioned process, and not as the internal feature of a monadic individual 
or any other anthropocentric conceit. Our obligations are precisely to 
the conditions that make life possible, not to “life itself,” or rather, 
our obligations emerge from the insight that there can be no sus-
tained life without those sustaining conditions, and that those condi-
tions are both our political responsibility and the matter of our vexed 
ethical decisions. (FW, 23, my emphasis) 
 
This is to say that we must think of precarious lives in relation to those social 
norms and power relations that regulate “recognizability” and make the con-
ditions of life “livable” only for certain populations. Therefore, the starting 
point of our ethical considerations should be the normative conditions of life 
through which only certain lives are recognized as valuable and are thus pro-
vided with the possibility of living and flourishing. It is against this back-
ground that Butler’s concepts of “precarious” and “livable” lives should be 
understood. The concepts point to the ethical task of contesting the differen-
tial distribution of precariousness. 
 
Intriguingly, Butler invokes here an (liberalist) idea of egalitarianism and 
seeks to rethink it in light of her concept of precariousness: 
 
Precariousness has to be grasped not simply as a feature of this or that 
life, but as a generalized condition whose very generality can be de-
nied only by denying precariousness itself. And the injunction to think 
precariousness in terms of equality emerges precisely from the irrefu-
table generalizability of this condition. On this basis, one objects to the 
                                       
87 For Butler, the conditions of life that obligate us ethically encompass also the ecological conditions 
of life (see FW, 75; NPTA, 113). 
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differential allocation of precariousness […]. (FW, 22, emphasis in 
original) 
 
In Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler goes so far as 
to argue that our critical reflections on and struggles against the differential 
distribution of precarity (i.e. the unlivable conditions of life), “has to be based 
on the demand that [precarious] lives should be treated equally and that they 
should be equally livable” (NPTA, 67, see also ibid., 43).88 Unfortunately, 
however, she does not explicate further the political and ethical implications 
of this argument but leaves the question open.89 Given that Butler systemati-
cally rejects those notions of ethics that are based on abstract universal moral 
principles (see e.g. GAO, 5–7), I suggest that the notion of the equal value of 
precarious lives can be interpreted in this context as a critical and heuristic 
strategy that seeks to push the boundaries of the current normative frame-
works that regulate the recognizability of precarious lives. 
 
When interpreted as a critical heuristic, we can start to see that Butler’s radi-
cal notion of the equal value of precarious lives bears an interesting resem-
blance to the critique of those animal scholars who have argued that the lib-
eral-individualistic framework of “animal rights” is not adequate enough for 
problematizing the exploitation of and violence against nonhuman animals 
(see e.g. Wolfe 2013; Calarco 2008).90 Wolfe, for example, reminds us of a 
paradox regarding the situation where only certain kinds of nonhumans be-
come potentially recognized as “subjects” and thus bearers of certain rights. 
For instance, in 2008 the Spanish Parliament approved human rights to 
chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos, relying on a conventional 
model of human rights. These new rights include three basic rights that 
Wolfe summarizes as follows: 
 
1) “The Right to Life,” which means that “members of the community 
may not be killed expect in very strictly defined circumstances” such 
as self-defense; 2) “The Protection of Individual Liberty,” which for-
bids imprisonment “without due process” and only where it can be 
shown to be “for their own good, or necessary to protect the public”; 
                                       
88 Interestingly, Butler seems here to rethink the principle of equality (that derives from the liberalist 
tradition) through her theorization of norms. 
89 Although Butler articulates the idea of equality generally as “an equal value of all life,” in Notes To-
ward a Performative Theory of Assembly Butler ties the question and the concept of “equality” to 
Hannah Arendt’s notion of “the right to have rights” and the “right to appear” (see e.g. NPTA, 25–26; 
48–49; 60–61). I will discuss this topic in terms of resistance in the final chapter of this dissertation 
(Ch. 4). 
90 The most influential animal rights theorists include, for example, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Gary 
Francione, David DeGrazia, Mark Rowlands, Evelyn Pluhar, Julian H. Franklin, Gary Varner, Robert 
Garner, Alasdair Cochrane, and Will Kymlicka. 
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and 3) “The Prohibition of Torture,” which forbids “the deliberate in-
fliction of severe pain on a member of the community. (Wolfe 2013, 
11)91 
 
Although the legal recognition of “great apes” can be understood as a signifi-
cant step forward in rethinking of our relations to animals within the legal 
framework of liberal democracy, Wolfe asserts, quite rightly I think, that “it 
might well be seen […] as essentially a kind of tokenism in which nonhumans 
who are ‘racially’ similar enough to us to achieve recognition are protected” 
(Wolfe 2013, 104, 11; see also Calarco 2008, 97). The paradox is thus this: 
although we are ready to grant some human rights to certain animals, such 
as to our animal “cousins,” we continue to mass kill certain other animals in 
order to eat their meat. These animals are not regarded as subjects of rights 
but as raw material and profit in the food industry. 
 
To put it differently, and to stretch Butler’s vocabulary of “livability” one step 
further: as long as animal ethics does not radically question the norms that 
produce only certain animals as “precarious lives,” that is, as livable and pro-
tectable, it runs the risk of reinforcing speciesism. As a result of this anthro-
pocentric hierarchy, we come to think that we are ethically responsible to 
make “the conditions of life” sustainable and flourishable merely for those 
animals we are ready to accept as “individuals” or “subjects,” such as those 
who resemble us in terms of the species, or those we have historically and so-
cially come to view as our “companion species,” such as dogs and cats and 
other pets.92 
 
To thoroughly expose and interrupt the production of “unlivable” lives, we 
need, in Butler’s terms, “a critical approach to the norms” that exclude cer-
tain lives from the ethical sphere (NPTA, 37). Only then, as she stresses, can 
we “begin to dismantle those more vicious forms of logic that uphold forms 
of […] anthropocentrism” (ibid.). If norms of recognizability separate be-
tween livable and unlivable lives as Butler claims, then our capacity to re-
spond ethically to those we do not recognize as “precarious lives” is, too, nec-
essarily limited. Therefore, the question of the equal value of precarious 
lives—and its flipside: the unequal distribution of precarity and the produc-
tion of unlivable lives—is connected to the problem of ethical responsiveness. 
Next, I develop these questions further by critically scrutinizing the norma-
tive distinction between “livable” and “killable” animal lives. 
                                       
91 Wolfe cites here The Great Ape Project (1994), a coedited book by animal rights philosophers, Peter 
Singer and Paola Cavalieri. 
92 The concept of “companion species” originates in Donna Haraway’s (2003) analysis of the relation-
ships between humans and animals (specifically dogs). 
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3.3 Killable animals and the ethics of responsiveness 
 
According to the American Pet Products Association, 68% of US households 
own a pet (this equates to 84.6 million homes) and in 2016, Americans spent 
$66.75 billion on pet products, including $28.23 billion on pet food alone. 
Currently, dogs are the most popular pets: 60.2 million US households own 
dogs, the total number of dogs owned in the US being 89.7 million.93 As this 
already implies, pets, especially dogs and cats, enjoy many privileges com-
pared to animals raised for food. For example, dogs are nurtured with opti-
mal diets, quality care, toys, cognitive exercises, and special services. They 
have their own hospitals, insurances, daycares, grooming services, spas, and 
even luxury terminals at airports (such as “the Ark at JFK”). The lives of dogs 
are sustained as “livable” and “flourishable,” and upon death, they are often 
euthanized peacefully and with respect, and afterward deeply mourned. In 
contrast to farmed animals, the lives of pet dogs, for example, are not main-
tained because of their economic value but simply because they are valuable 
in their own right—or, at least as our “companions.” Indeed, we conceive of 
dogs as what I call “lovable” animals since they are our friends, companions, 
and family members. 
 
For this reason, our general reaction to dog abuse, neglect and cruelty (such 
as dogfights), is shock and moral disgust. As animal scholar Jen Wrye points 
out, “in contrast to most other animals, such behaviors are largely judged to 
be socially unacceptable” because “[t]he presumption is that pets are loved 
and adored […]” because they are conceived as “pets” and not as food (Wrye 
2015, 99). As she explains, “Pets are not categorized as such because of in-
herent characteristics, but through human practices and social relations,” 
although there is “nothing definitively distinctive about a cow or a pig that 
would warrant inhume living conditions or would even justify their con-
sumption” (Wrye 2015, 98–99). However, we view dogs as “lovable” animals 
and kill and eat cows and pigs. Moreover, we also feed “beef” and “pork” to 
our pets; a practice that, as Wrye notes, further strengthens our understand-
ing of farmed animals as not “lovable” individuals but as “meat-to-be” (Wrye 
2015, 95, 99).94 
 
                                       
93 The next most popular US pets are cats: 47.1 million US households own cats, a total of 94.2 million 
cats. The data is based on the statistics provided by the American Pet Products Association. The statis-
tics are available at: http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp (accessed May 
25, 2017). 
94 For more on the current practices of eating meat, see, for example, Barbara King’s Personalities on 
the Plate (2017). 
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In Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight 
(2011),95 political scientist Timothy Pachirat notes that the line speed in a 
typical US cattle-slaughterhouse is approximately 300 cattle per hour, or, as 
the title of his book suggests, one animal every twelve seconds (Pachirat 
2011, 17–18).96 Despite its unprecedented massiveness, Pachirat argues that 
the daily practice of industrialized killing is nevertheless distanced and con-
cealed from the larger society in order “[t]o enable us to eat meat without the 
killers or the killing, without even […] the animals themselves” (Pachirat 
2011, 3). According to him, this happens through the de-individualization of 
the animals as well as through the routinization and mechanization of their 
killing: 
 
The living creature, the animal that is herded off a truck and into the 
production sequence of the kill floor […] arrives in varied shapes and 
sizes, each distinct, each unique. Some balk when prodded up the 
chute leading to the kill box, some collapse from exhaustion or dis-
ease, some have horns that are especially difficult to cut off, some are 
pregnant and about to give birth, some are unusually large, and some 
unexpectedly small. The kill floor must make concession to this 
uniqueness, this regular irregularity. […] its function is to erase indi-
viduality and produce in its place a raw material, an input. Already 
stripped of all individuating characteristics of hide, horns, and sex, the 
carcass that reaches the cooler is further homogenized: the very tex-
ture of the flesh is reduced to one temperature, one consistency, one 
thing identical to the thing next to it, which is identical to the thou-
sands of things next to it, all ready to be fabricated into a series of 
meat “products.” (Pachirat 2011, 40, emphasis in original) 
 
Another strategy of the routinization of killing identified by Pachirat is the 
hierarchical supervision of the slaughterhouse work. 97 Since the line speed of 
                                       
95 Pachirat’s research is based on his detailed ethnographic fieldwork (undercover participatory-
observation) on the kill floor of a cattle-slaughterhouse in Omaha, Nebraska in 2004. 
96 The National Agricultural Statistics Service of the United States of Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) has provided the following statistics of US red meat production from 2016: the number of cat-
tle slaughtered during 2016 totaled 30.6 million head (up 6% from 2015); calf slaughter totaled 
487,700 head, (up 8% from 2015); hog slaughter totaled 118.2 million head (up 2% from 2015); sheep 
and lamb slaughter totaled 2.24 million head (up 1% from 2015). According to the USDA, there were 
814 slaughter plants under USDA inspection on January 1, 2017. The data is available at: 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/LiveSlauSu/LiveSlauSu-04-19-2017.pdf (accessed May 
26, 2017). 
97 The hierarchical supervision also reflects the way the slaughterhouse is architecturally designed: the 
front office of the facility is on the farthest side from the kill floor, thus distancing the managerial, 
white-collar work from the “dirty” work of the killing (Pachirat 2011, 4, 27–28). Notably, this separa-
tion between the office and other parts of the slaughterhouse is also gendered and racialized: most of 
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killing translates directly into economic profit, the workers’ main task is to 
make sure that the production line keeps running as quickly as possible. The 
surveillance and control of workers by The United States Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA) inspectors on the kill floor further reinforces this function 
(i.e. the efficacy) of the killing work. That is, the focus of the workers is not so 
much on the killing of living animals (let alone their welfare) but on the effort 
of avoiding making mistakes that could slow down or disrupt the production 
line. Or, in the words of one of Pachirat’s kill floor colleagues when asked 
about the ruthless use of the electric prods, “if we don’t keep these cows mov-
ing through, they’re gonna call us up to the office and we’re going to get 
fired” (Pachirat 2011, 148). As a consequence of these techniques of distance 
and concealment, the actual acts of mass killing start to fade away even in the 
middle of killing and even under the very eyes of those who participate in 
it.98 
 
Pachirat argues that as a result of this kind of routinized killing, even the kill 
floor workers who directly participate in the process of killing do not perceive 
the mass slaughtering of live animals as “real” killing (Pachirat 2011, 255–
256). Elsewhere he has also added that our intensified care of pets and our 
moral responses to their abuse “don’t contradict the industrialized killing of 
billions” but are in fact “a part and parcel of that system” (Pachirat cited in 
García 2015, 175). Wrye’s and Pachirat’s observations raise the question of 
how, then, should we understand the differential way we currently treat do-
mesticated and companion animals? It is my contention that the differential 
production of “lovable” and “consumable” animals is based on two interrelat-
ed and violent mechanisms of norms: on the one hand, it is based on the 
normalization of the killing of “food animals,” and, on the other hand, on the 
normative regulation of our ethical responses to animal suffering. Utilizing 
Butler’s notion of the normative regulation of lives, I discuss each of these 
mechanisms of power below, beginning with the rationalization of the prac-
tice of killing. 
                                                                                                            
the office workers are white women and men, whereas the vast majority of the kill floor workers are 
immigrant and refugee men from Central and South America, Southeast Asia, and East Africa (Pachi-
rat 2011, 17; see also Thierman 2010, 103). 
98 Another result of these techniques is that in cases when an animal survives the “knocking box” (ac-
cording to Pachirat, this happens regularly), it is possible that the animal stays sensible when entering 
the processing line where the disassembly machines such as “side puller,” “tail puller,” and “down pull-
er” cut the animal into pieces. Since the workers whose task is to make preparatory cuts into the sup-
posedly stunned animal before it enters the machines “stand on a platform elevated ten feet above the 
kill floor, the head of the cow is invisible to them” and thus they can be “unaware that they are cutting 
into a sentient animal” (Pachirat 2011, 60). Pachirat notes that the only way to notice the cow’s reac-
tions to pain is from the floor beneath the processing line (after they have been stunned by a gun, cattle 
are shackled and hung upside down) and can only be observed from “the movements of the cow’s head 
and eyes” (ibid.). 
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As Butler notes, the fact that we are precarious beings does not automatically 
lead to the ethical and political sustenance of the precarious lives of “others” 
but, and especially when we do not acknowledge our interdependent rela-
tions, it can give rise to forms of domination and violence (FW, 31). For But-
ler, this is particularly evident in the context of war. As she remarks, the US’s 
military response to 9/11 (i.e. the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) 
is a striking example when “the shared condition of precariousness” leads “to 
a specific exploitation of targeted populations,” because they are regarded as 
“destructible” and “lose-able” lives (ibid.). This is so because these lives are 
normatively “framed as being already lost or forfeited; […] rather than as liv-
ing populations in need of protection […]” (ibid.). As a consequence, their 
killing becomes normalized, since, “in the twisted logic that rationalizes their 
death, the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of 
‘the living’” (ibid.). 
 
While the mass killing of animals for food can hardly be understood as nec-
essary for the protection of human lives, I argue that it is nonetheless ration-
alized with a similar logic that Butler describes, namely, through the norms 
that differentiate between those animal lives we consider “protectable” and 
“lovable” (e.g. dogs and cats), and those we view as necessarily “lose-able” 
and “killable.”99 Generally, making farmed animals “killable” is informed by 
the capitalist logic of commodification whereby these animals become mere 
raw material for profit (Gillespie & Lopez, 2015, 8).100  
 
However, I argue that the mass killing of “food animals” is rationalized not 
only through economic norms (i.e. market value) but also through the norms 
that regulate our eating practices. These norms seek to uphold the idea of 
human exceptionalism by viewing certain other animals as “killable” and 
“consumable,” while constructing “humans” (and some of their pets101) as 
carnivorous beings whose very livability is dependent on the flesh—on the 
killing—of other animals. In this sense, and paraphrasing Butler, the mass 
killing of certain animals is deemed necessary for the sustenance of certain, 
particularly Western, human populations, their consumption and culinary 
                                       
99 My concept of “killability” builds critically on Donna Haraway’s concept of “making beings killable” 
(Haraway 2008, 80). Another critical deployment of Haraway’s concept in the context of animal ethics 
can be found in Gillespie & Lopez (2015). 
100 James Stanescu has called the intertwinement of the commodification and killing of animals “dead-
ing life,” by which he means that the (normative and literal) production of farmed animals is “funda-
mentally about [their] death, [their] consumption” (Stanescu 2013, 148). 
101 As Wrye notes, the pet food industry, which is a crucial part of the meat industry, construes (e.g. 
through advertisements) pet dogs, for example, as carnivorous beings comparable to wolves, although 
dogs have in fact evolved as “opportunistic omnivores” (Wrye 2015, 105). 
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habits, as well as their normative practices of valuing only certain animals as 
“lovable.”102 
 
In addition, and as Taylor (2010, 75) has also pointed out, the practice of eat-
ing non-human flesh can be understood as a way through which humans 
seek to construe their superiority over other animals. Far from being neutral 
practices, Taylor notes that our eating habits are highly disciplined and so-
cially regulated through “alimentary norms” that seek to normalize meat-
based diets as “natural” for humans, while making, for instance, plant-based 
diets “abnormal” or even pathologizing them as eating disorders (Taylor 
2012, 132, 141–143).103  Despite the growing scientific evidence of the unsus-
tainability (e.g. the disastrous ecological consequences and the serious prob-
lems regarding animal wellbeing)104  of meat-based diets, these norms are 
maintained through media, advertisements, the animal agribusiness, and 
government-funded nutritional science expert discourses, for example. In 
addition to the capitalist and alimentary norms that contribute to the ration-
alization of the mass killing of certain animals, I argue that the normalization 
of killing—the production of “killable animals”—also happens through the 
regulation of our ethical responsibility. 
 
Donna Haraway argues in When Species Meet that our ethical responsibility 
should not concern the act of killing animals itself but the practice of “mak-
ing beings killable” (Haraway 2008, 80). While she does not explicate what is 
the key difference between “killing” and “making killable” (she only vaguely 
points to the practice of killing that has reached “unprecedented historical 
proportions,” thus pointing implicitly to the mass slaughtering of animals for 
food), she nevertheless claims that feminists, mentioning specifically those 
who advocate vegetarian or vegan ethics, should let go of the command 
“Thou shalt not kill.” This is so, in her view, because it is not possible to live 
without killing: “Try as we might to distance ourselves, there is no way of liv-
ing that is not also a way of someone, not just something, else dying differen-
                                       
102 According to the latest data (from 2015) provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), Australia, USA, and Israel are, respectively, the top three meat consumers 
globally. The data is available at: https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm (accessed 
May 26, 2017) 
103 Taylor refers here to the new diagnosis of “orthorexia nervosa.” Interestingly, she notes that the 
introduction of this diagnosis is connected to gender normalization: “Because anorexia nervosa is 
strongly associated with women, the choice of orthorexia nervosa as the name for a new eating disor-
der, which resonates with the better known eating disorder, also genders it feminine. This suggests 
once again that alimentary normalization will be caught up with sexual and gender normalization […].” 
(Taylor 2012, 144.) 
104 99% of the meat produced in the US is raised in confined animal facilities, so called “factory farms.” 
For a scientific report on the connections of mass meat production and climate change, see, for exam-
ple, Steinfield & al. (2006). 
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tially” (ibid., 80). She goes on to explain that she does “not think we can nur-
ture living until we get better at facing killing,” insisting therefore that “hu-
man beings must learn to kill responsibly” (ibid., 81, my emphasis). Rather 
than the killing itself, the ethical problem for her is “to learn to live responsi-
bly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing […]” (ibid., 80, my 
emphasis). 
 
While Haraway may be right that it is not possible to live without killing (the 
cultivation of crops, fruits, and vegetables kills rodents and insects, for ex-
ample), to jump to the conclusion that therefore killing is necessary is to 
make a hasty generalization. As Gillespie & Lopez have also stated, Hara-
way’s argument “sets up a false construct of living and dying wherein killing 
certain bodies is taken-for-granted and ethical considerations focus only on 
how animals live and are killed, not whether they should be killed at all” (Gil-
lespie & Lopez, 2015, 9, emphasis in original). If this is the case, then Hara-
way’s understanding of “responsible killing” only further reinforces the nor-
mative divide between “protectable” and “killable” animals.  
 
Indeed, Haraway’s notion of responsible killing bears a resemblance to the 
idea of “humane slaughter,” a current law in the US that regulates the killing 
of food animals by requiring them to be stunned before processing.105  The 
mass killing of animals is considered to be a “humane” practice, insofar as it 
is carried out “responsibly.” 106  In my view, Haraway’s argument begs the 
question of the definition of “ethical responsibility.” By defining it narrowly 
to concern only the way animals are killed, she ignores the possibility that 
our conception of “responsibility” can actually serve as the very justification 
for the killing of certain animals. In contrast to Haraway, I argue that Butler’s 
work offers us a more promising notion of responsibility. 
 
According to Butler, one of the mechanisms through which the norms of rec-
ognizability (i.e. the norms that regulate which lives are recognized as lives 
                                       
105 Federal regulation of the treatment of “food animals” in the US is very limited, including only two 
major laws: the Twenty-Eight-Hour Law, which requires that livestock should be unloaded, fed, wa-
tered and rested for at least five hours after 28-hour interstate transportation; and the Humane Meth-
ods of Slaughter Act (HAS), which requires that livestock animals should be made insensible to pain 
before slaughter (poultry is excluded from the law). However, Pachirat argues on the basis of his 
slaughterhouse ethnography that although the implementation of HAS is controlled by USDA inspec-
tors, it does not prevent violence against animals but actually enables the normalization of the whole 
process of industrialized killing through the practices of hierarchical surveillance of the kill floor work-
ers as well as through the detailed division of labor and space on the kill floor (Pachirat 2011, 239–
240). 
106 A compelling critique of “humanely” raised and slaughtered meat and a defense of a (non-
universalist) vegan ethics can be found in Sunaura Taylor’s Beasts of Burden (2017), which discusses 
the common ground of animal and disability politics. 
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and which are not) work is the regulation of our ethical responsibility. Here, 
it is important to reiterate that for Butler, “the ethical” does not refer to 
forms of “conduct” or “disposition” but, as she states in Senses of the Subject, 
it “characterizes a way of understanding the relational framework within 
which sense, action, and speech become possible” (SS, 12). In other words, 
for Butler, “the ethical” is informed by the social and historical power rela-
tions that condition and regulate our moral deliberation and ethical princi-
ples through different kinds of norms (e.g. regarding our conception of what 
can be conceived of as a “livable live”), and for this reason she finds it indis-
pensable to theorize ethics in relation to a “social critique” of norms (GAO, 
82, 110–111).  
 
Butler’s concept of “ethical responsibility” also refers to a normative “struc-
ture of address in which we are called upon to act or to respond in a specific 
way” (SS, 12, my emphasis). Butler thus theorizes the question of ethical re-
sponsibility in terms of the problem of “responsiveness.”107  In Frames of 
War, she emphasizes that “responsibility requires responsiveness,” which is 
“a way of responding to what is before us with the resources that are availa-
ble to us” (FW, 50). Indeed, our capacity to respond to the world and to oth-
ers is thus not a neutral faculty but a socially mediated practice that is nor-
matively regulated through different kinds of interpretative frameworks. In 
this sense, our capacity—both collective and individual—to respond ethically 
to the suffering of certain populations depends on the broader social and po-
litical frameworks that govern our understanding of what can be regarded as 
a “livable life” (FW, 64, 180). It is the normative regulation of our ethical re-
sponsiveness that explains, according to Butler, “why we react to certain 
forms of violence with horror and to other forms with a sense of acceptance” 
(FW, 49). 
 
She further notes that the norms that regulate our ethical responses are often 
enacted through visual frames, such as media representations, that seek to 
limit our ethical perception (FW, 75). Butler’s typical example is the regula-
                                       
107 For Butler, “responsiveness,” or “impressionability” as she also calls it, names the capacity of our 
bodies to react affectively (e.g. through senses and emotions) to others and to the world. Although But-
ler views this capacity to “respond” as a fundamental dimension of our bodies (ultimately, it results 
from the fact that our bodies are vulnerable and dependent on others), she emphasizes, however, that 
our responses are not “automatic” but socially conditioned. In Senses of the Subject, she argues that it 
is this “primary impressionability” that socially operating norms come to “exploit” in their operation: 
they “impress themselves upon us, and that impression opens up an affective register” (SS, 5). As she 
explains, “Norms form us, but only because there is already some proximate and involuntary relation 
to their impress; they require and intensify our impressionability. Norms act on us from all sides […]; 
they act upon a sensibility at the same time that they form it; they lead us to feel in certain ways […].” 
(SS, 5.) For more on Butler’s theorization of affects and responsiveness, see, for example, Rushing 
(2015) and Schippers (2015). 
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tion of war photography during the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 
9/11 (the so-called “War on Terror”). In Frames of War, she discusses, for 
instance, how the US authorities used media for the service of the war effort 
by seeking to allow only the circulation of certain kinds of pictures, such as 
US victims, while attempting to limit others, such as pictures of civilian vic-
tims and torture committed by US military personnel (FW, 29, 38, 40). The 
reason for this, of course, is that by seeking to regulate the circulation of cer-
tain media representations, US authorities aimed to block critical public re-
sponse to the war. On a more fundamental level, this kind of regulation can 
be seen as an attempt to exacerbate our capacity to ethically recognize our 
interdependent relations—our shared precariousness to violence and suffer-
ing—beyond the hegemonic (here: nationalistic and imperialistic) norms of 
recognizability (FW, 28–29). 
 
I argue that the differential way we respond to the suffering of animals can 
also be explained by the regulation of our ethical responsiveness.108  This is 
evident, for example, in the vast media attention around a video footage rec-
orded during the filming of a recent movie, A Dog’s Purpose (2017). This 
footage, which circulated globally in the news media and in social media, 
showed a terrified dog, a German Shepherd, being forced into surging water 
during the shooting of the film’s water scene.109  The ensuing moral outrage 
led to the cancelling of the red carpet premiere of the film, followed by public 
apologies from the producers and the director of the film.  
 
Now, the problem here is not the moral response to the abusive treatment of 
the dog at the film scene per se, but rather how the media representations of 
sporadic cases of dog abuse enliven and strengthen our conception of dogs 
(or other pet animals) as “lovable” and “protectable” animals. The sensation-
al representations of the suffering of our companion animals intensify and 
anchor our reactions to the abuse and violence against those animals we al-
ready regard as, to use Butler’s vocabulary, “precarious” (we learned from the 
news that the name of the German Shepherd was “Hercules” and that he was, 
despite the incident, “happy and healthy”110), while we at the same time re-
main silent on the more systematic violence that is going on in slaughter-
houses every day. 
 
                                       
108 Kelly Oliver (2010) has also provided an account of animal ethics in terms of ethical responsiveness. 
Her discussion on animals seeks to deconstruct the human-animal -binary in the works of Derrida, 
Freud, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir. Although I am very sympathetic toward Oliver’s 
work on animals, my perspective differs from hers in that by drawing on Butler’s critique of norms I 
want to put more emphasis on the ways in which norms regulate our capacity to respond ethically. 
109 See, for example, New York Time’s coverage (and the video) of the incident: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/movies/a-dogs-purpose-film.html (accessed 6 March, 2017). 
110 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/movies/a-dogs-purpose-film.html 
	 101 
The normative regulation of our ethical responses to “killable animals” some-
times also happens through law. In the US, animal-agriculture lobbyists have 
managed to pass so called “ag-gag” bills in several states.111  These bills refer 
to a class of anti-whistleblower laws that prohibit with severe penalties unau-
thorized access to, and undercover recording or filming in, animal facilities, 
such as farms and slaughterhouses. Indeed, these laws make it a felony to 
expose and report neglect, abuse, and violent treatment of animals in the ag-
riculture industry. The law also prohibits the possession and distribution of 
visual, audio, or print documentation regardless of who—an activist, journal-
ist, researcher, or a worker, for instance—originally produced them (see, for 
example, Pachirat 2011, 7–8). 
 
Following Butler’s account of ethical responsiveness, it is my contention that 
the hierarchy between “lovable” and “killable” animals is produced and 
maintained through the normative frameworks that regulate our ethical re-
sponsiveness. Unless we do not expose and question the violent operations of 
the norms that make certain animals “lose-able” and thus “killable,” system-
atic violence against them remains unrecognized as real violence, precluding 
thus our capacity to ethically respond to it. As Butler formulates this point in 
Frames of War: 
 
The critique of violence must begin with the question of the repre-
sentability of life itself: what allows a life to become visible in its pre-
cariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from 
seeing or understanding certain lives in this way? (FW, 51, my empha-
sis) 
 
Later on in the book, she stresses that the idea of nonviolence must therefore 
be allied with a critique of forms of “epistemic inegalitarianism,” by which 
she means that our ethical formulations of nonviolence must be mindful of 
the norms that affect our capacity to recognize something as a precarious life 
(FW, 6–7, 180–181).112 
 
I argue, then, that in order to critique the unequal ways that precarity is cur-
rently distributed among nonhuman animals, we need to consider the ways 
in which our very understanding of ethical responsibility—our capacity to re-
spond to suffering, violence, and death—is already conditioned by the norms 
                                       
111 Ag-gag bills have to date been passed in Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, Utah, and Arkansas. 
112 Butler writes about the normative conditions for the epistemological capacity to recognize a life as 
follows: “The epistemological capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being pro-
duced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life. In this way, the normative 
production of ontology thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in 
turn gives rise to the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury 
and violence” (FW, 3). 
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that differentiate between “lovable” and “killable” animal lives. As Butler 
puts it, “Perhaps such a responsibility can only begin to be realized through a 
critical reflection on those exclusionary norms by which fields of recogniza-
bility are constituted” (FW, 36). For this reason, our ethical consideration of 
violence against animals must start with the critique of those norms that sep-
arate between “lovable” and “consumable” animals, and rationalizes the kill-
ing of the latter. Only then can we begin to articulate a radical critique 
against the unequal distribution of precarity, a critique that seeks to take re-
sponsibility for the precarious lives of not just human animals and “lovable” 
nonhuman animals, but also those animals we currently treat only as “meat-
to-be.” 
 
3.4 Conclusion: the animal ethics of nonviolence 
 
In this chapter I have sought to show that Butler’s recent work on precarity 
does not focus only on the question of the normative constitution of “the 
human” but also, and importantly, on the problem of the normative regula-
tion of “livable lives” more generally. I argue that this shift of emphasis is 
significant, since it points toward the inclusion of nonhuman animals into 
Butler’s notion of livable lives. Through my reading of her notion of “life,” I 
have demonstrated that Butler explicitly rejects anthropocentrism and in-
cludes nonhuman animals into her critique of the norms that regulate the 
recognizability of lives. My reading thus challenges the criticisms presented 
previously by Taylor, Iveson, and Wolfe. 
 
Furthermore, by expanding upon Butler’s theorization of livability and by 
providing a critical analysis of the normative production of “killable” animals 
I have demonstrated that the inclusion of nonhuman animals is not only pos-
sible but also a necessary step forward in her critique of norms. Although I 
agree with the critics that the question of “the animal” remains marginal in 
Butler’s work, I argue that her work nevertheless opens up new avenues of 
inquiry into animal ethics.  
 
In this chapter I have highlighted specifically two such possible avenues: her 
critique of the normalization of killing, and her notion of the normative regu-
lation of ethical responsiveness. In sum, I argue that Butler’s critique of 
norms offers promising tools for theorizing a radically inclusive notion of the 
ethics of nonviolence. In the next chapter, I examine Butler’s critique of 
norms by looking more closely at her notion of “critique” in the context of her 
ethics of grievability. 
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4 MOURNING, CRITIQUE, RESISTANCE 
 
 
[T]he ungrievable gather sometimes in public 
insurgencies of grief, which is why in so many 
countries it is difficult to distinguish the funer-
al from the demonstration. 
 
(Notes Toward a Performative Theory of As-
sembly) 
 
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in 2016 the 
number of refugees who drowned in boat sinkings while trying to migrate to 
Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea is one-third higher than in any 
other year: while the number of deaths officially recorded in 2015 was 3,771, 
in 2016 it raised to over 5,000 deaths.113  This means that an average of 14 
people died in the Mediterranean every day. Although certain individual 
losses from shipwrecks have attracted significant media attention, such as 
the widely circulated image of the corpse of the 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi, there 
has not been systematic political mobilization regarding the deaths and the 
crisis remains unresolved by the EU and its member states (Kovras & Robins 
2016, 45). Rather than establishing legal and safe migration routes, the EU 
has on the contrary strengthened its borders and intensified its surveillance 
techniques such as drones, satellites, and border patrolling. Pointing to the 
normalization of the deaths at the EU’s frontiers, the UN has called the situa-
tion “a scary new ‘normal.’”114 
 
In a recent keynote address, Butler suggested that one possible way to criti-
cally approach the deaths of the refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean 
is the question of “grievability,” that is, “who will be publicly grievable and 
who will not?” as she puts it in Frames of War (FW, 36). In the lecture, But-
ler stated that this question could offer insights into problematizing the “ne-
cropolitical”115  ways in which certain government policies produce systemat-
                                       
113 http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2016/12/585ce804105/mediterranean-sea-100-
people-reported-dead-yesterday-bringing-year-total.html (accessed 4th April 2017). 
114 The United Nations special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau said in a 
statement to Business Insider that “Through slowly stripping away the rights of asylum seekers and 
migrants, Europe is creating a scary new ‘normal.’” http://www.businessinsider.com/franois-crepeau-
statement-on-migrant-crisis-in-europe-2016-2 (accessed 4th April 2017). 
115 Here, Butler refers to Achille Mbembe’s concept of “necropolitics” that draws on and develops fur-
ther Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. According to Mbembe, necropolitics refers to “the various ways in 
which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of 
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ic forms of negligence and abandonment that let certain populations die.116  
Extending on my previous chapter (Ch. 3), where I discussed the differential 
distribution of precarity in the context of animal ethics, in this chapter I 
elaborate Butler’s critique of norms from the perspective of her account of 
grief and mourning. By doing this, I seek to foreground Butler’s twofold ap-
proach to norms in light of her notion of critique as resistance. 
 
In much of the recent commentary literature the question of “grievability” is 
often viewed as but one dimension of Butler’s more general theorization of 
“livability.” As, for example, Birgit Schippers states, “For Butler, the litmus 
test for a liveable life, and for the operation of an expansive frame that facili-
tates such a life, is the idea of grievability: that is, the acknowledgement of 
loss and the recognition of a life lived” (Schippers 2014, 41). Similarly, Moya 
Lloyd states that rather than addressing the specific practices regarding the 
politics of grief and mourning, “grievability” is, for Butler, “shorthand for re-
ferring to liveable lives” (Lloyd 2015, 178; see also Lloyd 2007, 136; and 
Chambers & Carver 2008, 69–70).117  Lloyd further argues that “grievability” 
in Butler’s more recent texts does the same conceptual work as “abject” and 
“cultural intelligibility” did in her previous writings, that is, it points to the 
normative mechanisms that “differentiate between lives that are eligible for 
rights, support and recognition (grievable lives) and those that are not (un-
grievable lives)” (Lloyd 2015, 178). Another emerging way of interpreting 
Butler’s approach to “grievability” is to articulate it in terms of Butler’s theo-
rization of emotions, affects, and sensibilities that attends to the different 
(emotional, social, and political) modes of dispossession through which sub-
jectivity is construed as relational and “ek-static” (Rushing 2010; 2015, 
Schippers 2015; Braunmühl 2012; Feola 2013). 
 
                                                                                                            
persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast pop-
ulations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (Mbembe 
2003, 40, emphasis in original). 
116 Butler gave the key note lecture “Grievability and Resistance” on 6th October 2016 at the event 
“Borders and the Politics of Mourning” at the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility (ZIMM), the 
New School for Social Research, New York City. The lecture is available on the Institute’s website: 
http://blogs.newschool.edu/zolberg-center/2016/11/23/watch-judith-butlers-keynote-address-
grievability-and-resistance-and-the-borders-and-the-politics-of-mourning-panel/ 
117 In fact, Butler often uses the concepts of “livable life” and “grievable life” interchangeably. She 
writes, for example, that: “An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, 
that is, it has never counted as a life at all” (FW, 38). Although I agree that the questions of “livability” 
and “grievability” are intertwined in Butler’s work, I argue that her account of grief and mourning has 
an additional theoretical significance that warrants a closer look. The subtitles of Butler’s books in 
themselves point to the emphasis Butler puts on the question of grief and mourning: Precarious Lives: 
The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004) and Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (2009). 
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Although I agree that Butler’s account of “grievability” relates centrally to all 
of these discussions, I argue that subsuming “grievability” under the topics of 
“livability” or “affects” risks obscuring the integral role that the question of 
grievability plays in Butler’s work. Or, as David McIvor has put it, “While it 
could be argued that, for Butler, mourning is merely one mode of ‘disposses-
sion,’ [….] the frequency with which Butler invokes mourning gives her work 
an internal thematic continuity” (McIvor 2012, 411–412). On the other hand, 
Butler’s discussion of “grievability” has sparked trenchant criticism as well. 
One of the most influential criticisms has been Bonnie Honig’s recent argu-
ment that by turning to questions of grief and mourning in her more recent 
work (which Honig sees as a “turn to ethics”) Butler’s theorizing of political 
action shrinks into “a sentimental politics of shared feeling” that focuses only 
on “lamenting” ungrievable deaths (Honig 2013, 64; see also, for example, 
Benhabib 2013; McIvor 2012; Shulman 2011; Dean 2009). Characterizing 
Butler’s recent work on precariousness and mourning as “mortalist human-
ism,” she further claims that “an ethics of mortalism and suffering is no ade-
quate replacement for a (post)humanist politics with agonistic intent” (Honig 
2010, 1). 
 
As I have already (in Chapter 3) challenged the suitability of the terminology 
of “humanism” in regard to Butler’s theorization of “precarity” by arguing 
that her notion of precarious lives extends to nonhuman animals as well, in 
this chapter my focus will be on the relationship between norms and grieva-
bility. In order to fully understand the emphasis Butler puts on the practices 
of mourning and grief, I suggest that it should be analyzed in terms of But-
ler’s critique norms. Reading Butler’s notion of grievability in light of her 
theorization of norms allows me to highlight the aspects of critique and polit-
ical contestation that Butler associates with questions of grief and mourning. 
By foregrounding Butler’s account of grievability in relation to her discussion 
of critique and the “politics of the street,” I argue—contra Honig—that But-
ler’s account of grievability can be read as a theorization of resistance. 
 
I begin my analysis (section 4.1) by mapping Butler’s discussion of mourning 
in her early work on gender melancholia, arguing that already there Butler 
connects her notion of grief to political contestation. The second part (4.2) 
explicates Butler’s more recent theorization of “grievability” and addresses 
the recent criticisms leveled against Butler’s account of grief. In the third part 
(4.3), I respond to these critical readings by discussing Butler’s notion of “cri-
tique” in light of the question of resistance. In the fourth part (4.4), I develop 
further my argument regarding the relationship between grievability and re-
sistance by turning to Butler’s radical democratic discussions of street poli-
tics. In the conclusion (4.5), I assess the implications Butler’s account of 
grievability have for her theorization of norms.  
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4.1 Grief inside out: normative heterosexuality as social 
melancholia 
 
The relationship between the normative constitution of subjectivity and the 
practice of mourning is a key question running through Butler’s oeuvre, orig-
inating in her critical discussion of Freudian psychoanalysis and the concept 
of “melancholia” in Gender Trouble (1999[1990]) and The Psychic Life of 
Power (1997).118  In these books, Butler reads Freud in order to explain the 
psychosocial constitution of gender identifications, focusing particularly on 
the constitutive role that disavowed homosexuality plays in the formation of 
heterosexual identity. In order to understand the relevance of the concept of 
melancholia for Butler’s account of “grievable lives,” it is helpful first to dis-
cuss Freud’s notion of melancholic identifications. 
 
In “The Ego and the Id” ([1923]1989) Freud suggests that in comparison to 
mourning, which ends after one has successfully dealt with grief after losing a 
particular love object (i.e. the person accepts the loss and adapts to the situa-
tion), melancholia refers to an unconscious mode of grieving where a person 
is not aware of what has been lost. This unawareness leads to the inability to 
“get over” the loss: the melancholic does not accept the loss but incorporates 
the lost object inside the ego by identifying with it. Although in “Mourning 
and Melancholia” ([1917]1957) Freud understood melancholia as a pathologi-
cal state (i.e. depression), he later changed his view in “The Ego and the Id.” 
There, Freud now conceives melancholia as the general mode through which 
an infant develops an ego through identification, a process also known as 
“The Oedipus complex.” As Sara Salih summarizes the basic idea behind the 
“drama” that in Freud’s model is triggered by the taboo against incest: 
 
Initially the infant desires one or other of its parents (these are its 
primary object-cathexes), but the taboo against incest means that the-
se desires have to be given up. Like the melancholic who takes the lost 
object into her- or himself and thereby preserves it, the ego introjects 
the lost object (the desired parent) and preserves it as an identifica-
tion. (Salih 2002, 54) 
 
But, as Salih notes, the object choices that the child makes seem to be prede-
termined, that is, they seem to be “the result of primary dispositions, i.e. 
whether one is innately ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’” (Salih 2002, 54). Indeed, 
Freud’s presumption regarding the internal gender dispositions is the point 
of departure for Butler’s critical reading. 
                                       
118 The wider context of Butler’s discussion of melancholia is the question of subjection (i.e. the consti-
tution of the subject through social power). In The Psychic Life of Power Butler brings Freud’s notion 
of melancholia together with Foucault’s notion of power and seeks to theorize the psychic forms that 
normalization takes. In the book, Butler also draws on the works of Althusser, Hegel, and Nietzsche. 
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Butler accuses Freud of heterosexualizing the mechanism of identity for-
mation and contends that heterosexual identification is “produced not only 
through implementing the prohibition on incest but, prior to that, by enforc-
ing the prohibition on homosexuality” (PLP, 135). As a result, “heterosexuali-
ty is cultivated through prohibitions, and these prohibitions take as one of 
their objects homosexual attachments, thereby forcing the loss of those at-
tachments” (PLP, 136–37). In this sense, heterosexuality can be understood 
as a melancholic identity: it is based on the unresolved grief concerning the 
enforced rejection of homosexual attachments. Of course, according to this 
model, homosexual identities are also “melancholic” to the extent that they, 
too, are formed through identification. Yet, the difference is that heterosexu-
ality is culturally recognized, valued, and normalized, whereas homosexuality 
is normatively proscribed (PLP, 147–149). 
 
Despite Butler’s criticism of Freud’s normative presumptions, she, however, 
adopts his understanding of melancholic identification and uses it strategi-
cally to explain the process through which gender norms become psychically 
incorporated. Here, the feeling of guilt plays a crucial role. In order to fully 
grasp Butler’s argument, we must again turn back to Freud. In Freud’s notion 
of melancholia, the subject (i.e. the “ego”) that has lost a love object starts to 
feel anger (as a result of the feelings of rejection) toward the lost object. Since 
the lost object is no longer present, the feeling of anger cannot be acted out 
on the object but becomes instead turned against the ego itself (Freud 
[1917]1957, 246, 248–249). The ego starts to reproach him/herself and ex-
pects to be punished. This “turning against itself” explains, according to 
Freud, the heightened risk of suicide related to melancholic states (ibid., 
251–252). The self-beratement of the melancholic is, as it were, a circuitous 
revenge for the loss and alleged rejection. For Butler, this circuitous “re-
venge” can be understood as an incorporation of a certain kind of punitive, 
self-reflective moral agency: 
 
Clearly, Freud conceptualizes the ego in the perpetual company of the 
ego ideal which acts as a moral agency of various kinds. The internal-
ized losses of the ego are reestablished as part of this agency of moral 
scrutiny, the internalization of anger and blame originally felt for the 
object in the external mode. (GT, 81) 
 
In fact, for Freud, the internalization of anger (or, aggression)—and its trans-
formation into a sense of guilt—is the mechanism through which the ego119  
gains conscience and the capacity to reflect on oneself morally: 
                                       
119 In Freud’s account the ego is analytically divided into the id (which includes “drives” or “instincts”), 
the ego (which acts according to the “reality principle” and tries to balance between the id and the su-
perego) and the superego (the conscience; the sense of guilt; the ego ideal) (see, e.g. Freud [1923]1989, 
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As a child grows up, the role of father is carried on by teachers and 
others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain power-
ful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise 
the moral censorship. The tension between the demands of conscience 
and the actual performances of the ego is experienced as a sense of 
guilt. Social feelings rest on identifications with other people, on the 
basis of having the same ego ideal. (Freud, [1923]1989, 643, my em-
phasis) 
 
With regard to this, Butler notes that it is possible to understand “the peculi-
ar phenomenon whereby homosexual desire becomes a source of guilt” in 
light of Freud’s notion of conscience (PLP, 140–141). Here, Butler’s under-
standing of the melancholic formation of the “self” comes quite close to 
Freud’s notion of conscience. For both, the internalization of “morals” (in 
Freud) and “norms” (in Butler) is a social process. On the basis of Freud’s 
notion concerning the development of guilt and conscience, Butler concludes 
that the “ego” is not only an outcome of the psychic process of identification, 
but also an effect of social power that regulates identities through gendering 
and heterosexualizing norms (PLP, 181). In this sense, for Butler gender 
identity is a psychic “trace” of that regulatory power. One of the mechanisms 
through which normative heterosexuality (including binary norms of “femi-
ninity” and “masculinity”) operates is thus the voice of conscience and guilt, 
that is, the internalized moral principle that regulates who one must love, 
mourn, and establish relationships with.120 
 
Indeed, for Butler, the production and regulation of conscience and guilt can 
be understood as an indirect, insidious operation of social power, whereby 
the subject begins to self-regulate its own actions. In other words, melanchol-
ic identification can therefore be conceived as the process through which 
gender norms operate (PLP, 24–25, 171). Stressing the regulative dimension 
of identifications, Butler links the idea of the “foreclosure” (i.e. repudiation 
or repression) of certain love attachments to Foucault’s notion of a regulatory 
ideal, “an ideal according to which certain forms of love become possible and 
others, impossible” (PLP, 25). She goes on, drawing on Foucault, to argue 
that this kind of foreclosure operates not only to repress existing desire but 
to “produce certain kinds of objects and to bar others from the field of social 
production” (PLP, 25). As a result, Butler concludes that the foreclosure of 
certain love objects “produce[s] a sociality afflicted by melancholia, a sociali-
ty in which loss cannot be grieved because it cannot be recognized as loss, 
                                                                                                            
631–645). Butler uses the terms “ego,” “self,” and “subject” somewhat analogously in her reading of 
Freud. 
120 In Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), Butler analyzes the internalization of moral principles and 
norms through which the subject emerges in terms of Adorno’s concept of “ethical violence.” 
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because what is lost never had any entitlement to existence” (PLP, 24). For 
Butler, this kind of social melancholia is thus informed by a double-denial: “I 
have never loved,” so “I have never lost” (PLP, 23). 
 
Having thus argued that melancholia can be understood as the psychosocial 
way through which gendering and heterosexualizing norms produce and reg-
ulate the objects of love and loss, Butler further notes that this regulation is 
also, and significantly, informed by the culturally-specific conventions and 
public rituals of grief. In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler illustrates this 
through her example of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the US in the 1980’s and 90’s. 
As she remarks, the psychosocial operation of the norm that prohibits homo-
sexual desire and object choice leads to the cultural failure to acknowledge 
and openly grieve the deaths of homosexual people by the wider (heterosexu-
al) public. She goes on to argue that the inability to mourn the deaths of ho-
mosexual people generates a melancholic sociality haunted by the “ungrieva-
ble” lives, lives that were already—before their actual death—marked as “so-
cially dead” (PLP, 27, 138).121  
 
Consequently, heterosexist melancholia produces, as it were, a double mar-
ginalization: the normative prohibition against certain love objects excludes 
and marginalizes homosexual people and, further, makes it difficult for them 
to openly grieve the loss of their love objects. Or, as David W. McIvor puts it: 
“The prohibition of public mourning, in effect, doubles the trauma of loss” 
(McIvor 2012, 416). 
 
Given the pervasiveness of the social melancholia that results from the pro-
hibition to mourn homosexual losses, one might wonder whether this kind of 
foreclosed grief can ever be worked through in any politically affirmative 
way. Indeed, as McIvor argues, while generally sympathetic to Butler’s ac-
count of grief and mourning as resources for ethics and politics, Butler’s reli-
ance on Freud leads her to theorize “the subject” as necessarily “melancholic” 
and thus essentially entangled in its punitive origins (McIvor 2012, 410). He 
goes on to argue that, as a result, Butler comes to view political contestation 
against the normative regulation of grief as an overly limited practice: as a 
contestation against one’s own super-ego, that is, as “a curious (if not para-
doxical) enraged nonviolence” that “seems to inevitably drift towards vio-
lence” due to the unresolved grief at the origins of the melancholic subject 
(McIvor 2012, 422).122 
                                       
121 Although Butler’s focus is on the deaths of homosexual people, she also mentions sex workers and 
drug users, for example (see PLP, 27). 
122 McIvor also notes that Butler’s reading of Freud’s concept of melancholia is inadequate. As he 
writes, “Ultimately, Freud provides two distinct accounts of the superego. In normal development the 
superego prohibits the child’s libidinal advances towards the parental dyad but also helps to sublimate 
this libido into productive love-relationships. This ‘mild’ superego offers prohibitions alongside en-
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I think McIvor is right in noting that Butler’s notion of melancholia some-
times over-emphasizes the punitive aspects of regulatory power at the ex-
pense of the enabling ones. In fact, in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), 
Butler notes that “In The Psychic Life of Power, I perhaps too quickly accept-
ed this punitive scene of inauguration for the subject” (GAO, 15). Revising 
her previous emphasis on prohibition and punishment, in Giving an Account 
of Oneself Butler examines, by following Foucault’s later work on ethics, crit-
ical reflexivity as codes of moral conduct (i.e. ethical practice or action) and 
not primarily as codes of punishment. This allows Butler to develop her ac-
count of the incorporation of morality and norms in terms of a practice that 
takes a critical relation to these norms. I will return to this idea in section 
4.3. 
 
Here, it has to be noted, however, that already in The Psychic Life of Power 
Butler implies that the “melancholic” incorporation of norms produces not 
only forms of critical self-reflexivity (i.e. the critical and moral voice of con-
science) due to internalized anger or rage, but also, crucially, modes of reflex-
ivity that can be put in the service of a more affirmative political action.123  
This is evident especially in the context where Butler talks about queer activ-
ism: 
 
The emergence of collective institutions for grieving are thus crucial to 
survival, to reassembling community, to rearticulation of kinship, to 
reweaving sustaining relations. Insofar as they involve the publiciza-
tion and dramatization of death—as in the case of ‘die-ins’ by Queer 
Nation—they call for being read as life-affirming rejoinders to the dire 
psychic consequences of a grieving process culturally thwarted and 
proscribed. (PLP, 148, my emphasis) 
 
In this passage I read Butler as hinting toward the possibility that grief can 
indeed be worked through. To put it differently: the “sociality afflicted by 
melancholia” can be contested through political action that aims, by making 
                                                                                                            
ticements. However, the superego can also transform into a ‘one-sided’ and cruel agency of prohibition 
and control” (McIvor 2012, 414). On the basis of this, he notes that “Butler elides the distinction Freud 
draws between the normal sense of guilt and the melancholic superego” (ibid.). 
123 Although Butler’s focus in The Psychic Life of Power is on the “guilty” subject, it is worth noting 
that she does acknowledge the possibility of affirmative—not only negative—aspect of the process of 
melancholic psychic incorporation when she writes, in the context of discussing Freud’s notion of mel-
ancholia, that: “Here, of course, an unexplored point deserves remark: internalization does not have to 
take the form of mercilessly violent conscience […]” (PLP, 195). And she continues by citing Derrida: 
“Indeed, Derrida insists, with the later Freud, that ‘mourning is the affirmative incorporation of the 
Other’ and that, in principle, there can be no end to mourning” (ibid.). 
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the deaths visible and indeed “grievable,” to restore the value of the lives 
lost—but also the value of the lives still living and struggling. 
 
The activist practice and tactic called “die-in” refers to public demonstrations 
where people occupy a public space, often a street, a sidewalk, or a square, 
and lie down, simulating being dead. Protesters usually cover themselves 
with banners and signs, seeking to interrupt the flow of people and get their 
attention. The tactic has long been used in environmental, animal, and 
HIV/AIDS activism, and lately the strategy has also been adopted by #Black-
LivesMatter protestors as well as activists in European cities (e.g. in London) 
who have sought to draw public attention to the migrant and refugee deaths 
in the Mediterranean.124  As Butler notes in the passage above, HIV/AIDS 
activists used the tactic in order to politicize grief by challenging the hetero-
sexist norms that sought to institute a politically debilitating silence around 
HIV/AIDS deaths. 
 
Since Butler explicitly points toward the possibility of political resistance 
against the normalization of melancholia, I argue that her reflection on the 
politicization of grief in The Psychic Life of Power significantly prefigures her 
later discussion of the unrecognized losses of the so-called war on terror in 
Precarious Life (2004a) and Frames of War (2009), as well as her more re-
cent considerations of grievability and the politics of the street in Notes To-
ward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015). I will come back to the 
question of grievability vis-à-vis the politics of the street toward the end of 
this chapter. Since Butler’s later work on grievability arises specifically from 
her critical response to US military politics after 9/11, it is necessary first to 
take a closer look at how the question of grief plays out in this critique. 
 
4.2 Normative regulation of grief and the problem of 
grievability 
 
As I showed in the previous section, Butler’s early reading of Freud centers 
on the role of melancholia with regard to the incorporation of norms (in that 
context, specifically gender norms), as well as on the question of how the in-
ternalization of normative prohibitions produces modes of critical reflexivity 
that can be put in the service of a political contestation against the normative 
production of “ungrievable” lives. As I have argued in Chapter 1, the question 
of grievability also informs Butler’s post-9/11 writings that deal with such 
topics as ethical responsibility, vulnerability, and the ethics of nonviolence. 
                                       
124 See, for example, a newspaper article by the New Republic that discusses the tactic of the “die-in” 
used by #BlackLivesMatter: https://newrepublic.com/article/122513/blacklivesmatter-breathing-new-
life-die. For a newspaper article about the “die-in” demonstration against EU border politics in Lon-
don, see: https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/die-in-migrant-deaths-bethell-hudson-833. 
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As in The Psychic Life of Power, in Precarious Life and Frames of War But-
ler similarly addresses the political implications of the social disavowal of 
certain losses as well as the regulation of public mourning. 
 
At the beginning of Precarious Life (2004a), Butler asks, referring to the US 
military response (in Afghanistan and Iraq) to the losses of 9/11, “what, polit-
ically, might be made of grief besides a cry for war” (PL, xii). In Precarious 
Life and Frames of War (2009) Butler sets out to answer this question as 
part of her critical response to the War on Terror. A pivotal aspect of Butler’s 
discussion of the relationship between grief and politics is her understanding 
of vulnerability and precariousness. As I have already discussed these ques-
tions in Chapter 3, it suffices here to note that for Butler the experience of 
losing somebody—an experience we all are familiar with—points to the fact 
that we are not only mortal but also interdependent beings, to whom death 
and loss are necessary dimensions of life. To the extent that loss is inevitable, 
the tasks of grief and mourning are also fundamental aspects of our lives. In-
deed, for Butler, grief that follows a loss is not a transient emotional state but 
something that “exposes the constitutive sociality of the self” (UG, 19).125  
Although Butler acknowledges the devastating losses and mourning that fol-
lowed 9/11, she is critical of the way these experiences were immediately put 
into the service of military retribution. Against this backdrop, Butler poses 
the following question: “Is there something to be gained from grieving, from 
tarrying with grief, from remaining exposed to its unbearability and not en-
deavoring to seek a resolution for grief through violence?” (PL, 30). 
 
By connecting the idea of relationality and interdependency to the task of 
mourning, Butler challenges President George W. Bush’s statement, given 
only a few days after 9/11, that the US had finished the task of mourning and 
must now take action.126  For the Bush administration, this meant wars first 
in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, as well as heightened border practices, de-
                                       
125 Butler writes, “Despite our differences in location and history, my guess is that it is possible to ap-
peal to a ‘we,’ for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody. Loss has made a tenu-
ous ‘we’ of us all. […] Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, 
attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of 
that exposure” (PL, 20). 
126 President Bush stated for example that, “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to 
defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies 
to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” He also declared that, “Great harm has 
been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission 
and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war.” The New York Times has published the full speech as 
“A Nation Challenged: President Bush’s Address on Terrorism before a Joint Meeting of Congress,” 
New York Times, September 21, 2001, p. B: 4. The transcript of the speech can also be found online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/us/nation-challenged-president-bush-s-address-terrorism-
before-joint-meeting.html 
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tainment and torture of those suspected as terrorists, and the suspension of 
civil liberties under the name of the Patriotic Act. Butler interprets Bush’s 
statement through her Freudian notion of melancholia, arguing that Bush’s 
claim can be understood as “the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia” 
that refuses grief through violent action, which attempts to restore a notion 
of sovereignty by denying vulnerability and interdependent global ties (PL, 
30).127  Against Bush’s statement, Butler develops an understanding of grief 
as a critical and affirmative resource for politics and ethics, one that recog-
nizes the mutual interdependency of our lives and resists the quick resolution 
of grief through violence.  
 
However, Butler does not argue that grief or mourning themselves must be 
the goal of politics. Her argument is instead that “without the capacity to 
mourn, we lose that keener sense of life we need in order to oppose violence” 
(PL, xviii–xix). As she further explains, “To grieve, and to make grief itself 
into a resource for politics […] may be understood as the slow process by 
which we develop a point of identification with suffering itself’ (PL, 30, my 
emphasis). Therefore, the task of grieving can be formulated as a question of 
“who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected violence, disposses-
sion, and fear, and in what ways” (PL, xii). In this sense, grief can be turned 
into a practice of empathizing with the suffering of others that can bring 
about, as Butler hopes, “a new basis for global political community” (PL, xiii, 
150). In other words, Butler sees grief as a possibility of transforming the ex-
perience of loss and violence into a rearticulation of politics that recognizes 
and seeks to affirm the mutual interdependency of our lives.128 
 
In Frames of War Butler develops her account of grief further by arguing 
that it is not only a potential resource for nonviolent politics but that it is, 
significantly, the precondition of a livable life (FW, 14, 98). Here, she attends 
to the way in which the feeling of grief is regulated through the normative 
framework of “grievability.” She defines “grievability” as follows: 
 
                                       
127 Articulating US military politics as a way of re-establishing the idea of a sovereign subject, Butler 
writes: “When the United States acts, it establishes a conception of what it means to act as an Ameri-
can, establishes a norm by which that subject might be known. […] its actions constitute the building of 
a subject that seeks to restore and maintain its mastery through the systematic destruction of its multi-
lateral relations, its ties to the international community. It shores itself up, seeks to reconstitute its 
imagined wholeness, but only at the price of denying its own vulnerability, its dependency, its expo-
sure, where it exploits those very features in others, thereby making those features ‘other to’ itself” (PL, 
41). 
128 Butler theorizes the possibility of turning aggression into nonviolent political action by drawing, 
among others, on Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic reflections on aggression, self-preservation, and rela-
tional ties (see, for example, FW, 173–177). 
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[A]ccording to the future anterior […] grievability is a condition of a 
life’s emergence and sustenance. The future anterior, “a life has been 
lived,” is presupposed at the beginning of a life that has only begun to 
be lived. In other words, “this will be a life that will have been lived” is 
the presupposition of a grievable life, which means that this will be a 
life that can be regarded as a life, and be sustained by that regard. 
Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something liv-
ing that is other than life. Instead, “there is a life that will never have 
been lived,” sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved 
when lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes pos-
sible the apprehension of precarious life. (FW, 15) 
 
For Butler, “grievability” is not only something that marks the value of life, it 
also refers to the normative differentiation between “grievable” and “un-
grievable” lives. Like “livability” (see my Chapter 3), “grievability” is also, ac-
cording to Butler, differentially distributed across populations. Butler’s dis-
cussion of the “differential allocation of grief” (PL, 37) is centered, as in The 
Psychic Life of Power, on the problematic of public mourning: only certain 
lives are openly grieved, whereas others are not. For her, the regulation of the 
practices and rituals of public mourning has to do with the question of who 
can appear in the public sphere; whose lives are recognized as lives, and 
whose deaths are counted as deaths. To put it differently: the practices of 
public mourning reflect the norms that govern the recognizability of precari-
ous lives. 
 
In Precarious Life, Butler addresses the problematic of public mourning 
through her analysis of obituary writing (especially in the context of 9/11 and 
its aftermath), which she understands as an act of nation-building (PL, 34). 
As she notes, the fact that American newspapers do not publish obituaries of 
those the US has killed implies that there is a “hierarchy of grief” (PL, 32). 
Indeed, as Butler argues, “the obituary functions as the instrument by which 
grievability is publicly distributed,” adding that it operates in this way nor-
matively as “the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly 
grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition […]” (PL, 34). Butler also 
comments on the way in which, for example, normative heterosexuality and 
racism functions in the obituaries. The obituaries written for the victims of 
9/11 excluded certain queer people and undocumented immigrants and thus 
produced representations of who can belong to “the idea of national identity” 
and who cannot (PL, 35; FW, 38). 
 
The same logic operated, as Butler notes, in the way the San Francisco 
Chronicle refused to publish obituaries for two Palestinian families who had 
been killed by Israeli soldiers. The newspaper explained the rejection by say-
ing that they did not want to “offend” anyone. Immediate question arises, 
what is “offensive” in the recognition of these losses, and for whom is the 
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recognition “offensive”? Indeed, as Butler notes, the newspaper’s refusal 
seemed to be “mandated through an identification” not with the victims of 
military violence but “with those who identify with the perpetrators of that 
violence” (PL, 36). 
 
For Butler, the genre of obituary writing in these instances can be understood 
as a normative mechanism of dehumanization that forecloses certain deaths 
from the public sphere. Since the lives of these people had never been recog-
nized as valuable—and indeed grievable—in the first place, their deaths too 
remain unmarked and thus ungrievable. This is to say that “the prohibition 
on certain forms of public grieving itself constitutes the public sphere on the 
basis of such prohibition” (PL, 37). As a result, Butler argues that the public 
sphere becomes constituted as “a generalized melancholia” (PL, 37), that is, 
as a disavowed mourning that can be understood as the hidden “continuation 
of the violence itself” against the “ungrievable” (PL, 148).129  
 
As she notes, the “normative schemes” that contribute to the generalized 
melancholia “work precisely through providing no image, no name, no narra-
tive, so that there never was a life, and there never was a death” (PL, 146). 
Here, we could also think of the deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. As Iosif 
Kovras and Simon Robins have noted, the exact figures of the migrant and 
refugee deaths in the Mediterranean are unavailable, since the European Un-
ion has declined to quantify the deaths (Kovras & Robins 2016, 40).130  The 
EU’s unwillingness to register the deaths has direct ethical and political con-
sequences for the politics of mourning. As Kovras and Robins write: 
 
Although official policies include DNA testing, limited efforts are 
made to identify individual bodies and bury them in a dignified way, 
thereby depriving families of the capacity to mourn or bury loved 
ones. The result is that the bodies of the dead are literally lost in a fog 
of bureaucratic ambiguity, unmourned and uncounted. This highlights 
                                       
129 In Frames of War, Butler discusses public mourning in terms of the normative regulation of affec-
tive responses following the work of Talal Asad (2007). For an analysis of Butler’s deployment of 
Asad’s theorization, see Schippers (2015, 104–105). 
130 Whereas officially recorded deaths at the EU border in the period 1990–2014 was 3,188 persons 
(Last & Spijkerboer, 2014), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that between 
2000 and 2014 the total number of deaths at the EU borders was 22,400 (Brian & Laczko, 2014). In 
2015, Professor Thomas Spijkerboer (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) and his research team (“The Hu-
man Costs of Border Control”) urged the European Parliament to establish a centralized “European 
Migrant Death Observatory” by using the data collected and digitalized by the research team. However, 
according to an interview with Spijkerboer conducted by “Investigate Europe” (an investigative cross-
border journalist network) in February 2017, the research group had not yet received an answer. 
http://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/the-uncounted-invisible-deaths-on-europes-borders/ (accessed 
5th February, 2017). 
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the transnational affective impact of death at the border: death creates 
a new border as a direct result of the presence of the physical frontier, 
which separates families from their relatives and even from news of 
dead loved ones. (Kovras & Robins 2016, 48) 
 
Indeed, not only the unavailability of information, such as the names, of the 
dead makes the mourning processes of the families of missing persons more 
difficult. But, following Butler, it could be said that it also establishes the EU 
border as a melancholic frontier that produces certain populations as “un-
grievable”—even before their literal death. 
 
For Butler, as Birgit Schippers notes, Butler’s discussion of grievability and 
precariousness is “underpinned by her profound commitment to ethics, and 
by an explicit shift to normative theorizing” that is evident, for instance, in 
Butler’s argument regarding the obligation to sustain our relations to others 
(Schippers 2014, 43). Schippers remarks that Butler’s vocabulary of ‘ought’ 
and ‘should’ also indicates the normative aspirations related to her more re-
cent work (ibid.). Most clearly, Butler’s commitment to certain normative 
principles is visible in her appeal to the equal value of precarious lives, a top-
ic I explored in Chapter 3 in relation to precarity, nonviolence, and nonhu-
man animals. In a similar way, Butler articulates grievability in terms of 
equality. In Frames of War, Butler writes that: 
 
This work seeks to reorient politics on the Left toward a consideration 
of precarity as an existing and promising site for coalitional exchange. 
For populations to become grievable does not require that we come to 
know the singularity of every person who is at risk or who has, indeed, 
already been risked. Rather, it means that policy needs to understand 
precariousness as a shared condition, and precarity as the politically 
induced condition that would deny equal exposure through the radi-
cally unequal distribution of wealth and the differential ways of expos-
ing certain populations, racially and nationally conceptualized, to 
greater violence. The recognition of shared precariousness introduces 
strong normative commitments of equality and invites a more robust 
universalizing of rights that seeks to address basic human needs for 
food, shelter, and other conditions for persisting and flourishing. (FW, 
29, my emphasis)131 
 
                                       
131 It should be noted, however, that although Butler explicitly relies on “certain liberal principles […] 
including equality and universality,” she rejects the liberal-individualistic framework that presupposes 
“an ontology of discrete identity,” since it “cannot yield the kinds of analytic vocabularies we need for 
thinking about global interdependency and the interlocking networks of power and position in con-
temporary life” (FW, 31). 
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However, this raises the question of what should be done in order to inter-
rupt and resist the “necropolitical” production of “ungrievable” deaths? Ac-
cording to Bonnie Honig, it is precisely the notion of political contestation 
and action that is lacking in Butler’s account of grievability.132  In her cri-
tique, Honig compares Butler’s notion of the shared vulnerability of our bod-
ies to Hannah Arendt’s concepts of labor and work.133 Here, Honig refers to 
Butler’s notion of vulnerability understood as a range of possibilities “that 
include the eradication of our being at the one end, and the physical support 
for our lives at the other” (PL, 31). As Honig notes: 
  
Notably the two end points of Butler’s range of human commonality 
map onto Hannah Arendt’s labor (in which we are governed by the 
time of mortality and risk eradication) and work (in which we insulate 
ourselves from the time of mortality by fabricating physical supports 
of life that outlast a human life). (Honig 2013, 43) 
 
The problem for Honig is, however, that Butler seems to replace sovereignty 
(i.e. the way in which for example the US replaced mourning with a violent 
re-establishment of sovereign power after 9/11) with “lamentation” through 
which Butler seeks, according to Honig, to theorize a new kind of “mortalist 
humanism” (Honig 2013, 43; see also Honig 2010, 26–27). Honig claims that 
Butler’s otherwise Arendtian notion of mortality misses the third aspect of 
“the human condition,” that is, “Arendtian action, a collective non- or quasi-
sovereign endeavor whose principle is natality” (Honig 2013, 43). Honig ex-
plains that “Arendtian action is of interest here because it points beyond the 
sorts of sovereignty whose violence Butler worries about, but also beyond the 
grievability with which [Butler] replaces them” (ibid.). 
 
Here, I am not interested that much in whether Butler’s notion of vulnerabil-
ity is Arendtian or not, but rather in Honig’s argument that Butler replaces 
politics (i.e. political action and contestation) with her “humanist politics of 
grievable life” (Honig 2013, 50). Indeed, another element of Honig’s argu-
ment is that by focusing on the question of grievability in her recent work, 
Butler performs a “turn to ethics,” which Honig sees as a turn away from 
politics. Honig claims that Butler’s “universalist ethics of lamentation in 
which the focus is on suffering” ignores the question of collective political ac-
tion, since it replaces the task of political contestation with the idea of equal 
grievability (Honig 2013, 42, 45, 64). Honig insists that Butler’s manner of 
theorizing grief “does little for our shared democratic futures” but, on the 
contrary, “may even feed a certain left melancholy” (Honig 2013, 55). This 
                                       
132 Honig’s broader framework of critique relates to Butler’s interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone in 
Butler’s Antigone’s Claim (2000). 
133 I will explicate these concepts in section 4.4 as part of my analysis concerning Butler’s critique of 
Arendt’s notion of action. 
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argument has also been recently made by McIvor, who maintains that to the 
extent that Butler theorizes precariousness and grievability “at the level of 
abstract, universal humanism” (McIvor 2012, 430), she neglects the concrete 
practices of politics “within the discursive space of the polis” and thus ends 
up “endlessly” reiterating “the scene of melancholic subjugation” (ibid., 410). 
 
Given that Butler often discusses grievability in the context of her theoriza-
tion of shared vulnerability and precariousness, it is easy to see why critics 
have interpreted Butler’s account of grief in terms of an abstract, existential-
ist or universalist ethics. However, another line of interpretation has empha-
sized that when Butler’s account of grievability is brought to the context of 
her discussion of “critique,” her ethico-political notion of (critical) action in 
the context of precarity becomes visible. Fiona Jenkins, for example, has 
stressed that in order to fully understand Butler’s notion of political contesta-
tion that lies, she argues, at the heart of her theorization of grief and mourn-
ing, her account of grievability must be read through her Foucauldian notion 
of “critique” (Jenkins 2015, 130).  
 
According to Jenkins, Butler’s notion of grievability does not point to the ab-
stract conception of the universal ethics of grieving (as Honig and others 
have argued), but actually to the possibility to disrupt through political ac-
tion and contestation the nationalist frameworks through which the regula-
tion of the public remembrance of death often takes place (Jenkins 2015, 121; 
see also Lloyd 2015, 178–180). In this sense, Butler’s account of grievability 
could be read as a critique of “the nationalism of grieving,” and, more gener-
ally, as a questioning of (especially US’s and Israel’s) nationalism and the na-
tion-state (Jenkins 2015, 121; see also, for example, FW, 26–28).134 
Following Jenkins, I argue that the problem of grievability is intertwined 
with questions of political action and contestation in Butler’s work. However, 
I contend that by reading Butler’s theorization of grievability through her 
discussion of “critique” it becomes possible to view her “ethics of grievability” 
in terms of her larger theoretical project, that is, her account of the twofold 
notion of norms. This reading, I argue, has important implications for the 
way we come to view Butler’s notion of political resistance. In the next two 
sections, I will elaborate further on these questions. 
 
 
                                       
134 For more on the critique of US nationalism, see Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s jointly 
published Who Sings the Nation-State? (2007). Given that Butler’s book Parting Ways: A Critique of 
Zionism (2012) puts forward a critical analysis of Israel’s nationalism, military violence, and occupa-
tion on Palestinian land, it, too, can be considered a critique of nationalism. In the introduction to the 
book, Butler also characterizes her effort to theorize ethics beyond the assumption of “sovereignty” in 
terms of a critique of nationalism (see, for example, PW, 9). 
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4.3 Critique of norms as a practice of resistance 
 
What Honig and other critics overlook is that Butler concludes both Precari-
ous Life and Frames of War (books that explicitly deal with the question of 
grief) by addressing the role of critique in relation to the possibility of re-
sistance. At the end of Precarious Life Butler returns, while discussing the 
civil victims of the US war in Afghanistan, to the problem of what is the rela-
tionship between violence and the prohibition against the public grieving of 
“ungrievable” deaths. Butler asks, “How does the prohibition on grieving 
emerge as a circumscription of representability, so that our national melan-
cholia becomes tightly fitted into the frame for what can be said, what can 
be shown?” (PL, 148, my emphasis). “Is this not,” she continues, “the site 
where we can read […] the way that melancholia becomes inscribed as the 
limits of what can be thought?” (ibid., my emphasis). Indeed, it is precisely 
the normative limits of representability (i.e. the question of whose lives count 
as grievable and whose not) and of “what can be thought” that Butler seeks to 
challenge with her account of grievability. I argue that it is for this reason 
that Butler brings up the idea of “critique” at the end of these books. In order 
to expose these normative limits, the task is, as Butler puts it, 
 
to reinvigorate the intellectual projects of critique, of questioning, of 
coming to understand the difficulties and demands of cultural transla-
tion and dissent, and to create a sense of the public in which opposi-
tional voices are […] valued for the instigation to a sensate democracy 
they occasionally perform. (PL, 151, my emphasis) 
 
In the same manner, Butler ends Frames of War by calling for “a critical in-
tervention” into the norms that operate by making it difficult to “stay respon-
sive to the equal claim of the other for shelter, for conditions of livability and 
grievability” (FW, 184; see also Jenkins 2015, 130). This kind of critique, But-
ler maintains, can help us “to break with the closed circle of reflexivity” (FW, 
184) that “produces a permanent ground for legitimating (and disavowing) 
[…] violent actions” (FW, 179). Here, Butler notes that this kind of critical in-
tervention that refuses violent retribution (that she associates with the US 
military response to 9/11) can be conceived of “as a mode of resistance, espe-
cially when it refuses and breaks the frames by which war is wrought time 
and again” (FW, 184). Here, “the frames” of war refer especially to those 
norms and normative frameworks (i.e. ethnic and racist frames, see Chapter 
1 in this dissertation) that distinguish between “grievable” and “ungrievable” 
populations and establish prohibition against the public acknowledgement of 
certain deaths.  
 
I interpret Butler’s turn to the concept of “critique” as an attempt to inter-
rupt the national melancholia (or, more broadly formulated: the normative 
schemes of recognizability) through which the violence against those who are 
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already regarded as ungrievable becomes legitimized time and again. The 
task of critique emerges here as a mode of resistance against violence and, 
importantly, as a way of questioning the normative differentiation between 
grievable and ungrievable lives. In this sense, critique opens up the possibil-
ity to apprehend the “radically egalitarian character of grievability” (FW, 
183). I will come back to the question of the relationship between grievability 
and resistance in the next section. But for now, it is necessary first to expli-
cate Butler’s notion of critique, since it is, I argue, crucially related to her no-
tion of (nonviolent) resistance, as already pointed out in Chapter 1, in the 
context of Butler’s reading of Monique Wittig. Indeed, as I suggested there, 
Butler’s notion of critique can be understood as a feminist practice of nonvio-
lence. In order to emphasize Butler’s notion of critique as a form of re-
sistance, I turn now to Butler’s reading of Foucault. 
 
Butler provides her most extensive elaboration on critique in her articles 
“What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue” (2002) and “Critique, Dis-
sent, Disciplinary” (2009)135  as well as especially in those parts of Giving an 
Account of Oneself where she addresses Foucault’s later work on ethics. In 
“What is Critique?” Butler discusses Foucault’s ethics by focusing on his for-
mulation of critique as virtue.136  Notably, in her reading, Butler is specifical-
ly interested in the question of “the place of ethics within politics” (“WIC,” 
215). As Butler remarks, critique for Foucault is “a certain mode of question-
ing” and a “practice in which we pose the question of the limits of our most 
sure ways of knowing” (“WIC,” 213, 215). Butler notes that this kind of ques-
tioning is a social practice: a practice of a subject, or a quality that describes a 
certain kind of practice or action. Ethics defined in this way, as “the practice 
of critique,” differs from those formulations of ethics that seek to offer objec-
tively defined commands, imperatives, norms, rules, or laws. As Butler em-
phasizes, ethics as critique “is, more radically, a critical relation to those 
norms” (“WIC,” 215, my emphasis). In other words, the practice of critique 
can be conceived of as “a non-prescriptive form of moral inquiry” (“WIC,” 
216) that inquires not only into “the conditions by which the object field is 
constituted, but also [into] the limits of those conditions, the moments where 
they point up their contingency and their transformability” (“WIC,” 222, my 
emphasis). 
 
To the question of what motivates this kind of critical questioning Butler an-
swers that: 
  
One asks about the limits of ways of knowing because one has already 
run up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one 
                                       
135 This text partly builds on Butler’s previous text “Academic Norms, Contemporary Challenges: A 
Reply to Robert Post on Academic Freedom” (2006c). 
136 Butler has named her article after Foucault’s lecture “What is Critique?” ([1984]2002). 
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lives. The categories by which social life are ordered produce a certain 
incoherence or entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this 
condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the 
practice of critique emerges […]. (“WIC,” 215, my emphasis) 
 
Following in the footsteps of Foucault, Butler stresses in “Critique, Dissent, 
Disciplinarity” (2009) that critique does not emerge from our inherent ca-
pacity to reason as humans (as, for example, Kant would have it with his no-
tion of “practical reason”) but from “a specific historical reality and demand” 
and against a particular form of governmental authority (“CDD,” 788, 791). 
In other words, critique as a social practice can only take place in relation 
to—or as a response to—certain changing historical conditions and practices 
that seek to limit the domains of the “speakable” and “thinkable” (“CDD,” 
777). And, I would add, the domains of the “livable” and “grievable.” There-
fore, the practice of critical questioning cannot be articulated as “how to be 
radically ungovernable” but, rather, “how not to be governed” in relation to 
specific forms of governmental authorities or norms (“WIC,” 219). As she 
goes on to argue:  
 
[critique] follows, rather, from a distinct and largely contingent histor-
ical accumulation and formation of conventions that produce subjects 
who, in turn, open up a set of possibilities within that historical hori-
zon or, rather, by virtue of it. The norms that establish the modes of 
intelligibility and recognizability for a subject are themselves queried, 
called into question, and so the very social basis for the intelligibility 
of the subject is risked at the moment in which such historical norms 
are interrogated. (“CDD,” 788) 
 
Yet, the subject who engages in “risky” (cf. Foucault’s concepts of “courage” 
and parrhesia) critical practice is not external to the norms that she criticizes 
and, in this sense, the practice of critique is immanent to the field of its ap-
plication, that is, to the field of norms.137  In other words, the element of 
“risk” implies the possibility that a subject who engages in the practice of cri-
tique (i.e. takes a critical relation to norms) might become unintelligible 
within the particular frameworks of recognizability and/or normative prac-
tices that the subject puts in question. This is evident for instance in cases 
when one problematizes certain “truths” that are taken to be self-evident, 
such as when animal activists are ridiculed for their concern for nonhuman 
animals. Or, when anti-racist activists are mocked for promoting political 
correctness over free speech.  
 
                                       
137 As Butler writes, “Only with reference to this prevailing ontological horizon, itself instituted through 
a set of practices, will we be able to understand the kinds of relations to moral precepts that have been 
formed as well as those yet to be formed” (“WIC,” 216). 
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On the other hand, Butler emphasizes that the subject who undertakes the 
practice of critique is not only formed by norms and networks of power-
knowledge but that the subject also becomes, through the very process of 
formation, self-forming (“WIC,” 225). For Foucault, as Butler interprets him, 
the process of self-forming within the politics of “truth”—or, as Butler puts it, 
within “the politics of norms”—is exactly the practice that makes it possible 
for the subject to take a critical distance from authorities and norms (“WIC,” 
226). Here one can see echoes from Butler’s earlier notion of critical reflex-
ivity that she developed, as I showed in section 4.1, in the context of her read-
ing of Freud and melancholic incorporations. However, I suggest that in her 
reading of Foucault’s notion of critique Butler rethinks her previous Freudian 
notion of the prohibitive origins of subject formation (i.e. critical self-
reflectivity) through a Foucauldian understanding of critical action as an in-
ventive and disruptive aspect of our constitutive relation to norms. 
 
As Butler points out in Giving an Account of Oneself, for Foucault the ethical 
subject that is engendered by different moral injunctions is not “a self-
berating psychic agency,” like the one in Freud, but “inventive” to the extent 
that it “compels the act of self-making” that takes place “in relation to an im-
posed set of norms” (GAO, 18). In this sense, the practice of critique can be 
understood in terms of a reworking of the norms and social conventions of 
one’s formation and thus “we might […] participate in the remaking of social 
conditions” (GAO, 134–135). To highlight the aspect of inventive self-
formation, Butler distinguishes in “Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity” two in-
terrelated dimensions in Foucault’s notion of critique: i) critique as a form of 
disobedience understood “as a way of refusing subordination to an estab-
lished authority” and ii) “an obligation to produce or elaborate a self” 
(“CDD,” 787). Taken together, these aspects refer to the possibility of “inven-
tion” in the scene of subjectivating norms (i.e. the framework of recognizabil-
ity), a possibility that can be conceived of as a practice of resistance against 
authorities and, hence, a practice of freedom (“WIC,” 217–219; see also GAO, 
19 and UG, 31).138  However, this kind of conception of resistance should not 
be interpreted as a radical anarchism or original freedom but as a provisional 
                                       
138 As Jakub Franêk has noted, “freedom,” for Foucault, can be conceived of as “consist[ing] of an ac-
tive engagement in power relations” (Franêk, 2014, 303). Butler also understands Foucault’s notion of 
freedom as this kind of immanent practice. She writes, “But perhaps what [Foucault] is offering us by 
way of ‘critique’ is an act, even a practice of freedom, which cannot reduce to voluntarism in any easy 
way. For the practice by which the limits to absolute authority are set is one that is fundamentally de-
pendent on the horizon of knowledge effects within which it operates. The critical practice does not 
well up from the innate freedom of the soul, but is formed instead in the crucible of a particular ex-
change between a set of rules or precepts (which are already there) and a stylization of acts (which ex-
tends and reformulates that prior set of rules and precepts). This stylization of the self in relation to the 
rules comes to count as a ‘practice’” (“WIC,” 11). For an extensive analysis of Foucault’s notion of free-
dom, see Oksala (2005). 
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or tactical practice—as a “provisional anarchism”139—that takes a critical rela-
tion to existing authorities, norms, or codes of moral conduct (“CDD,” 791). 
 
In sum, the aim of critique in Foucault, and I would argue in Butler as well, is 
thus not to offer moral evaluations or judgments whether certain objects, 
such as social conditions, institutions, practices, forms of knowledge, or dis-
courses, are good or bad or even right or wrong, but rather to expose and 
problematize the very frameworks of evaluation and judgment itself (“WIC,” 
214). Here, critique has “a double task”: on the one hand, it exposes the nor-
mative frameworks through which the intelligibility—or, in Butler’s terms, 
recognizability—is constituted (“WIC,” 222). This happens for instance by 
asking “What is the relation of knowledge to power such that our epistemo-
logical certainties turn out to support a way of structuring the world that 
forecloses alternative possibilities of ordering?” (“WIC,” 214). But, on the 
other hand, the task is to track the breaking points and discontinuities of the 
framework, locating “the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility for 
which it stands” (“WIC,” 222). In other words, the task of critique as an ethi-
cal practice is to enact “the possibility of thinking otherwise” beyond the 
norms that govern “the thinkable” (“WIC,” 214, my emphasis).  
 
I contend that it is just this kind of ethical questioning that Butler engages in 
at the end of her essay “What is Critique?” when she poses the following set 
of familiar questions: “who will be a subject” and “what will count as a life” 
(“WIC,” 226). Or, indeed, when she asks in Precarious Life and Frames of 
War “whose lives are grievable and whose are not”? (FW, 74; see also PL, 
146). In other words, by posing these questions Butler’s ethical task is to 
broach the normative limits of “thinkable” and “speakable” and expose and 
disrupt the norms that separate “recognizable” from “unrecognizable” lives. 
To put it differently, and in contrast to Honig’s reading, to pose these kinds 
of questions is to practice ethics within politics.  
 
However, in “Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity” Butler also takes issue with 
Foucault’s notion of “self-formation” and “self-invention,” arguing that these 
concepts put too much emphasis on an individual subject, and thus on an 
“ontology of individualism” as a result of which Foucault disregards the ques-
tion of the social conditions of subjectivity and critical agency (“CDD,” 789: 
                                       
139 In a recent interview, Butler also calls herself a “provisional anarchist”: “So anarchism in the sense 
that interests me has to do with contesting the ‘legal’ dimensions of state power, and posing disturbing 
challenges about state legitimacy. The point is not to achieve anarchism as a state or as a final form for 
the political organization of society. It is a disorganizing effect which takes power, exercises power, 
under conditions where state violence and legal violence are profoundly interconnected. In this sense, 
it always has an object, and a provisional condition, but it is not a way of life or an ‘end’ in itself” (But-
ler in Heckert, 2010, 94). 
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n12; see also Schippers 2014, 134).140  Here, Butler’s critique is directed 
against Foucault’s discussion of Baudelaire’s reflections on European mo-
dernity and the aesthetics of dandyism (i.e. the “flâneur”) in “What is En-
lightenment?” In Butler’s view, Foucault puts too much emphasis on an anal-
ysis of the Baudelairean “self-crafting” subject and, therefore, overlooks his 
“idea of the crowd as a way to rethink the sociality of the subject and the 
problem of agency” (“CDD,” 789: n12, my emphasis). Critically reworking 
Foucault’s notion of “self-invention,” Butler thus asks: “Can we imagine that 
the operation of critique emerges neither from a radically unconditioned 
freedom nor from a radical act of individual will, but from a kind of jostling 
that happens in the midst of social life […]?” (ibid., my emphasis). 
 
I argue that the idea of a crowd, or more precisely an assembly, is crucial to 
understand the dimension of contestation that Butler attaches to her notion 
of critique. Therefore, and in order to fully understand the ethico-political 
implications of Butler’s account of grievability, I want now to further elabo-
rate Butler’s notion of critique by contextualizing it through her recent essay 
“Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life?” ([2012]2015).141  This reading 
strategy, I suggest, brings into relief Butler’s conception of critique as a form 
of political action and resistance. 
 
4.4 When the ungrievable amass: the ethical dilemma of 
the good life and the politics of the street 
 
In “Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life?” Butler offers a follow-up to 
Theodor Adorno’s famous claim according to which “Wrong life cannot be 
lived rightly”142 (NPTA, 193; see also Adorno, 1974, 39). For Adorno, this 
statement referred to the dilemma of posing the ethical question of how 
could one pursue a good life for oneself in the midst of systemic forms of ine-
quality and exploitation.143  Reformulating Adorno’s claim as a question—
“Can one lead a good life in a bad life?”—Butler seeks to mobilize Adorno’s 
query in our present time (NPTA, 196).  
 
                                       
140 Interestingly, in Dispossession (2013), Butler asserts that “I think Foucault makes clear that the 
crafting of the self takes place within a normative horizon […]” (DPP, 67). 
141 The essay is based on Butler’s Adorno Prize Lecture delivered in Frankfurt in 2012 and was first 
published in Radical Philosophy 176 (November / December 2012). In this chapter I refer to the essay 
as it was published (with only very minor changes) in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assem-
bly (2015). By this choice I want to emphasize the broader context of Butler’s theorizing, which is, in 
my view, her radical democratic notion of resistance and political action. 
142 “Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen” (Adorno 1951, 43). Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus 
dem beschädigten Leben. Suhrkamp, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main. 
143 Adorno wrote the book between 1944 and 1949 while living in America in exile from Nazi Germany. 
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Following Adorno, who wrestled with the tension between individual moral 
conduct and the broader relations of social power and domination, Butler 
notes that the classic moral philosophical questions of “how best to live” or 
“how ought I to act” cannot be asked in isolation from larger networks of so-
cial power. Butler argues that by posing the question of “how best to live” one 
is already negotiating the norms that regulate not only our understandings of 
“what is good, but also what is living, and what is life” (NPTA, 195). Since the 
question of the good life can only be asked by invoking certain ideas of 
“goodness,” “value,” and of “life,” Butler holds that we already have—by pos-
ing the question—arrived at the framework of biopolitics.144  She writes:  
 
The most individual question of morality—how do I live this life that is 
mine?—is bound up with biopolitical questions distilled in forms such 
as these: Whose lives matter? Whose lives do not matter as lives, are 
not recognizable as living, or count only ambiguously as alive? (NPTA, 
196) 
 
Significantly, Butler adds that in order to understand the intertwinement of 
individual morality to the broader frameworks of “livability” (see Chapter 3 
of this study), we need to turn to the question of grievability. As she main-
tains, “The biopolitical management of the ungrievable proves crucial to ap-
proaching the question, how do I lead this life?” (NPTA, 196–197).145  This is 
because the question concerning “how best to live” already presupposes that 
“there are lives to be led,” that the life of the “I” who asks the question is rec-
ognized as a grievable life, one that is mourned when lost and, therefore, also 
maintained and safeguarded so as to prevent its premature death (NPTA, 
198, emphasis in original). In other words, the possibility of posing the ques-
tion “how best to live” already presumes that one’s life is recognized as a life 
to begin with. But given that certain lives are excluded from grievable lives, 
the question itself is entangled in the very norms that contribute to the 
heightened mortality of certain populations. 
 
Referring to the work of Ruth Gilmore, Butler argues that the differential ex-
posure to early mortality that “currently characterizes the lives of subjugated 
peoples and the precarious” is often informed by systematic forms of racism 
and calculated abandonment (NPTA, 48; see also Gilmore 2007, 28). Follow-
ing Achille Mbembe, Butler calls this form of power “necropolitics” in order 
to emphasize how the normative production of “the ungrievable” does not 
                                       
144 Here, Butler defines biopolitics, following Foucault, as “those powers that organize life, even the 
powers that differentially dispose lives to precarity as part of a broader management of populations 
through governmental and nongovernmental means, and that establish a set of measures for the dif-
ferential valuation of life itself” (NPTA, 196, my emphasis). 
145 In her lecture “Grievability and Resistance” Butler called the biopolitical management of grievability 
“the demographic of grievability” (see footnote 116 in this chapter). 
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only take place through the maintenance of those considered “livable” but 
also through the creation of the “socially dead” prior to their actual destruc-
tion (NPTA, 12, 197; see also Mbembe 2003, 40).146  In other words, “mortal-
ity” in Butler’s vocabulary not only refers to the fundamental aspect of our 
shared bodily existence (i.e. vulnerability or precariousness) as for example 
Honig claims, but, more importantly, to the ways in which norms operate by 
making certain, such as racialized, populations ungrievable and thus more 
susceptible to the forms of precarity and premature death than others. 
 
Since the “first-person modality of ethical questioning” is always disrupted 
by the larger operations of power that differentiate between grievable and 
ungrievable lives, the question of “how best to live” is, for Butler, necessarily 
a political problem. It is for this reason that Butler argues that the question 
of “how best to live” is “bound up with a living practice of critique” (NPTA, 
200). As she writes: 
 
So though I must and do ask, how shall I live a good life? and this as-
piration is an important one. I have to think carefully about this life 
that is mine, that is also a broader social life that is connected with 
other living beings in ways that engage me in a critical relation to the 
discursive orders of life and value in which I live or, rather, in which I 
endeavor to live. What gives them their authority? And is that au-
thority legitimate? Since my own life is at stake in such an inquiry, the 
critique of the biopolitical order is a living issue for me, and as much 
as the potential for living a good life is at stake, so too is the struggle to 
live and the struggle to live within a just world. (NPTA, 200, my em-
phasis) 
 
Posing these Foucauldian questions, Butler thus urges us to pay attention to 
the normative presumptions grounding the question of “the good life,” since 
the question itself can operate as a normative ideal and a norm that effaces 
the differential distribution of livability and grievability—or, indeed, prema-
                                       
146 Stressing the necropolitical elements of biopolitics, Butler also deploys in her theorization of precar-
ity Orlando Patterson’s concept of “social death” by which Patterson (1982) refers to the condition of 
institutionalized marginality in his study on slavery. Acknowledging the differences between contem-
porary conditions of precarity (here Butler mentions for example “the institutionalization of neoliberal 
rationalities”) and the condition of slavery, Butler notes that it is important to differentiate between 
different modalities of social death. Yet, she defends her concept of precarity and argues that “the term 
‘precarity’ can distinguish between modes of ‘unlivability’: those who, for instance, belong to impris-
onment without recourse to due process; those who characterize living in war zones or under occupa-
tion, exposed to violence and destruction without recourse to safety or exit; those who undergo forced 
emigration and live in liminal zones, waiting for borders to open, food to arrive, and the prospect of 
living with documentation; those who mark the condition of being part of a dispensable workforce […]” 
(NPTA, 201). 
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ture death—across populations. Here, one can, for example, consider those 
who currently struggle to survive under conditions of politically and econom-
ically induced precarity, such as migrants and refugees who attempt to cross 
the Mediterranean in order to live a more livable life but who in growing 
numbers are left to die at sea. As Butler points out, the question of “how best 
to live” can work as a cruel “moral imperative” for those who actually live the 
modality of being ungrievable, “who live in a daily way within a collapsed 
temporal horizon, suffering a sense of damaged future in the stomach and in 
the bones” (NPTA, 201). She continues, “How can one ask” in these condi-
tions “how best to lead a life […]?” Recalling that Butler’s theorization of liv-
ability is based on the idea of the equal value of precarious lives, the moral 
question concerning “how best to live” should thus be understood in light of 
this normative commitment. 
 
Discussing Butler’s ethical notion of grievability, Drew Walker argues that 
“although Butler’s insistence on the grievability of all lives as an ethical ideal 
for politics seems to difficult to dispute” Butler, in his view, fails to consider 
“the ways that her ‘dehumanized’ others do in fact appear in the public 
realm, and the possibility that this analysis itself devalues the struggle of 
those whose lives are read as derealised and spectral” (Walker 2015, 145). 
While it is true that in Precarious Life, for example, Butler often describes 
those populations that are rendered as “socially dead” and “ungrievable” as 
only “spectrally” marking the limit of the (melancholic) public sphere, in her 
reading of Adorno it becomes clear that this is only one dimension of her ar-
gument regarding grievability. I argue that another dimension is the struggle 
of the “ungrievable.” Indeed, Butler states that “the question of the biopoliti-
cal management of grievability” becomes most urgent for those who actively 
live the condition of ungrievability (NPTA, 196–197). 
 
Here, Butler performs an interesting shift of perspective. While she has pre-
viously focused mainly on the normative differentiation between grievable 
and ungrievable lives from the perspective of the normative regulation of 
public grief, she now also underscores the viewpoint of “the ungrievable” who 
actively live, sense, and experience the condition of being ungrievable at the 
present moment (NPTA, 197).147  This change of perspective, I think, allows 
Butler to place a stronger emphasis on the ways in which those who have 
been excluded from the normative frameworks of grievability nonetheless 
resist contemporary operations of power. 
 
Worth noting here is that the original version of the essay “Can One Lead a 
Good Life in a Bad Life?” that was published as her “Adorno Prize Lecture” is 
divided into two sections: the first is entitled “Biopolitics: the ungrievable” 
                                       
147 Butler writes, “If it turns out that I have no certainty that I will have food or shelter, or that no social 
network or institution would catch me if I fall, then I come to belong to the ungrievable” (NPTA, 197). 
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and the second “Resistance” (see Butler 2012, 10, 16). Given that Adorno re-
solved the dilemma concerning the good life by arguing that the moral ques-
tion needs to be rearticulated as a task of resistance against the “bad life” 
(see, for example Adorno 2002, 167–168), Butler’s choice of dividing her es-
say into the topics of grievability and resistance seems to mirror Adorno’s 
reasoning.148  Similarly as Adorno, and out of the insight that one’s “own” life 
is connected to and made possible by the broader conditions of life that regu-
late grievability, Butler reasons that one “must become critical” of the une-
qual conditions of life and struggle against them, indeed, as I quoted earlier, 
“struggle to live within a just world” (NPTA, 199–200). 
 
However, although Butler seems to partly accept Adorno’s conclusion that 
the pursuit of the good life in a bad life (i.e. for Butler: the biopolitical and 
normative management of the ungrievable) must lead to the practices of cri-
tique and resistance, she ultimately rejects Adorno’s definition of resistance. 
For Adorno, the motivation and resources for resistance seems to be generat-
ed through the social critique by “the most progressive minds” (NPTA, 215–
216; see also Adorno 2002, 167–168). As Butler remarks, “it seems that 
Adorno appoints himself to the elect group of those who are progressive and 
capable enough to conduct critical activity that must be pursued” (NPTA, 
216). Contra Adorno’s narrow understanding of resistance, Butler defends a 
notion of “popular resistance,” which she conceives as “forms of critique that 
take shape as bodies amass on the street to articulate their opposition to 
contemporary regimes of power” (NPTA, 216, my emphasis). Interestingly, to 
highlight resistance as a “popular resistance” Butler turns in the end of the 
essay to Arendt’s conception of action. 
 
Whereas Honig claims, as I showed in the section 4.3, that Butler completely 
neglects Arendt’s notion of political action, other scholars have observed, 
paradoxically, similarities between them. For example, Elene Loizidou has 
pointed out that despite the differences in their theoretical approaches “we 
can even trace Butler’s understanding of the political in terms of resistance in 
Arendt’s thought” (Loizidou 2007, 131). Although I agree that Butler partly 
relies on Arendt’s notion of resistance, in order to better fathom out this reli-
ance I argue that we also have to pay attention to the fact that Butler actually 
problematizes certain key elements of Arendtian conception of political ac-
tion. Indeed, throughout her work, Butler has contested what she sees as a 
problematic division between the public and the private spheres in Arendt’s 
notion of action (see, for example, AC, 81–82; PW, 174; NPTA, 44, 206–207; 
Butler 2016, 14). 
 
                                       
148 As Butler notes, Adorno’s query about “how to pursue the good life in a bad life culminates in the 
claim that there must be resistance to the bad life in order to pursue the good life” (NPTA, 215). 
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In The Human Condition ([1958]1998), in the context of her discussion of 
the Greek polis, Arendt distinguishes the public sphere (the polis) from the 
private sphere and defines it as the political sphere, that is, “the realm of 
speech and action” and “the realm free of necessity” (Arendt [1958]1998, 27–
32). Whereas the political sphere, for her, can be identified in terms of free-
dom and equality, the private sphere (the sphere of household and family, or 
“the social sphere”) refers to the realm of necessity and survival, since its 
primary function is to reproduce and maintain life by satisfying bodily needs 
for food and sleep for example (ibid., 28). Along these lines of necessity and 
freedom, Arendt differentiates three categories that describe “the general 
condition of human existence”: labor, work, and action (ibid., 8, 73). While 
labor refers both to individual survival and to the survival of the human spe-
cies, work designates the activity through which humans create material 
products and artifacts (ibid., 8). For Arendt, these activities belong to the 
private sphere and, though encompassing the crucial dimensions of being 
human, cannot be understood as properly political.  
 
In contrast to labor and work, only action can realize the human potentiality 
for freedom and independency, which is activated by coming together and 
speaking together (i.e. “acting in concert”) within the public “space of ap-
pearances” (ibid., 13, 178, 198). Arendt illustrates her notion of action 
through her concept of “natality,” which characterizes political action as a 
practice of freedom that, just like the act of being born, creates something 
new into the world (ibid., 9). Further, action is in this sense also “plural,” for 
every actor—though belonging to the same species—is a unique person and 
brings this uniqueness into the sphere of political participation (ibid., 7–8). 
For Arendt, political action is thus something that differentiates human lives 
(bios politikos) from other animals (zoë) (Arendt 1978, 20). 
 
Since the distinction between the public and private spheres has historically 
been used to legitimize certain exclusions from politics (in the context of 
Greek polis: specifically women, slaves, children, and those considered as 
“barbarians”), Arendt’s distinction has been a subject of ongoing debates in 
feminist interpretations of Arendt for decades (see, for example, Honkasalo 
2016a). Also Butler challenges Arendt’s conceptual distinction between the 
public and the private as well as between the social and the political. Given 
that the distinguishing of humans from animals indicates a movement from 
mere survival and dependency (“necessity”) to the sphere of political action 
understood as public speech, Butler is especially critical of Arendt’s anthro-
pocentric notion of the human (NPTA, 133, 207–208; see also PW, 174). Re-
calling that Butler defines “humans” in terms of human animals that are de-
pendent—as precarious lives—on normative and physical conditions of liva-
bility (see my Chapter 3), it does not come as a surprise that she takes issue 
with Arendt’s humanist understanding of political action as separated from 
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the questions of “mere” survival and bodily needs.149  In this sense, Butler’s 
idea of the mutual interdependency of humans and animals alike radically 
challenges Arendtian conception of action. Butler writes: 
 
If action is defined as independent, implying a fundamental difference 
from dependency, then our self-understanding as actors is predicated 
upon a disavowal of those living and interdependent relations upon 
which our lives depend. If we are political actors who seek to establish 
the importance of ecology, the politics of the household, health care, 
housing, global food politics, and demilitarization, then it would seem 
that the idea of the human and creaturely life that supports our efforts 
will be one that overcomes the schism between acting and interde-
pendency. (NPTA, 44–45)150 
 
In other words, for Butler, political action becomes possible only through the 
conditions of livability and survivability that provides the necessary support 
for action. In her recent article “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance” 
(2016), Butler elaborates on this idea further by noting that action is not 
thinkable in isolation of the “norms” that “constitute the intersubjective and 
infrastructural conditions for livable life” and, therefore, we cannot think of 
action as something that “overcome[s] these prior and constituting dimen-
sions of social normativity” (Butler 2016, 19; see also NPTA, 148). In light of 
Butler’s critique, the problem with Arendt’s notion of action is, then, that it 
normatively excludes—and thus depoliticizes—those struggles that seek to 
challenge the norms that make the conditions of life—or, indeed the condi-
tions of the good life—unlivable for those regarded as “ungrievable.” 
 
However, despite the fact that Butler strongly criticizes Arendt’s humanist 
presuppositions, she nevertheless draws upon her notion of “concerted ac-
tion” in order to rethink political resistance in terms of embodied plurality in 
the form of a public assembly. Whereas for Arendt public speech is the 
cornerstone of political action, for Butler already the gathering of people on 
the street or in the square or in other types of public space—and their bodily 
gestures of movement, stillness, refusal to move, silence, singing, chanting—
represents embodied political action and resistance (NPTA, 11, 88–89, 218; 
see also WSN, 62–64).151  Here, Butler invokes specifically Arendt’s concep-
                                       
149 For a critical analysis of Arendt’s notion of the body, see also, for example, Zerilli (1995) and Pulk-
kinen (2003). 
150 Butler even calls her critical rejoinder to Arendt’s notion of political action (and that of “co-
habitation”) as a “an ecological supplement to Arendt’s anthropocentrism” (NPTA, 133). 
151 It should be noted that Butler stresses emphatically that the public sphere is also conditioned and 
framed by media representations as well as “constituted in part through sites of forcible sequestering” 
and therefore “the borders that define the public are also those that define the confined, the seques-
tered, the imprisoned, the expelled, and the disappeared” (NPTA, 167, 172). Here, she refers to Angela 
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tion of “the right to have rights” which Butler conceives as a practice of re-
sistance that performatively enacts the very rights that have been denied for 
those (in Arendtian framework: refugees and the stateless) who nevertheless 
lay claim (through “citing”) to the rights of political participation and belong-
ing (NPTA, 48–49, 81–83; WSNS, 65; see also Arendt 1973, 296). 
 
It is in this context that Butler connects most clearly the question of grieva-
bility to resistance. In the end of “Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life?” 
Butler argues that by coming together and gathering in public demonstra-
tions, “the ungrievable” mark “their demand to live a life prior to death” 
(NPTA, 217, emphasis in original). Butler illustrates this in her essay “Bodies 
in Alliance and the Politics of the Street” (also included in Notes Toward a 
Performative Theory of Assembly): 
 
[I]n the public demonstrations that often follow from acts of public 
mourning—as often occurred in Syria before half of its populations be-
come refugees, where crowds of mourners became targets of military 
destruction—we can see how the existing public space is  
seized by those who have no existing right to gather there, […]. In-
deed, it is their right to gather, free of intimidation and the threat of 
violence […]. To attack those bodies is to attack the right itself, since 
when those bodies appear and act, they are exercising a right outside, 
against, and in the face of the regime. (NPTA, 82–83)152 
 
Another timely example of these kinds of gatherings is the continuous peace-
ful demonstrations in Helsinki where hundreds of asylum seekers and pro-
immigration and anti-racist activists gather together in the city’s main 
squares as well as in the Helsinki Vantaa Airport to protest against Finland’s 
tightened immigration policy and the forcible deportations of asylum seek-
ers. Or, when refugees, migrants, and activists throughout Europe have as-
sembled together carrying signs saying “refugees welcome” to demonstrate 
                                                                                                            
Davis, whose work (see, for example, Davis 2003 & 2017) has clearly demonstrated the relationship 
between structural racism and imprisonment in the US, for example. For this reason, Butler is also 
mindful of the practices of resistance that do not take place in the visible and actual public sphere or on 
the street but in such places as prisons, refugee camps, or detainment centers (e.g. hunger strikes). As 
Butler notes, the very freedom to gather “is haunted by the possibility of imprisonment” (NTPA, 173; 
see also Butler 2016, 20). Therefore, the critical question remains: “[…] what will be the public space 
and who will be admitted to public assembly”? (NTPA, 173). 
152 Notably, Butler’s Arendtian idea of “the right to have rights” flashes already in Excitable Speech, 
when she comments on one of the most symbolic moments of the Civil Rights Movement as follows: 
“When Rosa Parks sat in the front of the bus, she had no prior right to do so guaranteed by any of the 
segregationist conventions of the South. And yet, in laying claim to the right for which she had no prior 
authorization, she endowed a certain authority on the act, and began the insurrectionary process of 
overthrowing those established codes of legitimacy” (ES, 147, emphasis in original). 
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against the strengthening of EU borders and the rising anti-immigration 
movements and far-right parties. In May 2017, for example, activists gath-
ered in Milan’s Piazza della Scala to protest against the EU border policies 
that contribute to the deaths of migrant and refugee populations in the Medi-
terranean.  
 
In Butler’s terms, this kind of political action can be considered “a way of 
enunciating and enacting value in the midst of a biopolitical scheme that 
threatens to devalue such populations” (NTPA, 208, my emphasis).153  In this 
way, the “right to have rights”—which in Butler’s framework can be under-
stood, I would suggest, as the “right for a livable and grievable life”—comes 
into being when bodies amass and protest against violent regimes, deadly 
borders, and the heightened forms of precarity. In other words, for Butler, 
the plural and embodied enactment of “equal grievability” is a form of critical 
resistance that disrupts the norms that attempt to set up frontiers between 
grievable and ungrievable lives. 
 
4.5 Conclusion: ethics as political practice 
 
In this chapter I have discussed Butler’s account of grief by tracing it to her 
interpretation of Freud’s notion melancholia and to her early discussion of 
the psychic incorporation of norms. As I have shown, this early discussion 
where she merges the Freudian notion of melancholia with Foucault’s ac-
count of normalization lays the groundwork for her later theorization of the 
differential distribution of grievability. Already in this early reading Butler 
seeks to articulate the psychic forms of critical reflexivity that can be put in 
the service of critical resistance against the norms that regulate whose lives 
count as grievable lives. As I have demonstrated, the aspect of critique is also 
significant in Butler’s later work on the ethics of grievability, which should 
not be understood as an account of existential mortality, as Honig and others 
have claimed, but as a political problem concerning the biopolitical and ne-
cropolitical production of ungrievable populations.  
                                       
153 For Butler, this kind of “acting together” can also be considered a spatiotemporal expression and 
exercise of provisional forms of “popular sovereignty” that can potentially be revolutionary (see, for 
example, NPTA, 16, 160–163, 171). Notably, although Butler notes that also lynch mobs, anti-Semitic, 
racist, or fascist congregations could be understood as public gatherings, she underscores that the aim 
of her radical democratic notion of assembly is not simply to endorse any kinds of “surging multitudes” 
but to enact solidarity between precarious groups in order to “establish more sustaining conditions of 
livability in the face of systematically induced precarity and forms of racial destitution” (183). Bearing 
this in mind, I suggest that Butler’s notion of “assembly” has to be thought of in terms of the principle 
of the equal value of life, an ethical principle that strongly calls into question any kind of effort that 
seeks to limit the “livable life” only to certain kinds of groups or communities (such as forms of nation-
al belonging). 
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Through my discussion on Butler’s reading of Foucault’s notion of critique, 
Adorno’s reflections on the good life, and Arendt’s conception of action, I 
have emphasized Butler’s notion of grievability in terms of her conception of 
critique as resistance. When Butler’s account of grief and mourning are 
brought to her broader theorization of norms—to her notion of norms as a 
mechanism of social power and as the conditions and modes of social 
change—her ethics of grievability becomes visible as an intervention into the 
contemporary power relations that regulate the recognizability of losses. In 
contrast to recent criticisms that Butler’s account of grievability represents a 
turn away from politics, I contend that it should instead be understood as a 
theorization that seeks to make radical political contestation possible. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study I provide the first systematic analysis of Judith Butler’s theori-
zation of social norms. My central argument is that Butler’s theorization of 
norms must be understood in light of what I here call her twofold notion of 
norms. As my examination of Butler’s discussion of norms demonstrates 
through four thematic chapters, Butler conceives norms, first, as mecha-
nisms of social power that produce the field of what can be regarded as so-
cially recognizable subjects, bodies, lives, and deaths. In this first instance, 
norms, such as gender norms and racializing norms, distinguish between 
what Butler calls “livable” and “unlivable lives,” exposing those populations 
to negligence and heightened violence that do not fit the contemporary 
standards of what counts as a valuable life. In this study I examine the vio-
lent effects of norms by addressing Butler’s critique of the US war on terror, 
her problematization of the pathologization of trans lives, as well as her criti-
cal discussion of the necropolitical production of ungrievable populations. In 
addition, my study extends Butler’s critique of norms to the question of ani-
mals as well and exposes the process through which certain animals are 
normatively produced as killable lives. 
 
Secondly, throughout this study, I show that in order to understand Butler’s 
account of norms, we also have to look carefully at the other sense of her no-
tion of norms. That is, the possibility of change and resistance. Even though 
she finds, much in line with Michel Foucault, norms as constitutive and ena-
bling characters of social life, my study elucidates that by conceptualizing 
norms in terms of social temporality (i.e. repetititon and “iterability”) and 
action, Butler is able to theorize transformation as a crucial dimension of 
norms. By highlighting both aspects of Butler’s approach to norms my study 
constitutes an original contribution to previous Butler scholarship that has 
tended to overemphasize Butler’s theorization of norms as a theorization of 
violence: more specifically, as an account of “ontological,” “transcendental,” 
or even “fundamental violence.” In contrast to such readings, this study es-
tablishes Butler as first and foremost a theorist of critical agency and re-
sistance. 
 
The four chapters of the study highlight Butler’s twofold approach to norms 
through a discussion of the following problematics: Butler’s critical debt to 
Monique Wittig’s notion of discursive violence; Butler’s critique of gender 
normalization in the context of her discussion of trans lives; her problemati-
zation of anthropocentrism; and her discussion of grievability as a politics of 
resistance. Each chapter thus examines a particular problematic related to 
mechanisms of social power as well as violence. Taken together, the chapters 
provide a systematic analysis and a sustained discussion of Butler’s response 
to social norms. 
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I began my study by establishing Gender Trouble as the textual source in 
which Butler first begins to develop her notion of norms through her discus-
sion of Wittig’s conception of discursive violence. Although the book has pro-
voked extensive debates in the field of feminist and queer studies, Butler’s 
Wittigian background has remained a highly marginal topic in secondary lit-
erature. My study challenges mainstream interpretations of Gender Trouble 
by arguing that Butler’s notion of the binary notion of gender as a violent 
norm appears first in the context of her critical reading of Wittig’s argument. 
As I show, for Wittig, the system of heterosexuality as well as the categories 
of sex and gender can be understood as forms of discursive violence.  
 
Contesting the common readings that take Butler to be merely debunking 
Wittig’s ideas, I claim that, on the contrary, Butler in fact draws from Wittig’s 
work on discursive violence. Inquiring into Butler’s early reading of Wittig is 
important for two major reasons. First, it makes visible Butler’s feminist the-
oretical background from which her notion of norms originally emerges. Se-
cond, a thorough analysis of Butler’s deployment of Wittig’s conception of 
discursive violence makes it clear that although Butler builds on Wittig’s 
work, she does not accept her claim that the categories of sex and gender, or 
the social system of normative heterosexuality, are violent in essence. My de-
tailed explication elucidates that instead, Butler complicates Wittig’s argu-
ment by reading it through her own notion of social norms understood as re-
petitive—performative—bodily practices. This tactic allows Butler to theorize 
how gender might be done differently. Making visible Butler’s critical adop-
tion of Wittig’s notion of discursive violence further clarifies that contrary to 
the readings that emphasize Butler as a theorist of ontological violence, Gen-
der Trouble already exemplifies a twofold approach to norms.  
 
While Butler’s interpretation of Wittig lays the groundwork for her under-
standing of norms as both mechanisms of violence as well as modes of social 
change/critical agency, the theorization of norms is developed further in her 
later critique of the pathologization of gender, especially in Undoing Gender. 
Although Butler here still conceives of the binary norm of gender as a form of 
violence, her discussion of trans lives makes it evident that her overall theo-
rization on gender is motivated by an aim to show that the gender binary is 
not fixed but is open to rearticulation. In my study, I propose that Butler’s 
reflections on trans embodiment and trans autonomy throws into stark relief 
her conception of norms not only as violent mechanisms of power but, im-
portantly, also as mechanisms of transformation.  
 
As becomes clear from my analysis of Butler’s understanding of gender self-
determination (that is, the right to “choose” one’s gender), gender norms do 
not work on our bodies as if we were mere passive targets of their normaliz-
ing functions. On the contrary, the norms and their normalizing effects are 
actively embodied and lived. Although gender norms work forcefully in the 
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sense that they mark only certain kinds of bodies (often only heterosexual 
and normatively gendered bodies) as valuable and livable, embodying norms 
is always a negotiation with power. Sometimes the negotiation can risk one’s 
life, leading to an unlivable life: to forms of exclusion, discrimination, un-
wanted pathologization and even criminalization and violence. However, ne-
gotiation with norms, including gender norms, also makes possible a form of 
conditioned, critical agency. The example that Butler repeats throughout her 
work is the way in which the original gender assignment—one given at 
birth—can be rejected, revised, and even reassigned. This is clearly evident in 
the complex and diverse ways in which gender is currently lived and chal-
lenged across the trans and genderqueer spectrum. 
 
In the context of Butler’s discussion of trans embodiment, I develop a new 
concept, namely, trans livability to illustrate the twofold operation of norms. 
By the concept of trans livability I not only foreground Butler’s twofold con-
ception of norms in the context of her work on gender norms, but my concept 
also opens a novel interpretative angle to previous commentary literature 
that has overlooked Butler’s contribution to transgender theorization. By 
providing a multifaceted analysis of Butler’s discussion of trans lives, my 
study stresses the significance of this topic for her overall theorization of 
norms. Considering the theoretical width of Butler’s analysis of gender 
pathologization and trans embodiment, as well as the passionate, ethical tone 
of her writings on this particular issue, I contend that it deserves as much 
scholarly attention as her other, more recognized, major topics such as gen-
der performativity. In sum, my explication of Butler’s discussion on trans 
lives suggests that her twofold notion of norms can be conceived of as a trans 
affirmative contribution to feminist theory. 
 
As has been extensively discussed in the secondary literature, Butler’s more 
recent work is characterized in particular by the problem of “livability.” In 
recent writings, Butler addresses ethical and political questions regarding the 
unequal distribution of bodily exposure to violence and mortality across dif-
ferent populations, a condition that she terms “precarity.” The predominant 
interpretative approach to Butler’s work on precarity has been to discuss it 
through the question of “the human,” that is, the question of who counts as 
normatively human and who does not. Many scholars have analyzed this 
problematic, particularly in close connection with Butler’s critique of the US 
War on Terror and Israeli state violence against the Palestinian population in 
occupied territories. Scholars have attempted to analyze these topics with in-
terpretative notions such as Butler’s “new corporeal humanism,” “mortalist 
humanism,” “the political philosophy of the human,” and “the political prob-
lem of the human.”  
 
My study departs from these interpretative strategies and suggests a different 
approach. I contend that even though Butler discusses the different ways in 
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which “the human” is produced, she does not accept it as a point of departure 
for theorizing ethics or politics. Nor is her aim to include more lives into the 
universal category of “the human.” Instead, as my interpretation under-
scores, she seeks to interrupt the whole category. For Butler, “the human” is 
a normative category that regulates what we come to recognize as precarious 
lives. My reading illustrates that Butler actually moves from the framework 
of the human to theorize more broadly the normative conditions of life and 
the regulative power through which destroying certain lives comes to be 
viewed as more legitimate—or even necessary—than destroying others. My 
discussion of Butler’s notion of livability demonstrates that upon closer read-
ing, by this move Butler in fact calls anthropocentrism into question and ex-
plicitly includes animals into her conception of precarious lives. 
 
Unfortunately, however, Butler does not elaborate to any great extent on the 
theoretical—and indeed ethical and political—implications of her intriguing 
move for her overall critique of norms. Instead, she leaves the question of 
“the animal” aside, or leaves it for others to pursue. For this reason, by build-
ing on Butler’s discussion on livability, which rests on a rejection of anthro-
pocentrism, I provide a critical development of Butler’s twofold approach to 
norms. My analysis thus makes use of and further develops Butler’s argu-
ment that norms not only operate through incorporation and embodiment 
but also by normatively establishing the broader conditions of life only for 
those kinds of beings that are recognized as valuable. 
 
My study elucidates this aspect of norms by problematizing the prevalent and 
naturalized differentiation between companion animals and food animals. By 
exposing this distinction as normatively constituted I engage in a critical 
scrutiny of the norms that rationalize the violent mass killing of certain ani-
mals within the widespread practice of industrialized slaughter. My analysis 
points out particularly the norms that regulate our eating practices and the 
norms that anchor our ethical responsiveness only to the suffering of those 
animals that are regarded as our companions. Through the concept of killa-
bility I offer a critical rejoinder to Butler’s concept of “livability.” 
 
By bringing Butler’s account of norms in dialogue with critical animal stud-
ies, my reading establishes a new analytical framework to previous scholarly 
analyses that have prioritized the anthropocentric framework of “the human” 
in their interpretations of livability. When anthropocentricism is questioned 
as a self-evident interpretative framework to discuss Butler’s notion of liva-
bility, her critique of norms becomes discernible as a more radical interven-
tion into current power relations than previous interpretations allow. The 
significance of my analysis thus lies in bringing Butler’s critique of norms to 
bear on animal ethics. In this way, my study opens a path to theorize a more 
inclusive notion of ethics, one that stays responsive not only to humans but 
also to other animals. 
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Finally, my elaboration on livability is followed by a discussion of a related 
problematic in Butler’s work: the question of grievability. My concluding ex-
amination provides a sustained response to a recent criticism by scholars 
who have claimed that Butler’s turn to the ethics of grieving in her more re-
cent work compromises her notion of political contestation and shrinks it in-
to a sentimentalist politics of feeling. I claim instead that when Butler’s dis-
cussion of grief is brought to the broader framework of her twofold approach 
to norms, it becomes visible as a theorization of political contestation. As my 
examination demonstrates, the question of grievability runs through Butler’s 
oeuvre and is not something to which she only turns in her later work on eth-
ics. On the contrary, already in her early reading of Freud’s notion of melan-
cholia Butler politicizes grief by asking what kinds of deaths become socially 
recognizable as grievable losses and whose deaths disappear from view.  
 
As becomes clear from my analysis, Butler’s more recent critique of different 
forms of state violence (such as the war on terror) continues the politicization 
of grief by interrogating the differential distribution of grievability and early 
mortality across populations. To emphasize the political implications of But-
ler’s discussion of grievability I read it through her Foucauldian notion of cri-
tique, her critical deployment of Adorno’s conception of resistance, and final-
ly, her interpretation of Arendt’s notion of concerted action. My reading 
strategy articulates Butler’s theorization of grievability as a question of cri-
tique and resistance. In other words, I conceive Butler’s ethics of grievability 
as an intervention into the contemporary power relations that regulate the 
recognizability of losses. In contrast to critiques according to which Butler’s 
account of grievability represents a turn away from politics, my analysis 
demonstrates that it should instead be understood as a theorization that dis-
closes radical possibilities for political contestation. 
 
Taken together, all the four chapters of my dissertation illuminate Butler’s  
theorization of norms as a practice of feminist critique. By explicating the re-
lationship between norms, violence, and social change, my study emphasizes 
the close relationship between feminist and queer practices of political re-
sistance and the critique of norms. Only by paying careful attention to the 
ways in which norms differentiate between livable and unlivable lives, can we 
provide effective ways to contest the current power relations that support on-
ly certain lives at the expense of others. 
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